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PREFACE

Anthony Trollope's biting satire of London's establishment, The Way We 
X J  L Live Now (1875), turns on a monstrous railroad scheme and a conti­
nental financier, allowing the author to display the layers of hypocrisy in 
the pretensions of birthright, capital wealth, and political power. The rail­
road world also acts as the mise-en-scene of Emile Zola's La bete humaine 
(1890), a setting that credibly intertwines murder, corrupt justice, and politi­
cal manipulation. The final scene of a runaway train evinces Zola's view of 
humanity's helplessness in the face of vast industrial power. And when, in the 
aftermath of the 1873 stock-market crash, German politicians needed a figure 
to absorb the public fury over stock swindles, the preeminent choice was the 
German railroad magnate Bethel Henry Strousberg, whose collapsed railroad 
empire symbolized the unscrupulous greed of the modern age. Whether in fic­
tion or in actual deed, the politics of building railroads gripped the minds of 
nineteenth-century Europeans. The unprecedented share capital, the magni­
tude of profit, and the interpenetration of railroad capitalism with state power 
and ruling elites did indeed change "the way we live now." 
The current work, too, examines the politics of making money in the rail­
road industry. Centering on the relationship of railroad entrepreneurs with 
the Prussian state during the industry's critical phase of growth and consoli­
dation, this study presents how a capitalist economy was established within 
a political system stamped by Prussian conservatism. It provides a new view 
of business politics by exploring the political practices of railroad business­
men, who, in their aim to profit from Germany's largest industrial sector, both 
struggled against and cooperated with the Prussian state. The business poli­
tics of the railroad industry played a critical role in German political culture, 
state building, and bourgeois civil society. For this reason, as the introductory 
chapter will make clear, this political history of business elites contributes 
to a number of current discussions. By cutting across the customary bound­
aries of business, economic, and political history, this book illuminates how 
business elites' search for a "mutual accommodation" between capital and 
political authority affected the political development of the Prussian-German 
nation-state. 
This study consists of eight chapters. The opening chapter poses the prob­
lem and presents the historiographical context. I have endeavored to provide 
ix 
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an informative overview for readers not conversant with the problem of Ger­
man exceptionalism or with the influential works that have framed the dis­
cussions of nineteenth-century political economy. In providing access to this 
well-developed body of literature for scholars not specializing in German his­
tory, this study hopes to sharpen future comparative studies on entrepreneurs 
and statebuilding. Chapters 2, 3, and 7 are narrative chapters that provide 
a chronological analysis of government-business relations over forty years. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are thematic chapters, focusing on specific issues of rail­
road politics regarding government regulation, joint-stock banking, and state 
railroad finance. The final chapter offers a synoptic conclusion, while briefly 
discussing the ramifications of railroad nationalization in 1879. The book sur­
veys railroad politics throughout Prussia but devotes substantial attention to 
the Rhineland owing to available repositories of private railroad companies. 
I have incurred numerous debts of gratitude while researching and writ­
ing this book, and it gives me great pleasure to acknowledge them. I am 
especially grateful to the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), 
which launched the project with a summer grant and subsequently provided a 
year-long research stipend. I also thank the International Research Exchange 
Board (IREX), which facilitated six months of research in the former Ger­
man Democratic Republic, enabling me to mine systematically the files of 
the Prussian Trade Ministry. A generous research grant from the Univer­
sity of Delaware brought me back to German archives in 1993 and 1995, for 
which I am appreciative. The archivists at the former Zentrales Staatsarchiv 
in Merseburg were extremely accommodating during my long stay, and I fur­
ther thank Dr. Eberhard Illner and the fine staff at the Historisches Archiv der 
Stadt Koln for their unstinting cooperation. Alfred and Irmgard Eschweiler, 
Ralph and Ulrike Verch, Dr. Jorg-Werner Kremp, Martina Frey, Dr. Gerhard 
Eschweiler, Professor Silke von der Emde, Professor Bert Wachsmuth, Herr 
Doktor and Frau Doktor von der Emde, and Horst and Margret Wachsmuth 
were all instrumental with their assistance and friendship during my research 
visits. The cooperation that numerous librarians extended to me at the Ber­
lin Staatsbibliothek, Cologne's Universitatsbibliothek, Indiana University, and 
the University of Delaware is also cordially acknowledged. 
There are a number of individual historians whom I wish to thank. At 
every stage of this project Otto Pflanze provided indispensable advice, editing, 
and criticism. Over the last twelve years, it has been a pleasure and a privi­
lege to draw on his enormous learning of German history. David E. Barclay, 
Eric Dorn Brose, and Geoff Eley read and commented on the manuscript, and 
their comments undoubtedly improved it. I also thank the two anonymous ref­
erees for the Ohio State University Press, who provided excellent suggestions 
for the final version. I also thank George Basalla, Lawrence Duggan, Willard 
Preface • xi 
Fletcher, and David Shearer, colleagues at the University of Delaware, whose 
concern for this book make the department of history at Delaware a pleasure 
to work in. Both as scholars and as parents, Elizabeth Bergen Brophy and 
James D. Brophy have helped over many years with sound advice and sus­
tained encouragement. Finally, my greatest thanks goes to my wife, Susan M. 
McKenna, whose indefatigable support and counsel bolstered me throughout 
the ordeal of researching and writing this book. This book is dedicated to her. 

CHAPTER ONE

Capital and Political Authority 
in German History 
The question who ought to rule . . . belongs in the realm of philosophi­cal speculation; practical politics has to do with the simple fact that it is 
power alone that can rule."l August Ludwig von Rochau's famous pronounce­
ment in 1853 marked a shift in liberal political thought. A radical democrat 
turned moderate liberal, Rochau sought to awaken the German bourgeoisie 
to the realities of state power after the failure of the revolution of 1848. The 
weakness of the constitutional movement in 1848, he argued, had been its re­
liance on right rather than might, on the irresistibility of moral idealism rather 
than on the politics of power. 
It was irrational, Rochau wrote, to expect power to subject itself to law: 
"To rule means to exercise power, and only he who possesses power can exer­
cise power."2 He dismissed as unrealistic the assumption of German idealism 
that ideas triumph when their time has come. And yet he clung to the belief 
that the middle classes would eventually triumph. State power, he maintained, 
was conditioned by the "relationship of social forces," the most important of 
which were "wealth, intelligence, and education."3 Of these, wealth would 
ultimately be decisive. "The aristocratic tie to the land as a force in the state 
has fallen," he wrote, because "landed property is more and more outweighed 
by the daily growing mass of movable capital."4 In Rochau's scheme of Real­
politik, then, it was not the moral force of liberal idealism that would clear 
the path to power but the growth of a new economic order that would compel 
Germany's rulers to yield to the interests and values of the middle classes.5 
The "Structural Continuity Thesis" 
Rochau's thoughts on social relations in the 1850s describe the beginning of 
what has now come to be called the "structural continuity thesis."6 The power 
1
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of capital to recast society and politics endowed the German business class 
with undeniable importance. The expansion of commodities, capital, and ser­
vices in regional and international networks since the 1830s was changing 
Germany into a modern market economy. The owners of factories, banks, 
insurance companies, and railways determined the investments, innovations, 
distribution of resources, and division of labor. Although they were merely 1.2 
percent of the population, the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie (bank­
ers, brokers, manufacturers, merchants, company directors, and owners of 
coal mines and iron foundries) led the industrial revolution.7 These business­
men8 were, as Friedrich Engels wrote in 1847, the "most decisive faction of 
the German bourgeoisie." Prosperity in industry, he wrote, produced in turn 
greater domestic and overseas trade, more railroads, and an expanded stock 
market. The business class and its needs, Engels believed, was the motor of 
social transformation. It "represents the needs of the entire bourgeoisie and 
all classes dependent on it."9 
For both Rochau and Engels the new business elite was also the bearer 
of a new political order. It possessed the economic means to challenge the 
political dominance of the landed aristocracy and remodel the state to accom­
modate more fully the interests of commerce and industry and the emerging 
mass society. Contrary to their expectations, however, a decisive break with 
the past never came to pass. Unprecedented economic growth converged with 
the reassertion of Prussian conservative political power, producing a "historic 
compromise" in this "age of capital."10 The decade of reaction in Prussia after 
1848 frustrated many who had hoped to achieve decisive political reforms. 
For many historians the sociopolitical attitudes of businessmen and their 
continuing links with the Prussian-German state explain how an aristocratic, 
landholding political elite retained power in Germany until 1918 in spite of the 
shrinking economic influence of agriculture. They argue that a structural con­
tinuity in the political economy of Germany explains the course of German 
history from 1848 to 1918. In 1848 the capitalist class abandoned liberal ideals, 
so the argument goes, and sought stability in the reaction of the 1850s; eco­
nomic concessions neutralized political aspirations. When liberalism revived 
in the New Era (1858-62) and the Prussian parliament rejected a military re­
form bill, setting off a constitutional conflict over the legislature's power of the 
purse (1862-66), the business class again deserted the liberal front. Following 
the military victory over Austria in 1866, businessmen formed the core of the 
new National Liberal Party, which made its peace with Bismarck's "Bonapart­
ism," accepting a new amalgam of authoritarian government, national unity, 
laissez-faire, and finance capitalism. During the depression that followed the 
crash of 1873, Bismarck scrapped free trade (1878-79) and (so it has been 
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said) "refounded the empire" with tariff laws protecting both iron and rye, 
thus securing the political alliance of Junkers and industrialists. 
In the period after Bismarck, the structural continuity argument con­
tinues, the bloc-building, lobbyist politics (Sammlungspolitik) of the 1890s 
reduced the German parliament to a brokerage house of economic interests, 
which was also parlayed into a defensive front against the rise of the Social 
Democratic Party, by 1912 the largest political party in Germany. Business­
men, furthermore, advocated Weltpolitik: colonies would bring new markets 
and cheap raw materials; battleships would sustain the growth of the heavy 
industries; and the lure of foreign glory would paper over domestic political 
strife ("social imperialism"). The advocacy of territorial annexation by major 
economic interest groups after 1911 contributed to Germany's aggressive war 
aims in 1914. The structural legacies of the Wilhelminian empire, so the thesis 
concludes, weakened the democratic forces supporting the Weimar Republic 
and thus prepared the way for the rise of the Third Reich, the Second World 
War, and the Holocaust.11 In brief, the structural continuity thesis would ex­
plain the long discussed and much debated "special path" (Sonderweg) taken 
by German history during the fateful century after 1848, from the failed revo­
lution to the founding of the Bonn republic. 
Betrayal, Alliance, Symbiosis 
To discuss the validity of this general thesis in its entirety would far exceed 
the normal limits of a single historical monograph. Instead, this study focuses 
on the early years, the four vital decades (1830-71) when the structure's foun­
dation was putatively laid. But first it is necessary to consider a number of 
subsidiary issues (that is, subsidiary to the central problem outlined above) 
that have been raised by historians and social theorists concerning the events 
of these years. 
To orthodox Marxist historians, the behavior of the German capitalists 
after 1848 was an act of betrayal (Verrat). The German bourgeois failed to 
carry out the role assigned them by dialectical materialism. They failed to 
overcome the aristocratic-monarchical order and replace it with a bourgeois 
republic in a united Germany—the necessary prelude to the final victory of 
industrial capitalism over feudal agrarianism. That victory would in turn have 
prepared the way for the inevitable triumph of the proletariat in the climac­
tic class struggle with the bourgeoisie. Even worse, the bourgeoisie came to 
terms and even cooperated with the old order, unnaturally extending its life 
into the twentieth century.12 
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In his study of railway construction in Prussia before 1848 Dietrich Eich­
holtz shows how the "Prussian way" veered from the path Marx had charted. 
The "necessary" class antagonism between the nobility and bourgeois capi­
talists, he argues, did not develop to the point of clearing away the remnants 
of feudal society. Using the railroad industry in its early phase (1830-48), he 
shows how the bourgeoisie established an "unholy alliance" with the Junkers. 
He calls the bourgeoisie's use of the Prussian absolutistic state to facilitate the 
construction of railroads the "method of material corruption." The capital­
ists, for example, relied on the state for legal decrees to expedite land appro­
priation and to overcome the difficulties of accumulating capital, government 
subsidies, loans, and the subscription of stock. "From the beginning the Prus­
sian way was a compromise between the bourgeoisie and the old ruling classes 
by which both Junker and capitalist profited."13 Such a relationship between 
capital and feudalism encouraged "antirevolutionary tendencies . . . among 
the Prussian bourgeoisie . . . whose pitiful behavior can be characterized by 
cowardice, betrayal of the mass movement to the old ruling powers, and mis­
erable servility."14 Karl Obermann, Ernst Engelberg, and Roland Zeise echoed 
Eichholtz's position.15 
Most scholars have dismissed the bourgeoisie's "historical mission" and 
its betrayal as teleological and unhistorical.16 In the 1960s a new generation 
of historians sought to use social scientific methods to explain the historical 
roots of the Nazi dictatorship. In so doing they strove to avoid both the Marx­
ist blueprint for social development and the historicist-idealist tradition that 
accepted Bismarck's empire as a uniquely German social formation.17 Their 
principal analytical tool was modernization theory, a sociological model that 
posits democracy as the normative form of government for urbanized, indus­
trialized mass societies. England's gradualism, France's revolution, and the in­
dustrialized democracy of the United States were held up as examples against 
which the deficiencies of Germany's political tradition could be examined.18 
In this context alliance became a key term—a codeword—to describe 
the relationship between capitalists and Prussia's ruling elite during the 1848 
revolution and the subsequent reaction that marked for the middle classes the 
beginning of a servile, antidemocratic tradition. Faced with a two-front battle 
against democrats in the street and the ruling aristocratic elites, liberal poli-
ticians—many of them businessmen—chose to side with the latter, entering 
into a junior partnership that guaranteed order and stability but sacrificed a 
political voice. The term alliance, however, is not completely an ex post facto 
construct. In 1847 the historian Heinrich von Sybel prescribed an "open, 
thorough, and practical alliance" among capitalists, the intelligentsia, and 
the state to prevent the rise of "dangerous communistic tendencies" brought 
about by the "great contrast between capitalists and the unpropertied."19 
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Postwar historians, however, use the term alliance less for a specific event 
or agreement than as a general description of the political milieu of the 1850s. 
First used by Heinrich Heffter in 1950,20 the word reappeared in Friedrich 
Zunkel's work on Rhenish and Westphalian entrepreneurs between 1834 and 
1878. Published in 1962, Zunkel's lapidary prose, wealth of primary sources, 
and clear, forceful thesis made the book enormously influential, and it still 
remains the authoritative study on Prussian entrepreneurs. "It was perhaps 
the brilliance of this work," noted Hartmut Kaelble in 1985, that discouraged 
"subsequent social-historical works on the political history of the [entrepre­
neurial] bourgeoisie."21 
Zunkel sought to explain the origins of the cartel of economic interests 
that arose between the landed nobility and the high bourgeoisie in the Kaiser-
reich. He was the first of Germany's postwar historians to employ social his­
torical methods—attention to social origins, occupations of sons, marriage 
patterns, and social networks—to clarify the political stance of entrepreneu­
rial groups in the Rhineland and Westphalia. He argued that in the 1830s and 
1840s a confident, self-conscious entrepreneurial class arose that provided 
leadership in the revolution of 1848. While noting some uniquely German 
characteristics in the prerevolutionary era—rapid industrialization, late devel­
opment of the bourgeois class—Zunkel clearly views the 1848 revolution and 
its political fallout as a significant watershed in German political life. Fear­
ing both the democratic demands of radical artisans and the threat of exten­
sive damage to property, the Rhenish leadership became increasingly moder­
ate, advocating a constitutional monarchy, limited suffrage, and, eventually, a 
"break with the revolution." For the sake of order and economic stability, the 
bourgeoisie gave up its "political emancipation," "retreated" from politics, 
fortified a "feudal society," and hindered development toward a "humanistic, 
democratic social order."22 
In the 1850s and 1860s the development of the bourgeoisie degenerated, 
Zunkel suggested, into an "alliance of governing classes" in which the entre­
preneurial class remained the "second social power."23 The alliance of the 
1850s and 1860s is presented as a dualism: the once political businessmen of 
the Rhineland were "diverted" to economics by an "authoritarian monarchy," 
thus accepting the administrative dominance of the state and the political 
leadership of the feudal nobility.24 The combination of economic prosperity 
and the abandonment of bourgeois values led in turn to a "feudalization of 
the bourgeoisie": the increasing imitation of aristocratic styles of living and 
bourgeois conformity to a "half-feudal Prussian society." The building of 
lavish villas, the cultivation of noble contacts, and the desire for aristocratic 
titles exemplify the feudalized behavior of entrepreneurs.25 In short, these de­
velopments amounted to stagnation; the "bourgeoisie, which at mid-century 
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dreamed of ruling in the future, no longer possessed the vitality and influ­
ence to assert itself against the East-Elbian nobility."26 For Zunkel the price 
of bourgeois integration into the Prussian-German state was dear. 
In this perspective the pivotal era of the German Sonderweg was 1848­
66, when leaders of the German bourgeoisie swapped their claim to political 
leadership for the privilege of making money. In so doing, commercial and 
industrial leaders gradually estranged themselves from any kind of emancipa­
tory social-political movement, thus laying the groundwork for a weak demo­
cratic tradition in Germany. When the ascension of Prince-Regent Wilhelm 
to the Prussian throne in 1858 revived public forums on liberal politics—the 
New Era—and brought about the founding of the liberal Progressive Party in 
1861, entrepreneurs ceased to identify themselves with the liberal parliamen­
tary movement. Satisfied with the economic concessions granted by the state, 
the business class denied the political movement the economic clout it needed 
to succeed. Hence, the alliance thesis dovetails with that of a German tendency 
toward "revolution from above": the ability of conservative elites throughout 
early modern and modern German history to introduce just enough reform 
to preempt social and political change from below.27 In the context of the 
1850s, writes Hans-Ulrich Wehler, the "continuation of the 'revolution from 
above' after 1849 proceeded with economic-political reforms and concessions 
as compensation for political repression and lack of emancipation."28 
The alliance thesis, so forcefully presented by Zunkel, pervades the major 
social histories on entrepreneurs, liberalism, and nineteenth-century politi­
cal movements. It is to be found, for example, in the works of Jiirgen Kocka, 
Helmut Bohme, Richard Tilly, Heinrich August Winkler, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 
Wolfgang Mommsen, Wolfgang Klee, Wolfram Siemann, and others.29 
Bohme, in particular, uses the alliance thesis to place the role of the "do­
mesticated" bourgeoisie in a larger context. His Deutschlands Weg zur Gross­
macht (1966) sought to show that the struggle between Prussia and Austria 
for political hegemony in Central Europe from 1848 to 1866 was primarily 
rooted in economics. Such an approach eclipses the importance of Bismarck's 
statesmanship in the 1860s. Writing economic history as diplomatic history, 
Bohme argued that Prussia's success in frustrating Vienna's attempts to enter 
the German Customs Union in 1853 and 1865 was more decisive in its effects 
than Prussia's military victory of 1866.30 Prussia's "marriage" to the western 
industrialized states through the Franco-Prussian customs treaty in 1862 pre­
vented the Habsburg monarchy from attaining the economic leverage needed 
to realize its large-German (grossdeutsch) design, an "empire of seventy mil­
lions" that would have stretched from the North Sea to the Adriatic.31 
Underlying Bohme's argument is the assumption that free trade had a uni­
fying effect on diverse political interests in Prussia. The allure of free trade 
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produced a "new political coalition" between "traders, bankers, and [light] in­
dustrialists and the conservative feudal agrarian leadership of Prussia." With 
this "community of interests, not only did the liberal-democratic aims of 1848 
fail but also the plans of Austria."32 Free trade, Bohme asserted, was the nec­
essary concession that produced a "division of labor." With the noble land­
holding classes abstaining "from modern industrial economic processes . . . 
[balanced by] the far-reaching abstinence of entrepreneurs from the political 
arena, the old and new elites laid the basis for the special position and the 
special development of Germany."33 For Bohme the politically supine Prus­
sian bourgeoisie was an essential component to the Prussian state's drive for 
political hegemony in Central Europe after 1848. 
Under close examination the idea of a political alliance among German 
elites based on free trade does not stand up. A consensus on free trade existed 
neither in the business community in the 1850s nor between the National Lib­
eral and Free Conservative political parties in the 1860s.34 It is clear that the 
"concession" of free trade did not pacify businessmen, who had other de­
mands. In the 1850s, the same commercial circles, as we shall see in chapters 
4 and 5, sharply opposed the government on banking policy and entered into 
law suits against the government over control of private railroad companies. 
The use of "alliance" and "new political coalition" glosses over the com­
plexity of domestic politics and the numerous difficulties between business 
and the state in an expanding economy. The idea of a division of labor between 
Junkers and entrepreneurs overlooks the Silesian landlords who invested in 
coal mines, iron foundries, and railroad companies, as well as widespread 
speculation by Junker landlords in industrial securities. The clean division of 
economic and political spheres is an unconvincing interpretative scheme for 
the 1850s—particularly for the entrepreneurial outlook, which usually linked 
political and economic matters. 
The chief shortcoming of Bohme's work, then, is the overemphasis on 
high politics and state political economy, and an undiscerning attention to the 
politics of doing business in specific sectors, regions, and business circles. 
On this point Theodore S. Hamerow's important two-volume study is more 
astute, giving color and definition to the expanding public voices of bourgeois 
economic and public life. His studies underscore the import of the postrevo­
lutionary period for the empire's social and political foundations, but his com­
manding overview is concerned more with the breakthrough of laissez-faire 
industrialism, bourgeois public opinion, and the growing commercial hege­
mony of Prussia than with showing specifically how postrevolutionary eco­
nomic politics affected the evolving relationship between businessmen and 
Prussian state officials.35 Neither Bohme nor Hamerow shows us the politics 
of the boardroom: how businessmen, representatives of large-scale capital­
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ism, contested state policy to establish the right to make money.36 Handbooks 
and synthetic narratives further reflect this shortcoming.37 
In the 1970s West German neo-Marxist historians Lothar Machtan, Diet­
rich Milles, and Michael Gugel opposed the notion of alliance, advocating in­
stead the idea of symbiosis. Gugel, for instance, portrayed Prussia in the 1850s 
and 1860s as a postrevolutionary, acquisitive, consumer-oriented society that 
consequently developed a liberalism more reform-oriented than emancipa­
tory. The Progressive Party, Gugel asserted, was not interested in recasting the 
foundations of the Prussian state by franchise extension, a cabinet responsible 
to parliament, or a more democratic constitution.38 Rather, the Progressives 
sought a greater "embourgeoisement of the power structure" by reorganizing 
the state for greater efficiency.39 During the 1850s the concepts of civil law, 
justice, and the constitutional state, once brimming with radical significance, 
were emptied of their content by middle-class parties.40 
The bourgeoisie in the 1850s, asserted Gugel, drew a sharper distinction 
between society and state. They increasingly viewed the state as an institution 
through which disputed interests could be arbitrated and resolved; it was "an 
excellent instrument for the advancement of economic and social interests."41 
After the decreed constitution of 1850 secured the socioeconomic foundation 
of Prussia, a depoliticized "bourgeois-capitalistic" society unfolded. Gugel 
deflated the importance of the constitutional conflict, in which a liberal oppo­
sition attempted to rein in the authoritarian Prussian executive through greater 
parliamentary control. The conditions for a liberalization of the constitution 
and the Prussian political system, Gugel argued, never existed.42 
Machtan and Milles offered their study, Klassensymbiose von Junkertum 
und Bourgeoisie (1980), as a corrective to the left-liberal modernization theory, 
which "replaced the nostalgia for the holy world of the authoritarian state" 
with a "nostalgia for the holy world of the modern constitutional state." They 
argued that by reconciling capitalistic social development with the telos of 
liberal social democracy, West German modernization theory was putting a 
square peg in a round hole.43 Central to their critique is the dismissal of the 
term alliance. The word presupposes a "voluntary subjective act" rather than 
a "capitalistically determined, historical-concrete unity of ruling classes." 44 
They replaced "alliance" with "symbiosis of classes," a term that in their 
view more accurately reflects the relationship of the capitalist class to the pre­
industrial order. 
The symbiosis refers to a "fundamental consensus" between Junkers, a 
noble class of capitalist farmers, and the bourgeoisie, a class granted optimal 
conditions to industrialize by the state.45 The relationship had little to do with 
the conscious actions of either group but was "simply decreed to them by the 
ambivalent development of German capitalism."46 Mixing organic and me­
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chanical metaphors, Machtan and Milles stated: "Naturally the real-historical 
functional mechanism of this class symbiosis crystallized only very slowly 
and, for the time being, unconsciously behind the backs of the productive 
agents involved."47 In this respect, politics were merely epiphenomenal ac­
tions to protect material interests. Echoing Gugel, the authors argued that the 
constitutional conflict was nothing more than an effort by the middle classes to 
legitimate an already established social position and to attain further economic 
concessions. In what was hardly an emancipatory movement, the oppositional 
tendencies of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie could be dismissed as 
"pragmatic opportunism." 48 This neo-Marxist view assigns no emancipatory 
role to the business class after 1849. It characterizes the Prussian experience 
from 1850 to 1870 as a peculiar form of bourgeois dominance, in which the 
needs of the class were met without overthrowing the state. 
These neo-Marxist interpretations redress the misreading of the bour­
geoisie as a subordinated, feudalized middle class but offer only half-truths 
as alternatives. Certainly the ability of both new and old elites to amalga­
mate their interests in an undemocratic state is the crux of the matter. But 
whether the postrevolutionary socioeconomic base (which "objectively con­
ditions" the Junker-bourgeois "form of rule" [Herrschaftsform])49 was orga­
nized as effortlessly as Gugel and others suggest is questionable. Their argu­
ments evade the numerous concrete points of conflict between conservative 
and bourgeois interests during the first industrial revolution. Equally evasive 
is Milles and Machtan's use of the biological term symbiosis, the process by 
which two separate organisms live together with a mutually beneficial associa­
tion. It is ironic that these two historians harshly criticize bourgeois historical 
writing yet show a historicist penchant for the organic metaphor of symbio­
sis. Such a metaphor conveys a frictionless process. A metaphor of social 
process must also account for opposition, exclusion, and competition. Sym­
biosis evokes the "invisible hand" of capitalism silently transforming German 
society without showing the antagonistic processes inherent in a capitalist 
economy. There are no agents in Milles and Machtan's story. We are less apt 
to consider the politics of the 1850s as a cozy symbiotic process if we look 
beyond abstractions regarding the "ambivalent development of capitalism" 
toward the people and parties who represented the varied and vying interests 
of agriculture, trade, transportation, handicrafts, and light and heavy industry. 
Material Interests versus Liberal Idealism 
Implicit in all three versions of the Sonderweg construct is the idealization of 
pre-1848 liberalism. Eichholtz, Zunkel, Bohme, and Gugel all take the posi­
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tion that a clearly defined democratic-liberal idea existed before the revolu­
tion and was abandoned during it. The political interpretations of the 1850s 
are colored by the assumption that before 1848 the German bourgeoisie es­
poused a universalist political ideal calling for a free, rational, constitutional 
form of government. Afterward the universal humanism gave way to class-
specific interests, inviting opportunism and compromise. These assertions are 
based on the assumption that 1848 was a great political watershed. 
To be sure, some German liberals abandoned the universalist political role 
of the bourgeoisie as a result of 1848. But the political views of Prussia's liberal 
cadres were almost always class-specific—before and after 1848.50 No ideol­
ogy of natural-law philosophy or democratic principles led urban notables, 
merchant-patricians, and economically ascendant businessmen to advocate a 
constitution in the 1830s and 1840s.51 Urban leaders never believed in a politi­
cal role for the unpropertied classes and never challenged the legitimacy of the 
Prussian monarchy. Rather, this social group believed in the need to end arbi­
trary government and establish a Rechtsstaat (rule by law) to protect property, 
person, and marketplace. In so doing they presumed to speak for the masses. 
Practical issues such as adjusting the tax base, introducing better property 
laws, banning entail and hunting rights, promoting customs treaties, debating 
the merits of free trade, and abolishing the patrimonial court system occupied 
the political agenda of Prussian businessmen in the pre-1848 era. They were 
moderate economic liberals who believed that politics should accommodate 
the two principal spheres of civil society: commerce and industry. Joseph 
Dumont, newspaper owner, railway director, and urban notable, revealed the 
character of entrepreneurial politics in 1833 by advocating "sensible free-
dom—not because of any theory but because lawful freedom alone ensures 
the comforts of life, free activity, industriousness, and freedom of occupa­
tion." Ideologies he disdained: "exclusive theories from all sides are much 
too rigid."52 Recent research has rendered a more accurate political portrait 
of the pre-March Prussian entrepreneur.53 
This bias among businessmen toward practicality was equally prevalent 
during the revolution of 1848. Although idealistic political issues are usually 
the main focus of historical accounts of 1848, the material-economic issues 
are hard to avoid. The unification of Germany under Prussia was for Prus­
sian liberals as much an economic goal as a political ideal; it corresponded to 
David Hansemann's subsequent plan to unify the German states with a fed­
eral Zollverein (Customs Union) parliament.54 The protracted debates on vot­
ing and constitutions must not be permitted to obscure the significance of the 
many economic associations and advocacy groups that blossomed in 1848. 
They promoted a wide spectrum of interests and integrated the question of 
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free trade, national tariffs, and protective legislation for crafts into the central 
forum in Frankfurt.55 
The practicality of economic liberals contrasted greatly with the idealistic 
posture of the lawyers, professors, civil servants, and other representatives of 
Bildungsbiirgertum (the professional middle classes). Wilhelm Oechselhauser, 
a businessman from Dessau who worked in Silesia, complained in 1848 about 
the "enormous phrasemaking" of "illusionists" in Frankfurt who argued over 
the basic rights of Germans. He demanded that the parliament and the people 
finally concern themselves with sensible things, such as economic questions.56 
Gustav Mevissen, the Cologne entrepreneur, expressed similar sentiments 
when he wrote in October 1848, "The volubility of the professors is indefati­
gable, and I very much fear that German unity will perish because of Ger­
man thoroughness."57 It is perhaps not surprising that in March 1848 one of 
Hansemann's first deeds as minister was to supply credit to Rhenish banks and 
transform the leading Cologne bank, the A. SchaafThausen'sche Bankverein, 
into a joint-stock enterprise. 
Whether one interprets the pursuit of material interests as opportunis­
tic 58 or as an indication of political maturity,59 we must nonetheless recognize 
this rudimentary element in the political outlook of businessmen. It is unhis­
torical to impugn these liberal-minded businessmen as turncoats and cowards 
in 1848 when they consistently held plutocratic, commercially based politi­
cal views. In 1845 Rhenish liberals reformed the electoral procedure for the 
provincial diet; its three-tiered voting system based on degrees of wealth be­
came the model for that introduced by Prussia in 1849. Men such as Dumont, 
Hansemann, and Camphausen believed not in equal citizenship but in active 
and passive voting rights. Criteria for enfranchisement was based on wealth, 
property, and influence. It is not surprising, then, that Hansemann believed the 
constitution of 5 December 1848, which granted universal manhood suffrage, 
went too far, encouraging "destructive democratic and anti-government prin­
ciples." The subsequent "relief, if not satisfaction," as Rudolf Gneist com­
mented, with which the "propertied classes welcomed the Three Class Sys­
tem" was not betrayal but consistency.60 
The betrayal and alliance theses lose much of their force if it is assumed 
that businessmen (before and after 1848) always presumed to work with the 
monarchy to achieve reform. Hansemann's pamphlet of 1833, Preussen und 
Frankreich, criticized the state of Prussia by praising France's constitution and 
enlightened legislation. But Hansemann presented his call for a constitution 
as advice to the Prussian monarchy and not as opposition; he admonished the 
king to include the wealthy bourgeoisie in the ruling elite in order to ward off 
a more radical democratic movement. In 1840 he characterized the Prussian 
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monarchy as a "useful and conservative" protection "against the lower more 
dangerous democratic elements."61 Similarly, it was Ludolf Camphausen, the 
railroad entrepreneur from Cologne, who in May 1848 called back the prince-
regent from exile in England and never abandoned his hope of unifying 
Germany under the Prussian monarchy. To pursue the small-German (klein­
deutsch) program, he convened the Prussian National Assembly on 22 May 
1848. It opened four days after the National Assembly in Frankfurt, whose 
unifying efforts it undercut. To know the limited reform program of these 
businessmen in the prerevolutionary or Vormarz era is to recognize that their 
political attitudes in the 1850s were a continuum from the 1830s, not a conse­
quence of failure in 1848. For this reason, this study begins in 1830 to under­
score the strong strands of continuity in entrepreneurial politics. 
In doing so, this study confirms the thesis of Jeffry Diefendorf's distin­
guished work on Rhenish businessmen's politics between 1789 and 1834.62 
His research on entrepreneurial behavior under French occupation and early 
Prussian governance reveals the utterly pragmatist political style of Rhenish 
businessmen, who sought to weave the needs of business institutions and busi­
ness politics into the fabric of state life. Although Diefendorf's study ends in 
the 1830s with the onset of industrialization, his argument that "the old, pre­
revolutionary political process which had benefited them and had provided 
them with their political education" deserves emphasis.63 The following chap­
ters will confirm the validity of this claim, while also showing the continued 
flexibility of businessmen in adapting to (and exploiting) the new political 
conditions after 1830. 
As the next chapters will show at greater length, the business class in 
the 1840s and 1850s sought no radical change in Prussia's social and political 
order. Before and after 1848, it did not seek to expel aristocrats from the seats 
of power. More accurately, the business elite demanded to be incorporated 
into the ruling class, "those privileged people who, without exercising actual 
political functions, influence those who govern . . . because of the economic 
and financial power they possess."64 Not only are the rigid class distinctions 
anachronistic for this period, but the independent role of the Prussian state 
is also distorted. Marxist theory asserts that the state is the instrument of the 
ruling class (Junkerstaat) and thus dismisses the problem. The alliance thesis, 
relying more on Max Weber and Western sociology, recognizes the state as a 
potential third party but evades the problem with the shibboleth of a "feudal 
absolutistic state" —inferring a mirror conformity of the state to the politi­
cal needs of the conservative aristocracy. The symbiosis theory considers the 
state to have been the stage where the interests of Junkers and capitalists met 
and negotiated their competing claims, assigning to the state the role of me­
diator, not player. 
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The government of Minister-President Otto von Manteuffel (1850-58) 
and the bureaucracy that served it, however, sought to steer a course between 
the romantic conservative philosophy of the Prussian aristocracy (expressed 
best by the Gerlach brothers and the political philosophers Karl Ludwig von 
Haller and Friedrich Julius Stahl) and the demands of the liberal opposition in 
parliament.65 Manteuffel's neoabsolutism sought to reassert the primacy of the 
Prussian state over all particular estates and classes, and this policy pleased 
neither noble conservatives nor middle-class liberals.66 Moreover, one cannot 
assume a monolithic policy or philosophy when referring to the state. Min­
isters and high-ranking regional bureaucrats, for example, could not agree on 
basic economic policy, displaying inconsistencies and contradictions that re­
veal a divided, uncertain government. 
In rendering a more accurate construction of the political dialogue be­
tween old and new elites, we must assume a multivocal Prussian state in the 
throes of remaking itself. Eric D. Brose's study on how the Prussian state 
lurched into the era of industrialization moves beyond conventional para­
digms, throwing new light on the fragile consensus-building procedures that 
operated in the factionalized, multiparty state apparatus. His research under­
scores the influence of new social forces that eroded the caste mentality 
of government elites (Beamtenstaat), obviating any absolute distinctions be­
tween state and society after the 1840s.67 Equally important is David E. Bar-
clay's political biography of Friedrich Wilhelm IV, in which his interpretation 
of the Prussian state in the 1850s as a complex amalgam of countervail­
ing forces opens up new conceptual space for future research.68 Barclay, for 
example, demolishes the prevalent view that the Camarilla, the king's ultra­
conservative shadow cabinet, exercised wide-ranging powers in the period 
1850-58.69 He presents instead a more persuasive interpretation of Friedrich 
Wilhelm, whose intricate balancing of opposing interests enabled a wider 
range of political, economic, and social forces to exert influence in the recon­
stitution of the Prussian state after 1848. Grounded in solid archival materials, 
these studies give tangible meaning and historical specificity to the important 
but overly abstract term state building. 
In many ways, it is exactly the absence of a rigorous context of business 
politics that mars the betrayal, alliance, and symbiosis theses of structural 
continuity. They place theoretical arguments ahead of empirical evidence. 
Although the political and economic attitudes of the capitalist class are the 
linchpin of this historical problem, the nuances and ambiguities within this 
social group have been surprisingly neglected. Bbhme, Eichholtz, Engelberg, 
Obermann, Gugel, and Machtan and Milles all assume an unproblematic, 
docile business class. Hamerow admirably foregrounds the criticisms and ten­
sions of economic politics circulating in the public sphere but does not focus 
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on specific spheres of conflict in government-business relations. Zunkel's por­
trayal, too, is more differentiated and therefore convincing, but his analysis 
of bourgeois subjugation rests more on a sociological preoccupation with 
status and prestige in Prussian society than on an empirical analysis of how 
the postrevolutionary socioeconomic settlement was actually produced. We 
are given little idea how businessmen and other middle-class social groups 
interacted with the governmental bureaucracy at any level, whether local, re­
gional, or ministerial. The question of how three elite groups—businessmen, 
state officials, and the nobility—confronted one another on such major ques­
tions as banking, customs and tariffs, transportation policy, joint-stock banks, 
and government supervision in this pivotal decade remains unanswered. 
In the one case where work has been done on businessmen's behavior, 
the results fail to confirm the conventional picture. Hartmut Kaelble's study 
of Berlin entrepreneurs during the period of early industrialization (1830­
70) sets aside overarching theories and investigates the social and political 
actions of businessmen in Berlin. Arguing from solid empirical research, 
Kaelble stated: "At least in the case of Berlin and its leading entrepreneurs 
the thesis cannot be confirmed that businessmen after 1848 . . . paid for their 
social ascendancy and economic decision-making freedom with political con­
formity." 70 He shows that the 1850s were actually a time when businessmen 
began to challenge the authority of the state bureaucracy and demanded a 
greater voice in the decision-making process. Using such associations as the 
chamber of commerce and the Berlin Trade Corporation (Die Berliner Kor­
poration der Kaufmannschaft), businessmen saw to it that their interests were 
duly weighed by the government, which relented on many issues. "The thesis 
that businessmen retreated from politics after 1848," Kaelble concluded, "is 
at least not valid for Berlin."71 He noted, however, that Berlin's business class 
did not challenge the basic autonomy of the bureaucracy. Businessmen con­
tented themselves with winning small business-related gains in the govern­
ment through quiet advisory channels and did not seek the larger gains of 
direct political power. Although Kaelble was careful to present his findings 
as unrepresentative of other entrepreneurial groups,72 his study suggests that 
further research could produce a better conception of entrepreneurial politics 
than the simplistic formulas of betrayal, alliance, and symbiosis. 
Burgertum and the Business Class 
Perhaps the most salient feature of modern research on nineteenth-century 
Germany was its neglecting to explore agency in social spheres other than 
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the conservative establishment. Because paradigms centered on conservative 
elites pulling wires to direct the movements of a "supine bourgeoisie and a 
pusillanimous liberalism,"73 historians' research emphasized the antidemo­
cratic, feudalistic, preindustrial elements. In 1980, however, Geoff Eley and 
David Blackbourn launched a new research agenda with the publication of 
essays that challenged the theoretical and comparative premises upon which 
the Sonderweg, or special path, thesis rests.74 
Eley sets himself the task of illuminating the conceptual flaws in modern­
ization theory and its application to the Sonderweg thesis. He especially ques­
tions modernization theory's assumption that the benchmark of a successful 
industrialized country is the presence of middle-class liberalism. The distinc­
tion between industrialism and liberalism, he argues, must be better sharp­
ened: the former is a socioeconomic category, the latter a specific ideology. 
Conflating the two obfuscates the essential differences and further allows the 
German middle class, whose members were not "good liberals," to be judged 
as a failure. Overall Eley charges German historical literature with termino­
logical slippage with the terms bourgeoisie-liberalism-democracy: "The con­
ceptual elision of 'liberal' into 'bourgeois' is further compounded by the still 
riskier equation of 'liberalism' and 'democracy.' "75 If the terms can be pried 
apart, he argues, one could begin to recognize a German bourgeoisie, mature 
and assertive, which found liberalism ill-suited to its political aims.76 The ten­
dency of the structural continuity thesis to fuse these terms indivisibly, Eley 
states, further enforces the inclination to measure events with "straightfor­
ward polarity" —either liberal victory or aristocratic authoritarianism.77 "The 
interests of the bourgeoisie may be pursued and secured by other than liberal 
means," which leads Eley to place greater emphasis on the German bour-
geoisie's economic and juridical successes than on parliamentary liberalism. 
By stressing the ability of Burgertum (middle-class groups) to develop and 
profit from industrial capitalism as well as to shape a law code that enabled 
bourgeois civil society to blossom in imperial Germany, Eley dismisses the 
"deficiencies" of Burgertum. "Germany did, after all, experience a successful 
bourgeois revolution in the nineteenth century."78 
Although Eley's strictures gloss over valid elements of the Sonderweg 
thesis, his critical inquiry is salutary and welcome.79 Certainly his discussion 
about what groups actually implemented radical social revolutions in Western 
Europe and whether liberalism must be the prescribed ideology of the capital­
ist bourgeoisie was a clarion call to undertake more rigorous comparative his­
tory. More important, his pleas to jettison the hardened either-or formulations 
in judging bourgeois "success" after 1848 and to recognize the many middle-
class social groups who became the principal beneficiaries of the reconstituted 
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postrevolutionary Prussian-German state is a theoretical breakthrough. Eley's 
essay exhorts historians to locate sites and processes of bourgeois agency in 
state and society. 
Blackbourn, too, questions the efficacy of the Sonderweg methodology, 
which examines a social class on the basis of what it ought to be; the German 
title of his essay, "How it actually did not happen" ("Wie es eigentlich nicht 
gewesen"), expresses the ironic dig. Blackbourn proposes to examine what is 
there and keenly observes the cultural influence of the bourgeoisie. At issue 
for Blackbourn is whether the bourgeoisie had the power and means to stamp 
German society with bourgeois values. Scrutinizing civil law, public space, 
and public institutions (zoos, operas, parks, museums, etc.), Blackbourn sees 
in the more diffuse experience of civil society a smugly optimistic bourgeoi­
sie, proud of its accomplishments. Against the "broader pattern of material, 
institutional, legal, and intellectual changes," Blackbourn speaks of a "silent 
revolution."80 By employing an argument of cultural hegemony, he does not 
deny the strong aristocratic presence and antiliberal tendencies in German 
society. But Blackbourn asserts that Germany's antiliberal tendencies, when 
integrated into the greater framework of European social history, are compa­
rable with other national traditions. Germany, he claims, merely "provided 
the heightened version of the norm."81 
Blackbourn's intent to modify perceptions of Germany's "peculiarities" 
is convincing, and his recognition of multiple identities in bourgeois life and 
his desire to examine civil society through a prism other than Berlin's court, 
government, and parliament is noteworthy. In recognizing that the bourgeois 
revolution may be closer to a gradual, fluid process of opportunities than the 
event-oriented "failure of 1848," both Blackbourn and Eley have cast new 
light on the study of bourgeois culture.82 
German historians have readily taken up the challenge of Blackbourn 
and Eley to rethink the middle-class role in German history. Numerous col­
lections of essays reexamining the socioeconomic and political world of the 
nineteenth-century German bourgeoisie have emerged in the last ten years, 
and numerous other articles and monographs address this subject.83 Although 
it is too early to surmise a consensus, it seems that an incremental revision of 
some Sonderweg assumptions is underway. 
Hartmut Kaelble and Wolfram Fischer have shown, for example, the rela­
tive uselessness of the Sonderweg idea when comparing processes of industri­
alization and social structures to other countries. Kaelble argued in 1983 that, 
in terms of per capita economic growth, occupational dislocation, growth in 
the secondary and tertiary sectors, structural economic changes (farming to 
industry, craft to mechanization), and such demographic factors as urbaniza­
tion, the putative influence of "rapid industrialization" on Germany's Sonder­
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weg does not hold up.84 Wolfram Fischer has added other socioeconomic sta­
tistical data to this thesis. In view of the pervasiveness of "deference society" 
and the general influence of nobility in the bureaucracies, armies, and econo­
mies of England, France, Russia, and Spain, the inability of the German 
bourgeoisie to become the sole ruling class is no exception.85 Comparisons 
between French and German entrepreneurs also belie the commonly held as­
sumption that German industrialists were both better trained academically 
and more authoritarian.86 The corollary between the Herr-im-Hause attitude of 
German business and the authoritarian state must be rethought. Certainly the 
careful social historical research of Dolores Augustine-Perez and Dirk Schu­
mann convincingly dismisses the idea that either "feudalization" or "aristo­
craticization" has little, if any, explanatory power for German businessmen.87 
New research using comparison and social-historical specificity will prune 
back many of the traits indulgently ascribed to "German character." 
Such revisions affect the period of this study. The convenient use of the 
bourgeois "retreat" from politics after 1848, for example, has been rejected. 
In his synthesis of German history from 1800 to 1866, Thomas Nipperdey 
labeled the history of the liberal retreat a "legend": "it is inexact, essen­
tially false—indeed nothing more than moralizing literary criticism."88 Beate-
Carola Padtberg's study of Rhenish liberalism during the reactionary period 
of 1850-58 also sets aside the notion of "political apathy." In examining the 
chamber of commerce, the municipal council, and the Cologne newspaper 
Die Kolnische Zeitung, she effectively shows how a broad oppositional politi­
cal movement (combining both bourgeois and aristocratic classes) grew out of 
the "rational and flexible" tactics of the city's economic elite to assert its ma­
terialist demands during the economic boom.89 Two recent German textbooks 
by Wolfram Siemann and Reinhard Riirup also strive to balance the repres­
sive features with the "modern constitutional and democratic elements"90 of 
the Prussian state and a politically active bourgeoisie.91 
Yet paradigms die hard. The staying power of the alliance thesis is evinced 
in Hans-Ulrich Wehler's new study of German history from 1849 to 1914, 
which still characterizes the 1850s as an "unpolitical Eldorado" for business-
men.92 And Rudolf Boch's study of businessmen who first introduced accel­
erated industrial expansion into the Rhineland equally adheres to 1848 as the 
great caesura in nineteenth-century business politics. Although Boch docu­
ments the robust political agitation of businessmen in the 1840s, he nonethe­
less posits that Rhenish business elites after 1848 "ceased to exist as a politi­
cally competent class."93 In view of the contentious negotiations between 
business and government in the second half of the nineteenth century, this 
claim, and its concomitant assumption that the state acted as an unproblem­
atical facilitator of business needs, is hardly accurate. 
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A recent study of early railroad building in Prussia and the United States 
in the 1830s and 1840s by the historian Colleen A. Dunlavy is also germane to 
this discussion.94 Dunlavy answered the call for rigorous comparative history 
whose broader perspective modifies claims about industrialization and politi­
cal change formulated in national frameworks. Her innovative analysis of the 
United States and Prussia, for example, offers the paradox that the central­
ized authoritarian Prussian state (modeled as a "unitary-bureaucratic" state) 
intervened less in both construction and regulation than the federal U.S. gov­
ernment (a "federal-legislative state"), whose strong promotional and super­
visory roles belied its liberal, laissez-faire reputation. Her crisp comparisons 
illuminate how contrasting political structures determined the different styles 
of technology and business practices of railroad companies and, conversely, 
how such large economic institutions affected the political world. But in ex­
amining differing styles of railroad technology, the degrees of state interven­
tion and abstention, and the long-term roles of lobbies, legislatures and state 
ministries, Dunlavy's questions are intended more for reshaping the fields 
of business history and history of technology than for advancing the politi­
cal history of German businessmen. Her interpretation of the Prussian state 
elides the many factions in the court and bureaucracy, province and capital, 
that resisted unified policy and that, in critical ways, dilute the strength of the 
unitary-bureaucratic construct. Moreover, the statement that economic liber­
alism better characterized Prussian policies than it did U.S. policy distorts the 
intentions of Prussian neoabsolutism and glosses over the state's paternalistic 
interventionist actions which businessmen sharply criticized in the Vormarz 
period.95 
The problem of the business class and its operational strategies with the 
government still remains an underexplored topic. Certainly the recent debates, 
discussed above, call for reassessing the formulation "alliance," the code 
word of government-business relations, which essentially precludes bourgeois 
agency. It is too constrained a term to explore the curious admixture of con­
flict and cooperation that characterized the rapprochement between business 
circles and the government after 1848. Although such historians as James 
Sheehan, Otto Pflanze, and Martin Kitchen have recognized the fundamental 
flaw in interpreting government-business relations as an alliance, there is no 
study of businessmen in Prussia after 1848 to draw a more accurate, detailed 
picture.96 In 1972 Kaelble wrote, "The rules that allowed non-civil servants to 
participate in political decisions remains largely unresearched."97 And Dieter 
Langewiesche could still report in 1988, "It has so far not yet been clarified 
to what degree representatives of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie 
in the 1850s used their economic position to advocate their political interests 
to the state bureaucracy."98 
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Railroad Entrepreneurs and the Prussian-German State 
What is most needed at this juncture in the debate concerning the German 
bourgeoisie is new primary research. In view of this, I present here a study 
of the business class in its relationship to the Prussian-German state during 
the period from 1830, the onset of industrialization and railroad construction, 
to the political reorganization of Germany that followed the wars of 1866 and 
1870. In order to stake out more credible ground between the polar hypothe­
ses of the putative alliance and the so-called bourgeois hegemony, I examine 
the relationship between Prussian entrepreneurs and their government in the 
critical area of railway construction and ownership during the period in which 
this industry was the leading sector of German industrialization. 
The decades upon which this study is focused were also the critical years 
of the "take off" in which German industrialization reached the stage of "sus­
tained growth." Although today the universal validity of the model developed 
on this theme by W. W. Rostow is, correctly, rejected, it still has significance 
for Germany. As Rainer Fremdling's quantitative studies on the railroad in­
dustry have shown, there is no reason to doubt his assumption that the leading 
sector of this acceleration in Germany was railroad construction (seconded 
by the enlargement and modernization of the armed forces in the 1860s).99 
For that reason I have concentrated my researches on the railroad industry 
in searching for the actual, in contrast to the assumed, relationships between 
entrepreneurs eager to promote the interests of private enterprise and a con­
servative, authoritarian state accustomed for nearly two centuries to directing 
the country's economic growth. What was true of the railway magnates and 
financiers was also true of entrepreneurs engaged in other enterprises during 
the "take off" years, for the development of the joint-stock form of business 
enterprise multiplied theflow of investment capital and involved businessmen 
in many kinds of enterprises. The railroad business was a sphere of great im­
portance for bankers, manufacturers, merchants, and industrialists; but it was 
also important for the landed estates in the eastern provinces, the state min­
istries of war, trade, and finance, and any town or region that sought access 
to national and international markets. "The location of railway lines," wrote 
Frank Tipton, "was always a political decision and always retained its power 
to create and destroy." 10° For government-business relations, the railroad in­
dustry was a touchstone of economic and political conflict. 
Before 1848 railroads were the domain of private entrepreneurs. After 
the revolution the Prussian government sought to buy out private railways 
and dominate the railroad business with a state-run system, threatening the 
existence of the twenty-seven private railroad companies operating in Prus­
sia. Government takeovers and aggressive regulation of the remaining private 
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lines produced an adversarial relationship between the government and the 
directors, financiers, and investors of private railways. The relationship was 
further exacerbated by Trade Minister August von der Heydt, who used every 
lever of the state's legal and financial powers to give the state the upper hand 
in railroad ownership. Heydt's aggressive tactics jeopardized one of Europe's 
largest investment sectors and antagonized Prussia's leading entrepreneurs.101 
Owing to close state supervision of railroads, we can monitor the chang­
ing relationship of government agencies to the business world with greater 
accuracy and depth. Previously unexploited sources give new insights on spe­
cific areas of conflict between the two groups, enabling us to portray the busi-
nessmen's ambivalence to state presence in the economy as well as to accent 
their influence on government policy. The behavior of railroad businessmen 
informs us how capitalists modified the terms of dialogue in preexisting politi­
cal institutions to attain a juste milieu for capitalist enterprises in the late 1850s. 
To understand this evolving settlement, the two sides of government-business 
relations must be equally weighted: the side of conflict, to affect and change 
policy; and the side of cooperation, which allowed capitalists to avail them­
selves of the financial and legal benefits of the state. Friedrich Dahlmann's 
remark that the Prussian state possessed the "magic spear which heals as well 
as wounds" also characterizes the equivocal, ambivalent attitude of business­
men toward state bureaucracy in the period of early industrialization.102 
The integration of the Prussian business class into Germany's political 
order after 1848 was a complex process of conflict and cooperation that can­
not be neatly described as an alliance or a capitulation to a preindustrial order. 
The business class exerted pressure at certain points in the government, bu­
reaucracy, and economy in the effort to shape policy in accord with their 
interest. The amalgamation of new and old elites cannot merely be explained 
as the "defense of inherited ruling positions by preindustrial elites against the 
onslaught of new forces."103 The resistance, antagonism, and protest from the 
business class in economic affairs played a key role in creating a new politi­
cal establishment after 1848. In structural terms, the series of compromises, 
successes, and failures that the business class encountered in establishing its 
terms of dialogue with Prussia's conservative order speaks more of a search 
for mutual accommodation than of victory or defeat, conquest or capitulation, 
alliance or symbiosis. 
The railroad industry is, to be sure, just one facet of a larger business 
world. I believe, however, that collectively railroad businessmen represented 
Prussia's capitalist class better than their counterparts in other sectors of the 
economy. The men who founded and directed railway companies were affili­
ated with a great number of other businesses and professions. Such founders 
and directors of the Rhenish Railway as Gustav Mevissen, Ludolf Camp­
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hausen, David Hansemann, Friedrich Wilhelm Konig, and Joseph Dumont 
either owned or had extensive investments in coal mines, iron foundries, 
newspapers, insurance companies, banks, and wool, linen, and cotton mills. 
Friedrich Lewald, H. Henock, and Karl Milde, Silesian railroad entrepreneurs, 
were involved in newspapers, banking, and textiles. Heinrich von Wittgen­
stein, president of the Cologne-Minden Railway, was active in steamships and 
insurance companies and served as a district governor in the Prussian govern­
ment. H. F. L. Augustin, director of the Berlin-Potsdam-Magdeburg Railway, 
was a former judge for a Prussian superior court. Friedrich Engels, father of 
the famous socialist, owned and ran cotton mills but sat on the board of the 
Berg-Mark Railway. The banker and silk entrepreneur Hermann von Beck­
erath also directed the Cologne-Crefeld line. The heterogeneity of their ac­
tivities makes it difficult to cluster these entrepreneurs into interest groups, 
such as it is often done in the case of landowners and heavy industrialists. 
How these businessmen interacted with the government as a social and politi­
cal force of the bourgeoisie is the primary concern of this study. 
Hence this examination of the business class veers away from questions 
normally asked about businessmen. It does not, for example, seek to enhance 
the studies of Fritz Redlich and Toni Pierenkemper, who examined the social 
profiles and business conditions in Germany in order to define successful 
entrepreneurship and the nature of the entrepreneur.104 Nor is it a contribu­
tion to the macroeconomic studies on the impact of railroads on capitalism, 
economic growth, and the development of the first industrial revolution.105 It 
also does not directly address the developed debate on the role of the state in 
promoting economic growth.106 Rather, this study seeks to bridge the gap be­
tween German economic and political history, the former ignoring the politi­
cal components of Germany's economy, the latter paying too little attention 
to the microeconomic details that shaped political outlooks. 
CHAPTER TWO 
T 
Private or State Owned? 
The Railroad Question, 1830-1848 
The opening of both new railways . . . produced a sensation felt by every­
one. . . . We notice how our entire existence has been thrown forward on 
a new path and accelerated in new directions—how new conditions, joys, 
and fears await us, and how the Unknown practices its dreadful excite­
ment, at once tempting and terrifying. . . . The railroads are . .  . a provi­
dential event, giving humanity new momentum and changing the color 
and shape of life. A new chapter in world history begins, and our genera­
tion can be proud to have witnessed it. What changes must now enter 
our outlook and imagination! Even the elementary notions of time and 
space have become unstable. Railroads have killed space, and only time 
remains for us. If we only had enough money to properly kill the latter!1 
The Rhenish emigre poet Heinrich Heine wrote this paean to railroads upon observing the opening of two Parisian lines in May 1843. How 
starkly it reveals both the fascination and tribulation that gripped the minds of 
those who first saw steam railways! Heine appreciated not only the "world­
historical" significance of what he saw but also the power of money to van­
quish space and propel civilization. In marveling at the achievement of accu­
mulated capital seemingly to alter fundamental laws of nature, Heine paid 
tribute, if only indirectly, to those who conceived and financed railroads. 
But the initial reception of railroads in Germany in the 1830s was less 
prophetic, less certain. Early proponents of railroad transportation, such as 
Friedrich List and Friedrich Harkort, failed to persuade rulers and statesmen 
to allocate the necessary millions to build the new iron roads.2 In Prussia, 
fiscal conservatism, technological skepticism, and political fears among high-
ranking government officials initially blocked state participation in railroad 
building. Financial advisers believed the colossal amount of capital demanded 
by railroads would overwhelm the budget of the Prussian state; technical ex­
perts deemed the innovation of steam-propelled transportation on iron rails 
fraught with mechanical problems and thus a money loser; and political elites 
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saw the financial burdens spilling over into a constitutional crisis if the state 
attempted to build its own railroads. Constrained by these principal consider­
ations, the Prussian ministers balked at integrating railroads into state eco­
nomic policy. The job of planning, financing, and building Prussia's first rail­
roads fell by default to the initiative and capital of entrepreneurs. 
The position of businessmen on whether railroads should be built by the 
state or the private sector evolved over the period from 1830 to 1848. As we 
shall see, there were a number of cultural, economic, and political factors 
that shaped the outlook of the business class, but the differing positions were 
guided, not surprisingly, by pragmatism and profit. In the late 1820s and early 
1830s, many Prussian businessmen were reluctant to build railroads as pri­
vate business enterprises, largely because of the likelihood of financial loss 
but also because of mercantilists and idealistic conceptions of the state's role 
in the political economy. But in the late 1830s and 1840s businessmen, in the 
face of unexpected profits, accepted the position of leadership—provided that 
the Prussian state offer supplemental financial and legal support to the new 
industry. The first comprehensive Prussian Railroad Law in 1838, however, 
failed to provide guidelines for firm state support, provoking criticism from 
business circles. When new legislation in 1842 finally anchored the state's 
commitment to private railroad development in the form of dividend guaran­
tees, loans, and stock investment, thereby contributing to a boom expansion 
period (1842-46), businessmen embraced this brand of private ownership. Yet 
enthusiasm for state ownership appeared again in the crash of 1846-49, en­
couraging state officials to draft plans for a state railroad system in 1848. As 
a general rule in the Vormdrz period, entrepreneurial support for state owner­
ship was inversely proportional to the prospect of profit. 
It is nonetheless ironic that the Prussian bureaucracy, which for decades 
demonstrated know-how and foresight in promoting economic reform, failed 
to initiate railroads, perhaps the most significant economic innovation of the 
nineteenth century. Since the time of Frederick the Great, state officials had 
spurned the typical Prussian merchant as too parochial to recognize the orga­
nizational and technological innovations needed for economic progress. Yet 
the organizational and financial abilities that businessmen demonstrated to 
build railroads and expand its allied industries of coal and iron augured a new 
era of entrepreneurial endeavor. The rise of the railroad marked the emergence 
of a new assertive, risk-taking business elite willing to accept the challenge of 
undertaking large capitalist enterprises.3 
Railroads became icons of the new civil society of capital and industry. 
Coal, iron, steel, and the new steam-driven textile mills also played an impor­
tant role in the rise of industrial society. But locomotives, railroad bridges, 
and railroad stations, more than coal mines and iron works, became cultural 
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symbols: they were dramatic visual expressions of modernity, progress, and 
technological power—heralds of a new society. Ludolf Camphausen, a grain 
merchant in Cologne, captured the centrality of railroads to entrepreneurial 
optimism when he announced in 1833 that Europe had entered a new epoch in 
its history, an age of trade and prosperity. "It is not politics or religion that will 
occupy the central position of this age," he wrote, but rather "the striving of 
all peoples for material welfare." And the "most effective lever of promoting 
material welfare . .  . [is] namely: the railroads."4 
The Private Era, 1825-1840 
Prussian business circles were among the earliest on the Continent to perceive 
the utility of railroads and build them. In the same year that George Stephen­
son opened his Darlington-Stockton railway line (1825), and long before the 
first steam-driven German railway (the Bavarian Niirnberg-Fiirth line, 1835), 
Friedrich Harkort published an essay that outlined the commercial impor­
tance of railroad construction, proclaiming it to be a "national obligation." 
"The railroads," he wrote, "will bring forth many revolutions in the commer­
cial world. When one connects Elberfeld, Cologne, and Duisberg with Bre­
men, Holland's transit dues are no more. The Rhenish West-Indian Company 
could consider Elberfeld a harbor once a ton can be transported to Bremen's 
dockside within two days for 2 silver groschen. . . . Rhenish-Westphalian 
commerce would prosper with such a connection to the sea."5 In 1828 Har­
kort founded the first German joint-stock railway company, building a 7.3-
kilometer narrow-gauge, horse-drawn railway from the Himmelfiirst coal 
mine at Uberruhr to Kupferdreh and Nierenhof.6 Between 1825 and 1835 he 
indefatigably promoted railroads. As builder, publicist, and member of several 
Westphalian diets, Harkort was one of Europe's first advocates of railroads.7 
Larger projects followed Harkort's pioneering start. Old manufacturing 
and commercial centers in the Rhineland and the Ruhr demonstrated their 
ability to produce enough share capital to start railway projects. Businessmen 
sought to break the hold of English exports on both finished and raw ma­
terials by making Ruhr coal accessible to neighboring valleys, where English 
coal undersold German coal by half. In its annual report of 1834, the Elber­
feld chamber of commerce complained that English metal buttons undersold 
locally made buttons in spite of import duties and local manufacturers' ad­
vantage with raw materials. Connecting coal seams and forges and factories 
with inexpensive transportation would provide the stimulus to break the En­
glish hold on continental trade. Railroads, the chamber asserted, would lower 
the cost of Ruhr coal, allowing Prussian producers to reclaim German mar­
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kets.8 Numerous committees sprang up in the 1830s in Elberfeld, Cologne, 
Diisseldorf, and Witten that promoted and eventually built important railways: 
the Diisseldorf-Elberfeld, the Berg-Mark, and the Cologne-Minden railways.9 
Among the first entrepreneurs of railroad construction was August von der 
Heydt, a merchant banker from Elberfeld, whose early activity prefigured his 
subsequent role in railway development as Prussian trade minister after 1848. 
On the left bank of the Rhine, Ludolf Camphausen, a wealthy entrepre­
neur active in Cologne, advocated in 1833 the construction of an "iron Rhine" 
from Cologne to Antwerp. For centuries Rhenish manufactures had suffered 
from the control of the mouth of the Rhine by the Dutch, whose tolls added to 
the cost of reaching the North Sea.10 The creation of the Kingdom of Belgium 
in 1830, however, offered the Prussian Rhineland an opportunity to evade 
the Dutch monopoly on Rhine transport. Reacting to Camphausen's plan, 
David Hansemann proposed an alternate route for the Cologne-Belgium line, 
a longer path that would serve the wool merchant's home city of Aachen and 
other Rhenish cities. In 1834-35 Camphausen and Hansemann founded rival 
companies to build the Rhineland-Belgium line, but they eventually merged 
in 1837 to become the Rhenish Railway.11 By the early 1840s private business­
men had formed companies to meet the three essential transportation needs 
in Rhineland and Westphalia: access to Belgium, a route to the Weser and 
the Hanseatic city of Bremen, and connections between the industrial valleys 
of Westphalia (Ruhr, Sieg, and Wupper) to link coal and ore producers with 
foundries and harbors. 
Rhenish businessmen clearly set the pace in early railroad development. 
By 1845 over half of the country's railroad investment was located in this 
one province.12 But bankers and merchants in the eastern provinces also con­
structed and operated lines by the early 1840s: Magdeburg-Leipzig (1837), 
Berlin-Anhalt (1839), Berlin-Stettin (1840), Berlin-Potsdam (1837), Berlin-
Frankfurt (1841), and the Upper Silesian Railway (1841).13 By 1842 private 
initiative had built 587 kilometers of railway, resembling the pattern of early 
construction in England, France, and the United States.14 These railways were 
built without direct state involvement, although the state helped indirectly by 
providing franchise charters, army engineers, and the legal privilege of emi­
nent domain. 
These businessmen exhibited independence and a willingness to take risks 
—definitive qualities of entrepreneurship—but they were not proponents of 
classic laissez-faire economics. Although Adam Smith's doctrines had taken 
hold in influential bureaucratic and university circles in Prussia,15 business­
men opted for private construction of railroads more out of necessity than 
ideological preference. Such notable businessmen as Friedrich Harkort, Lu­
dolf Camphausen, and David Hansemann looked to the state for financial and 
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technical leadership to build railroads but were repeatedly refused. Harkort 
built Westphalia's first railway in 1828, but one year earlier he had petitioned 
for the state to build Westphalia's railways.16 In 1831, as deputy of the West­
phalian provincial diet, he again proposed that the state build a Weser-Lippe 
railroad, but the plan was officially rejected in July 1832.17 In the 1833 essay 
"The Railroad Between Minden and Cologne," Harkort reluctantly advocated 
private initiative, "because one cannot wait for the state."18 
Ludolf Camphausen headed the private Rhenish Railway Company, but 
he too exhorted the government to finance Germany's principal railway routes. 
In 1833 he warned: "A joint-stock company as exclusive owner would con­
stitute a new force in the state and often conflict with the views of the gov­
ernment." 19 He likened railroads to highways and canals and saw danger in 
private ownership of what he felt ought to be, either solely or partly, state 
property. Camphausen presumed both financial and technical state support 
for the Rhenish Railway, and he expressed bitter disappointment when his re­
quest for state subsidies was rejected.20 
Hansemann, the organizer of both the Rhenish and the Cologne-Minden 
railways, also urged the state to monopolize railroads. At the fourth Rhenish 
Diet in 1833 Hansemann stated that "an enterprise so important and so per­
vasive in all material interests should not be left to private speculation . .  . it 
is in the best general interest of the land, when all roads, canals, and railroads 
belong to the state."21 The worth of a railroad, he wrote, should be mea­
sured not by profit (or loss) but rather by the common good. In a subsequent 
essay in 1837, Hansemann argued that the state should bear the cost of the 
institution that would bring general prosperity to the nation.22 A similar argu­
ment came from E. Biilow-Cummerow, a Junker agrarian-capitalist, who did 
not trust private entrepreneurial interests in the west to develop agricultural 
markets in the east. Such an important economic and military instrument as 
railroads, he argued in an 1843 essay on Prussian politics, should not be left 
to "private speculation."23 Unlike contemporary laissez-faire publicists such 
as John Prince Smith,24 commercial leaders in both the western and eastern 
provinces perceived the state, in its ideal form, not as an impediment to de­
velopment but, rather, as an institution to promote economic change. 
Businessmen, however, were disappointed. Harkort lamented in 1835 that 
ten years had passed and little had been done to encourage railroads.25 Camp­
hausen, criticizing the lack of an assertive economic policy, quipped in the 
same year, "Such is the order of things in our beloved Germany. It assembles 
a handsome library of books in German on locomotives, railroads, and canals, 
but we have neither locomotives, nor railroads, nor canals."26 
The assumption among business elites that the state should finance, if not 
own, railroads did not run counter to their financial interests. In this early 
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phase of railroad construction, few believed that private circles could amass 
the capital needed to build. More important, few believed that railroads would 
reap dividends worthy of long-term private investment. Behind arguments 
of the "common good," then, lurked the fear of debt, the belief that just as 
canals and streets had traditionally emptied state coffers, so would railroads.27 
In 1837 Hansemann assumed that railroads would never earn good profits be­
cause the advantage of low tariffs for commerce far outweighed the revenues 
to be earned from rail transport. Although "the mightiest lever of welfare and 
German power," railroads would never be a moneymaker.28 But when rail­
roads demonstrated their ability to make money as well as reduce shipping 
rates in the 1840s and 1850s, the cry for state ownership rapidly disappeared 
among businessmen.29 Profit margins more than economic doctrine affected 
the positions of Prussian businessmen on railroad ownership. 
And yet philosophical-historical considerations did support the idea that 
the state should take up money-losing enterprises for the common good, intel­
lectual convictions that influenced businessmen as well as scholars. Their 
minds were nurtured as much by G. W. F. Hegel and the Comte de St. Simon 
as by the laissez-faire economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Since 
the 1770s German Idealism had depicted the state as the moving force in 
world history, and Utopian socialist St. Simon saw in the growth of science, 
technology, and factory production a pattern for the future reorganization of 
society and government.30 In 1841, when Cologne businessmen (among them 
Gustav Mevissen, Ludolf Camphausen, Gustav Mallinckrodt, and Dagobert 
Oppenheim) financed the Rheinische Zeitung, they chose as editor the young 
Hegelian Karl Marx, not a free trader.31 Early German capitalists saw the state 
as the key to progress, the lever of national welfare. 
More concretely, the Prussian government had heeded the needs of the 
business community for decades, with both laws and direct involvement. Not­
withstanding some glaring and significant clashes with business interests, the 
state enjoyed the reputation of possessing one of the most progressive eco­
nomic policies in the German Confederation.32 Changes introduced by a circle 
of high-ranking officials in the years 1807-13, the Reform Era, enabled mod­
ern capitalism to take root in Prussia. Embracing certain elements of eco­
nomic liberalism, reform bureaucrats Freiherr vom Stein and Prince Karl Au­
gust Hardenberg abolished serfdom, guild restrictions on production, and re­
strictions on occupation and relocation. Tariffs were abolished between prov­
inces but—departing from Smithian economics—set at moderate levels for 
imports to encourage domestic industry.33 These reforms allowed capitalists 
to create open domestic markets, hire (and fire) wage laborers in accordance 
with business cycles, and rely on migration to urban and rural regions for tem­
porary, nontraditional labor. Although the Stein-Hardenberg reforms failed to 
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achieve many of their chief social and political aims, these laws had practical 
force for the infant railroad industry.34 The thousands of navvies that dug and 
built Prussia's first railroad beds and tunnels in the 1830s and 1840s prefigured 
the future industrial concentration of Germany's workforce.35 
In the Rhineland, the Prussian government further enhanced its relation­
ship with the business class by keeping the Napoleonic law code in effect 
after it acquired the province in 1815.36 The legal continuity eased the tran­
sition from French to Prussian rule and sent a strong signal to Rhenish busi­
nessmen, whose prosperity depended on the 1807 Code de Commerce, that 
Prussia recognized the advanced economic state of its new provinces.37 The 
French law codes ensured equality before the law and, unlike the Prussian 
Edict on Municipal Government of 1808 (Stddteordnung), made no distinc­
tion between town and rural residents, provisions which better suited the 
widespread putting-out system of the Rhenish textile industry. The French 
jury system also pleased Rhenish merchants; only property owners could 
be jurors, ensuring "that the law would deal severely with those who com­
mitted crimes against property."38 The Prussian government, furthermore, 
retained the French commercial courts, which settled commercial disputes 
more quickly than civil due process. Prussia also kept intact the semiofficial 
status of the Rhineland's chambers of commerce, through which businessmen 
shaped local affairs and enjoyed Staatsunmittelbarkeit—direct contact to Ber­
lin ministries.39 This apparent spirit of cooperation encouraged businessmen 
to advocate state ownership of railroads. 
The most far reaching achievement of Prussian economic policy before 
1848 was the creation of the Customs Union in 1834.40 This union of eigh­
teen German states removed many economic barriers posed by particularism 
and was the essential precondition for Germany's economic takeoff. To im­
prove trade communication the Prussian government radically overhauled its 
highway and postal system, increasing its highway mileage threefold between 
1817 and 1835 and fourfold by 1842.41 Consequently, the state's interest in im­
proving trade, infrastructure, and economic competitiveness made it a likely 
candidate for railroad ownership. 
More important, perhaps, the long history of direct state intervention in 
the economy led businessmen to believe that the state would absorb losses 
to promote railroads. Since the late eighteenth century, it had built model 
factories, imported new technology through state-sponsored industrial espio­
nage, and offered economic incentives for private investment in steam engines 
and power looms. The state's commercial investment bank, the Seehandlung, 
owned and operated an array of enterprises: coal mines, silk factories, tex­
tile mills, chemical works, and zinc, iron, and steel mills. It owned fleets of 
merchant and steam ships and operated tugs in the Elbe, Havel, and Spree 
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rivers.42 The state founded the Berlin Technical Institute (today the Technische 
Hochschule of Berlin) in 1821 to train civil servants as engineers and machin­
ists. Prussia's first locomotive was manufactured by the royal foundry in 1816, 
though it was decidedly not a model for entrepreneurs. The steam locomo­
tive was pulled by horses around a track in the factory courtyard, and when it 
was transferred to Silesia to work in the coal mines the wheels did not fit the 
track gauge.43 
With these early economic reforms, reform-minded officials hoped to un­
leash the creative and productive energy of individuals. Inspired by Kantian 
views of individual freedom and the economic philosophy of Adam Smith 
(Hegel made his mark on the next generation of bureaucrats), these state ser­
vants of the Reform Era sought to change the fabric of society. Yet, though 
these laws were cloaked in the spirit of laissez-faire individualism, the cut 
was distinctively Prussian. Unlike Adam Smith, who envisioned in the Wealth 
ofNations government reduced to minimal functions, Prussian officials intro­
duced these reforms to restore their badly indebted state to solvency and to 
nurture a new civic spirit capable of generating a popular resistance to French 
domination. Mercantilism, the economic doctrine of the Frederician state, 
had become outmoded. The liberal reform faction in the bureaucracy sought 
to engender greater private wealth that would yield higher tax revenues. The 
progressive elements of Prussia's economic policy did not serve the laissez­
faire program of dismantling government.44 
In short, the principle of the invisible hand was embraced neither by state 
bureaucrats nor by businessmen in Prussia. In the early phase of capitalism, 
both accepted the state's role in guiding, encouraging, and promoting eco­
nomic prosperity. Harkort, Hansemann, Camphausen, and others cautioned 
the Prussian government to learn from the squalor and misery created by En-
gland's laissez-faire excesses. They exhorted the government to enforce child 
labor laws, prevent overconcentration of industry to avoid urban misery, and 
build technical schools to train the unemployed.45 For most Prussian busi­
nessmen, the state was a self-evident component of their economic, social, 
and political outlook. Businessmen had benefited from state intervention in 
the past and expected it in the future. And government officials hoped that if 
commerce and industry were promoted, greater wealth could revive the Prus­
sian state—and the noble and bureaucratic classes that served it. Why, then, 
did the state not build the railways? 
The issue of state railways first arose in the late 1820s. Peter Beuth and 
Karl Schinckel, two prominent civil servants, toured British industrial regions 
in 1826, reported on English railways, and subsequently dispatched a state 
mining engineer and a geologist to study railroad construction.46 These re­
ports impressed Finance Minister Friedrich von Motz and Foreign Minister 
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Christian von Bernstoff, who in 1828 proposed a state railroad to connect the 
Weser and Lippe rivers. But their interest in railroads was grounded mostly in 
a short-term political aim: to apply political pressure on Hanover and Hesse-
Cassel. These states, along with Saxony and the free cities of Bremen and 
Frankfurt, had formed the Middle German Commercial Union in 1828, a cus­
toms league that threatened Prussia's plans for the Zollverein.47 Connecting 
the Rhine and Weser would open up a new toll-free trade link between south­
ern and northern Germany that would exclude Hanover and Hesse-Cassel.48 
The line, moreover, would loosen the Dutch garotte on Rhenish shipping.49 
But the king rejected the railroad plan, insisting that the road between the two 
rivers (connecting the cities Minden and Lippstadt) was adequate.50 And the 
idea faded altogether when both political problems found solutions: the King­
dom of Belgium ended the Dutch trade monopoly in 1830, and Hesse-Cassel 
finally joined the Prussian union in 1831.51 
The Prussian government's refusal in the 1830s to participate in railroad 
building stemmed partially from the initial lack of foresight by the king and 
from the weight of the factions in the bureaucracy and court that opposed 
railroads. In the early 1830s King Friedrich Wilhelm III took little interest 
in railroads and was resistant to arguments promoting them. When he an­
nounced "that he did not see that it made a great deal of difference whether 
one arrived in Potsdam a few hours sooner or later,"52 the king clearly failed 
to grasp the ramifications of railroads. Like the king of Hannover, who ex­
pressed his dislike of cobblers and tailors traveling as fast as he did, Friedrich 
Wilhelm objected to riding with commoners.53 He probably concurred with 
other nobles that the mobility offered by railroads would erode the moral fiber 
of society.54 He refused to use the Berlin-Potsdam line that connected his two 
residences for the first few months of its operation, and throughout the 1830s 
he set a resistant, obstinate tone at court against the "ephemeral fashion" of 
railroads. Nonetheless, one cannot view the king as an absolute opponent of 
railroads.55 In the three years before his death in 1840, he acknowledged the 
military utility of railroads, thus deferring to his generals, who constituted an 
important bureaucratic faction backing railroads. In recognition of the mili-
tary's need for railroads, Friedrich Wilhelm bequeathed one million thalers 
on his deathbed to a railroad line connecting the western and eastern prov-
inces.56 Although this sum alone could not finance the railway, which would 
demand tens of millions of thalers, the legacy represented 1/20 of Prussia's 
money supply and was therefore not insignificant. 
Friedrich Wilhelm's disposition toward railroads was all the more 
strengthened by the negative views of leading officials who together com­
posed a formidable bureaucratic faction against state involvement in railroads: 
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Postmaster General Karl Ferdinand Friedrich von Nagler; Peter Beuth, the 
celebrated promoter of Prussian industry in the finance ministry; and Christian 
von Rother, the president of the Seehandlung, the director of the Royal Bank, 
and the chief of the finance ministry's trade department. The king called upon 
these officials in 1835 to outline a railroad policy. Three charters had already 
been granted by this date,57 but these concessions provided scant information 
in answer to investors' questions regarding the government's attitude toward 
railroad building. Would it build its own network and remove railroads as an 
equity on the stock market? Or would it provide incentive to private investors 
with interest guarantees and favorable loans? The competition for a fourth 
charter between Magdeburg and Leipzig in 1835, compounded by official and 
unofficial requests for a policy, compelled the bureaucracy to consider gen­
eral rules for ownership and administration.58 
Rother's 1835 report damned state participation in railroads. He doubted 
whether railroads were a necessity for the European continent; the present 
demands of transportation, he wrote, were met by the highways and canals.59 
The construction costs, he believed, were also prohibitive. Because continen­
tal railroad companies had yet to pay satisfactory dividends, there was no evi­
dence that railroads could pay for themselves. And if profits were earned, he 
added, they would diminish the revenues from the toll roads and postal roads 
to which the state was committed.60 He also feared that capital, which should 
be invested in industry and state paper, would instead be attracted to rail-
roads.61 Thus, Rother concluded that the state had no business either building 
or subsidizing railroads. But private railroad companies, he acknowledged, 
presented serious problems with both stock swindles and a transportation mo­
nopoly that could harm the state. Consequently, he recommended—true to the 
Prussian bureaucratic spirit—that the government supervise construction and 
administration of private railroads and reserve the right to final ownership.62 
Nagler and Beuth supported Rother's position. Focusing on the specific 
issue of railroads and the postal system, Nagler saw railroads only as a threat 
to government profits and to the state's sovereign control over conveying post. 
As a minister who had worked tirelessly to make the Prussian postal system 
the best in Germany through superior roads and coaches (the latter doubled 
as a profitable transportation system), Nagler was disinclined to see his suc­
cess wiped away by a technological innovation.63 Beuth, on the other hand, 
believed that industrialization had not yet reached a level advanced enough to 
support the financing of railroads. Augmenting the oppositional front of these 
ministries was the Mining Corp, which feared that the promotion of railroads 
would escalate coal production uncontrollably, keeping the state from respon­
sibly managing the coal industry.64 The opinions of Rother's faction were ac­
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cepted by the king, who granted the Magdeburg charter in February 1836 with 
no subsidies or interest guarantees from the state.65 These two basic conditions 
of the 1836 charter became the nucleus of the general Railroad Law of 1838. 
The resistance of these three influential ministers to railway development 
remained throughout the 1840s. In 1837 Rother resigned from his position in 
the finance ministry because his opposition to railroads brought him into di­
rect conflict with the crown prince, but he was later forced in 1842 by Fried­
rich Wilhelm IV to manage railroad finance as the head of the Seehandlung— 
an act by the new king that "amounted to a cruel revenge."66 Nagler remained 
a staunch critic of railroads, while Beuth only grudgingly acquiesced in the 
government's policy. Rudolf Delbriick, a junior official in the finance minis­
try during the 1830s, remarked in his memoirs that Beuth, once a pioneer of 
reform, was "too advanced in years and too set in his ways to blaze new trails. 
This fact was most noticeably—and most sadly—evident with his position on 
railroads . . . [which] belonged to his administrative sphere but hardly existed 
for him. He delegated the preliminary work to his subordinates, limited him­
self to sarcastic remarks during meetings, and merely supplied the signature 
to finished memoranda."67 Ironically, locomotives after 1848 bore his name 
as a tribute to his "promotion" of railroads. 
There were, to be sure, proponents of a state railroad system in the Prus­
sian state. The junior ranks of the bureaucracy were filled with railroad en­
thusiasts who were not scarred by the debt-ridden years of Napoleonic era 
and were more receptive to the promises of the railway age. More crucially, 
the war ministry, shifting from its initial opposition to railroads, which was 
grounded in fear of a quick, indefensible French invasion, came to appreciate 
the benefits of rapid troop transport. In 1836, during the debate on the Rail­
road Law, leading members of the war department advocated a state system, 
which would ensure the military's full exploitation of this new mode of trans-
portation.68 
But when it came time for the king to arrive at a decision in 1837-38, the 
economic realities of state life, as presented by Beuth, Rother, and Nagler, 
overrode the military preference for state lines.69 Prussia had already tripled 
the mileage of its roads between 1816 and 1831, from 3,866 to 10,360 kilo­
meters, at a cost of 42 million thalers, giving it one of the best road systems 
in Europe.70 For a poor state like Prussia, this was a large infrastructural in­
vestment, especially with Rother's efforts to reduce the crushing state debt, 
standing at 250 million thalers after the Napoleonic era.71 A commitment 
to railroads, Rother believed, would burden the state with greater loans and 
negate the government's twenty-year attempt to stabilize its finances.72 Echo­
ing Rother, a state council report of 1838 announced: "It is impermissible to 
jeopardize the fortunate condition of an orderly government budget so that 
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the state, by borrowing money or by depleting necessary reserve funds, can 
play entrepreneur."73 Railroads did not fit into the economic outlook of offi­
cials who, having witnessed near bankruptcy in 1806-7, resolutely adhered to 
fiscal conservatism. 
But the most compelling reason why state officials shied away from rail­
road building was political. At issue was the question of the Prussian constitu­
tion. In 1810 and 1815 the king promised his subjects a constitution guarantee­
ing national representation, a major goal for the reform bureaucrats, who saw 
a constitution as the first step toward transforming the Prussian subject into a 
citizen.74 The constitution, however, never materialized. "Fears of a Jacobin 
revolt in 1818, pressures from Metternich in Vienna, the resistance of conser­
vative ministers and representatives of the East Prussian Junkers, and the con­
servatism of the monarch," writes Jeffry Diefendorf, "all combined to thwart 
plans for a constitution."75 To avoid political change the king never convened 
the United Diet, the central representative body of estates that would most 
certainly have exhorted him to fulfill his promise.76 
But this diet also had an important economic function: it cosigned state 
loans greater than twenty million thalers. The king considered this law, passed 
in 1820 to rein in the expenditures of an expanding bureaucracy, an "innocu­
ous concession," because he planned to rule without loans.77 And, indeed, he 
never called a diet during his reign, 1797-1840. Hardenberg, the king's lead­
ing minister, on the other hand, saw this 1820 law as the third promise for a 
constitution and as a mechanism to accelerate the building of a national as­
sembly78 He was right. With the industrial age imminent in Germany, this law 
effectively curbed royal and bureaucratic prerogatives, for it linked the state's 
finances to the constitutional question.79 Because the cost of railroad construc­
tion was too high to avoid the cosignatory, the railroad question was at once 
political and economic. This fact did not escape entrepreneurs such as Har­
kort, Camphausen, and Hansemann, all advocates of a constitutional monar­
chy. Their pamphlets in the 1830s pleading for state railroads bristled with this 
political subtext. They believed the urgency of building railroads in conjunc­
tion with the 1820 debt law would bring the constitutional question to a head.80 
Unwilling to face the political consequences of raising the credit to build 
railroads, the Prussian government introduced a general Railroad Law in 1838 
that handed the task offinance and construction over to the private sphere. The 
law's concise forty-nine paragraphs included provisions for upkeep, taxation, 
charters, stock subscription, police supervision, safety standards, postal trans­
port, military use, eminent domain and compensation, passenger and freight 
prices, profits (announcement, limitation, and use thereof), and the exclusion 
of competing lines for thirty years.81 The law's most salient features were the 
state's right to supervise administration and the company's need to receive 
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state authorization for any changes, such as branch lines or new stock issues. 
An appointed state commissioner would act as liaison between the govern­
ment and company, and he was to be notified of all stockholder and board 
meetings.82 The state, furthermore, reserved the right to take over a company 
after thirty years and set specific conditions for indemnifying stockholders.83 
The law exempted railway companies from commerce and stamp taxes but 
nonetheless imposed a special levy (as compensation for diminished toll reve­
nues on highways) that would enable the government to purchase stock. Given 
the political and economic constraints of the state, the law was tailored more 
to its needs than the needs of railroad builders. The law relegated a task that 
the state could not carry out to the private sphere but nonetheless reserved the 
state's right to supervise the industry and eventually own it. 
Historians have praised the law for its remarkable prescience of future 
needs and disputes,84 but contemporaries were not as sanguine. Karl August 
Varnhagen von Ense, the writer and perceptive observer of Prussian politics, 
entered in his diary on 13 April 1838 that the government "even makes a 
soured face to railroads."85 Less casual in locution, the Aachen and Cologne 
chambers of commerce presented stinging critiques of the law, objecting par­
ticularly to paragraph 48, which retroactively applied the law to the company 
charter already granted to the Rhenish Railway for the Aachen-Cologne line.86 
(The railway company, in fact, never recognized the validity of this particu­
lar clause.) The restrictive and potentially expensive clauses of the law, such 
as the company's unlimited liability for persons and goods traveling on the 
railway and a 10 percent ceiling on profits, led stockholders of the Rhenish 
Railway to believe that directors had duped them by deliberately founding the 
company before promulgation of the law.87 
Such complaints prompted a special meeting of stockholders with Ernst 
von Bodelschwingh, the provincial governor of the Rhineland, who freely ad­
mitted the deficiencies of the law.88 Officials of the Rhenish Railway, Ludolf 
Camphausen and David Hansemann among them, promised the stockholders 
to petition the government to amend the law. For this reason Camphausen im­
mediately published "Toward a Contribution to the Railroad Law," an essay 
that urged the government to amend the legal vagueness of the law and to 
recognize the public good to be derived from private railroads. He criticized 
the spirit of the law, which set the obligations of a railway to the state but not 
the reverse.89 He believed the lack of state support retarded railroad develop­
ment, while the many restrictions and obligations imposed on companies cut 
into slim profits. Camphausen concluded that the law would drive investors 
and entrepreneurs away from Prussia.90 
Hansemann, too, attacked government railway policy with three pam­
phlets. In 1837 he had already attempted to influence the writing of the law 
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with his "The Railroads and Their Stockholders in Their Relationship to the 
State." This pamphlet strove to influence the government, which in January 
of that year had begun to draft the Railroad Law. It ostensibly advocated state 
ownership, but its title revealed the true aim: to strike a balance between state 
supervision and the rights of stockholders. To create this equipoise, guaran­
tees of entrepreneurial freedom had to be secured so that speedy construction, 
efficient management, safe investment, and the needs of the "common good" 
could all be met.91 He wrote that the government's alleged plan to design a law 
that reserved the right to enact future restrictions, interfere in company deci­
sions, and impose its conditions retroactively on already chartered companies 
resulted in a shaky legal basis for private railroad ownership. He endorsed 
state supervision, which he believed was proper to avoid the abuses found in 
the American system, but objected to the absolute power conferred on the 
ministers by the law. Joint-stock companies were corruptible, he noted, but 
overweening government control was equally destructive for investment and 
efficient administration.92 Instead he advocated commissions in which repre­
sentatives from government, commerce, and industry would issue, renew, and 
revoke charters after reviewing companies' performance.93 
In 1838 Hansemann attempted a second time to influence the final draft 
of the law. Centering on the relation of the postal system to private compa­
nies, the essay "Prussia's Most Important Railroad Question" criticized the 
power accorded the postmaster general to determine independently the repa­
ration fee for each railroad company. It pleaded for firm laws that would apply 
the same criteria to each company infixing compensation and thus avoid arbi­
trary action by ministers. In this essay Hansemann's belief in private railroad 
ownership was more pronounced; the argument rested on the premise of pri­
vate companies and their unassailable right to seek reasonable profit while 
providing a public service. 
In 1841 Hansemann's A Critique of the Prussian Railroad Law of 3 Novem­
ber 1838 went further and lambasted the one-sided discussion that created 
a law that, he claimed, failed to provide clearly delineated legal protections 
upon which private investors could depend. He criticized the fact that all 
branches of government were CQnsulted, abiding by the collegial system of 
Prussia's bureaucracy, yet entrepreneurs were not invited to contribute. "Thus 
a law came into being," he wrote, "that gives stockholders the impression that 
the state has received the legal means to ruin companies, an opinion that is 
especially evident in the Rhineland, where one is accustomed to expect legal 
protection more from laws and less from what the government feels is fair."94 
Hansemann's commitment to constitutionalism emerged in his attack on legis­
lation designed under bureaucratic absolutism: "This condition is to be named 
lawless, when the legal conditions are so made that the profits of an enterprise 
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depend on state officials' sense of fairness. However beautiful and honorable 
the state government finds this trust in its own fairness, it honors itself more 
and appears worthier when the state establishes lawful justice fairly, as op­
posed to making lawlessness a law and then consoling itself with the belief 
that there is trust in its fairness."95 For Hansemann the "unmeasured paternal­
ism and control" which the law reserved for the state, combined with the "un­
heard of responsibilities" that it imposed on private companies, amounted to 
flawed legislation inappropriate for a rising commercial and industrial state.96 
He reminded the government that the cost of building public railroads was be­
yond the state's capacity. Having failed to provide for the common good, the 
government was wrong to lay unnecessary burdens and restrictions on pri­
vate companies.97 The political message was unmistakable: Prussia's business 
class, its bourgeoisie, merited a greater say in governmental affairs because it 
could now provide the economic power the state lacked.98 
The complaints of Camphausen, Hansemann, and the chambers of com­
merce surfaced in the Rhenish diet, whose 1841 proceedings petitioned the 
state for a revision of the law.99 These criticisms seemed to have had some 
effect. The state council, for example, amended a paragraph in the cabi-
net's original draft of the 1838 law that allowed the postmaster general to 
impose compensation fees on individual companies as he saw fit. Echoing 
Hansemann's critique, the revised version planned fixed terms (to be set at a 
future date) for compensation. Moreover, two paragraphs heavily criticized by 
Camphausen and Hansemann—the lease of a company's railways to another 
company and the 10 percent maximum on company profits—were never en­
forced. Finally, future discussions on railroad policy included railroad entre­
preneurs. 
The Mixed System, 1840-1847 
In 1838-39 the common stock of the Rhenish Railway fell twenty points 
below par, forcing its directors to sell reserves of stock to raise money and 
thereby increasing the amount of devalued paper in circulation and further 
depressing its price. This downward movement in value, which conformed 
to a general trend, encouraged the belief among businessmen that the Rail­
road Law had failed to give private companies enough government backing.100 
Threatened with liquidation, the Rhenish Railway appealed to the government 
to buy 4,000 shares at market value for one million thalers. The government 
refused despite Hansemann's threat to sell the 4,000 shares to the Belgian 
government, which he did secretly in October 1839.101 
The belief of Prussian businessmen that the direct effect of the Railroad 
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Law was a bear market is important. They feared that they would lose inves­
tors to Bavarian and Saxon railroads, which paid better dividends, and rea­
soned that the state was obliged to aid the fledgling railways. The lack of com­
mitment embodied in the 1838 law, they believed, harmed the business, and 
they complained about the government's inconsistent messages to investors.102 
Stock returns over the next four years, 1839-42, strengthened this view. Of 
the six Prussian railway companies offering dividends, five paid rates either 
the same as or lower than those of previous years.103 Relative to the European 
and American railroad market, this performance fell short of investors' ex-
pectations—and early railroad owners maneuvered boldly with block shares 
to prevent further devaluation. Although the 1840s are generally regarded as 
a prosperous period for railroad stocks and bonds, company ledgers reveal a 
precarious time. In hindsight, we see the beginning of irreversible industrial 
growth, the groundswell of Prussian economic superiority.104 Businessmen in 
the 1840s, however, did not exhibit the confidence often associated with early 
capitalism. 
In principle the 1838 law consigned all finance and construction of rail­
roads to private hands. Yet the old habit of state promotion of industries 
deemed important for its military or fiscal benefit reasserted itself. In 1839, the 
Seehandlung, the government's commercial bank, granted the Berlin-Anhalt 
Railway a 500,000 thaler loan and purchased shares amounting to one mil­
lion thalers.105 Similarly, the government aided the Berlin-Stettin Railway by 
purchasing 500,000 thalers worth of company bonds, while promising the 
Pomeranian diet to uphold its claim to the railway company to guarantee a 
4 percent dividend.106 Rother, who authorized these transactions, reluctantly 
acquiesced in the state's altered policy of aiding certain important lines. 
These actions were but overtures to what was to come after Friedrich 
Wilhelm IV came to the throne in 1840. Compared to his father's caution 
in mediating between rival parties in economic policy, the new king's open-
minded optimism toward railroads set a new tone in matters of economic re-
form.107 The Hohenzoller, like his Bavarian cousin Ludwig, had a passion for 
railroads and strongly believed in the state's obligation to promote them.108 As 
crown prince he had fought the conservative opinions of his father's minis­
ters in the 1830s, and it was his quarrel with Rother over the Railroad Law 
of 1838 that prompted the minister to resign from the finance ministry's trade 
department. The new king, with the backing of military advisers, was intent 
on building railroads in the eastern lands, especially a railway between Berlin 
and Konigsberg.109 
The public discussion on railroads was renewed in 1841 when the king 
called upon the provincial diets to select representatives for United Commit­
tees of the Estates of the Prussian Provincial Diets (Vereinigten stdndischen 
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AusschUsse der preussischen Provinziallandtage) to meet in Berlin in October 
1842. This committee was the first public expression of his commitment to re­
instate "Germanic" corporate assemblies, an extension of the provincial diets 
intended to restore something of the feudal Stdndestaat that absolutism had 
destroyed. The king decided when the standing committee would convene 
and what issues it would address. Its function was to be purely advisory.110 
But the king also saw the committee as a shrewd way to finance 
loans without granting a constitution. "A Central Diet [Reichstdnde] can be 
avoided," the king wrote his brother Prince Carl, "by contracting loans 
through a body composed of 32 deputies and 32 state councilors." m The 
Committee, he wrote to Oberprdsident Theodor von Schon, would raise "the 
possibility . .  . of enjoying all the advantages of a general diet without having 
to fear the consequences [Erschtitterungen] that the sudden introduction of the 
latter might bring."112 
For bourgeois liberals, though, a joint committee of provincial deputies 
revived hopes for a constitution.113 In connection with other reforms, such as 
less stringent press censorship,114 the committee appeared as the cautious first 
step toward fulfilling the promise of a constitution. The enthusiastic reaction 
of the press and its reform-minded audience, in fact, corresponded to the fears 
of Metternich, the tsar, and the king's ministers, most of whom implored him 
not to proceed with the idea.115 
To throttle political discussion during the committee's sessions, the king's 
ministers (Bodelschwingh and Eichhorn) drew up a narrow agenda of three 
questions to be presented to the deputies and furthermore created a protocol 
that prohibited debate and petition. The result was an agenda in which Hanse-
mann "recognized neither a political nor a practical thought."116 The three 
questions posed to the committee that assembled in October and November 
1842 were whether the salt tax should be lowered to help the working classes; 
whether private rivers should be opened for public navigation; and whether 
the government should establish a Railroad Fund to promote private compa­
nies' construction of a national network connecting all provinces. 
With the last question, the government proposed to help build five basic 
lines, whose construction was estimated to cost fifty-five million thalers: a 
Rhein-Weser line; a railway through Thuringia to the west; a railway from the 
Oder River to the Russian border; a line from Frankfurt on-the-Oder to Bres­
lau and continuing to upper Silesia; and a line to connect Posen and Silesia. 
The government guaranteed a 3.5 percent dividend for the stock of private 
companies but cautioned (to avoid charges of increasing the debt) that it would 
not spend more than two million thalers.117 
The first two issues facing the committee were not controversial (the 
former was a foregone conclusion, the latter technical and trivial), but the 
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question of a national railroad network was not as tame as the government 
had hoped. First, it raised the age-old Prussian question of whether the gov­
ernment should encourage state unity or preserve the particular political tra­
ditions of its provinces. Railroads amounted to economic and infrastructural 
unity, which liberals hoped would develop a common political consciousness 
and, ultimately, "unified political representation of all Prussian people."118 
Second, the 1820 debt law, as we have already seen, required that state-
financed railroads be approved by the estates in a United Diet, thus raising 
the question of whether the fund could legally be approved. "There can be no 
doubt as to the illegality of this kind of support," Ludolf Camphausen wrote 
his brother Otto. "The question is whether the government will decide to re­
veal the actual state of our finances."119 The political dimension of railroad 
building could not be ignored. 
The king's plan to use the committee as a rubber stamp for his economic 
and political designs was only partially successful. Although the assembled 
body did not have the right to initiate discussion, engage in debate, or even 
thank the king in a formal address, unpleasant questions arose. Friedrich 
Joseph Brust, a merchant from the Rhenish town of Boppard, declared that 
the committee was not empowered to approvefinancial operations of the state 
and asked for exact information on state assets and incomes before discussing 
financial matters. Moreover, if the state was interested in promoting railroads, 
he announced, it was obligated to convene a United Diet.120 August von der 
Heydt, a deputy representing the Westphalian diet, also broke with proto­
col, stating that because of the "great improbability of a high dividend from 
the designated railway lines, it appears wiser if the state took over construc­
tion." 121 This comment received the clear support of the majority, suggesting 
either a belief in state-supported economic enterprises or a political ploy to 
force the king to convene the United Diet. 
Heydt pressed the issue of state railroads so vigorously that Bodel­
schwingh, the presiding representative of the king's cabinet, forbade any fur­
ther discussion on state railways. The state, he announced, did not plan to build 
railroads, and the committee was convened only to consider the state's role in 
guaranteeing dividends for private construction. When committee members 
continued to question the legal validity of approving dividend guarantees, 
Bodelschwingh threatened to retract this question from the agenda and have 
the king renounce any kind of state support for railroads.122 Faced with this 
threat, the committee approved the original request with only fourteen dis­
senting votes.123 
Yet the committee unexpectedly exhibited initiative. Led by Heydt, the 
members of the committee compelled Bodelschwingh to take an additional 
vote on a tortuously formulated hypothetical question: "Whether the assembly 
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wishes to declare in the protocol that it believes the best means for carrying 
out the projected railroad lines is at state cost and would have voted for this 
option had the government not expressly stated its decision not to build rail­
roads in the near future at state expense."124 This motion was defeated 50 to 
47, a narrow but surprising loss for Heydt's popular position. Heydt ascribed 
the defeat to the peculiar hypothetical nature of the question, but the divided 
vote also showed the lingering willingness of politically inexperienced lib­
erals to accommodate the wishes of the government.125 Once it was clear that 
the government had no intention of building state railroads, many abandoned 
the position of principled opposition. 
Heydt's unflinching support for state-owned railroads in the 1840s mer­
its explanation. His viewpoint, which remained unaltered for the next thirty 
years, significantly affected German political economy, for he served as Prus-
sia's trade minister from 1848 to 1862. Although we have no primary docu­
mentation by Heydt on the origins of his position, his advocacy of state rails 
most likely grew out of his early trying experiences in launching private rail­
road projects.126 In the years 1836-42, Heydt led Elberfeid in attempting to 
build three railroad lines that would connect the commercial and financial 
center of the Wupper valley with branch lines to the coal seams of the Ruhr 
(Elberfeld-Witten line) and Berg regions (Elberfeld-Duesseldorf line), as well 
as with a trunk line connecting the Rhine and Weser rivers (the Rhine-Weser 
line). Heydt could hardly claim unqualified success; two of the three projected 
companies never came to life.127 Finding investors for the Rhine-Weser line 
(260 kilometers long) was especially difficult, provoking Heydt in 1838 and 
1839 to appeal to the state for a two-million thaler subscription. When the 
government refused, the company was compelled to stop its preliminary work 
and dissolve itself, producing in turn considerable regional distrust of future 
railroad schemes.128 
Following the coronation of Friedrich Wilhelm IV, whose enthusiasm for 
railroads produced a new optimism for construction, Hansemann's company 
received the right to build a Rhine-Weser line in 1841. The Cologne-Minden 
Railroad, however, planned a route that bypassed Elberfeid, arousing indigna­
tion and fury among the city's commercial elites. Heydt was a leading mem­
ber of the Berg-Mark Railroad Committee that protested to the king both the 
route and the study, which fixed a prohibitively high cost to include Elberfeid. 
Challenging the plans of the private Cologne-Minden Railroad, this com­
mittee proposed a "Rhenish-Westphalian line," built solely from state funds. 
This proposal fell on deaf ears in Berlin, but the committee's efforts were not 
in vain. The government agreed to fund an independent survey to assess the 
accuracy of Hansemann's cost projections. More important, the ardent wishes 
of Elberfeid businessmen to be linked to the railroad network were eventually 
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realized in March 1844 with the chartering of a line between Elberfeld and 
Dortmund, which became the Berg-Mark Railroad.129 For this railroad Heydt 
acted as both financial officer and chairman of the board.130 
Heydt's early engagement with railroads is instructive for two principal 
reasons. First, it reveals how interwoven political and economic issues were 
for the business class. Heydt's honorary public offices as a judge for the re-
gion's commercial court (1831; president 1840), a city councillor (1833), and 
a member of the district diet (1834) had always been connected with business 
and his status as the oldest son of a commercial patrician family. But business 
and politics were made indivisible by the convergence of Heydt's financially 
based desire, as a banker and an entrepreneur, to bring rail lines to Elberfeld 
with his political duties in the seventh Rhenish provincial diet in 1841 and 
in the standing committee of 1842. Second, Heydt's assertive, almost defiant, 
support for state railroads in the United Committee in 1842 is most likely ex­
plained by his frustrating experience in attempting to control Elberfeld's rail­
road future. The struggles among rival commercial centers to influence, if not 
dominate, railroad politics compounded by the difficulty of raising sufficient 
capital on the private market seems to have left an indelible mark on his think­
ing. Although most other Prussian commercial elites changed their stance 
after 1842 and championed private ownership, Heydt tirelessly strove for state 
ownership. Heydt would champion other economic liberal causes in his tenure 
as a state minister (joint-stock principle, privatization of coal industry), but 
he tenaciously advanced state ownership in the heyday of private railroads. 
The vote that approved the Railroad Fund in 1842 produced a discrete 
government account set up in 1843 to promote the construction of the five 
proposed railways. The government transferred a one-time sum of six mil­
lion thalers to the Railroad Fund. Additional two million-thaler annual install­
ments replenished it. The government further announced its decision to invest 
in one-seventh of the capital stock of the five proposed lines and guarantee 
the remaining six-sevenths of share capital with a 3.5 percent dividend. The 
interest on the government's stock flowed not to the treasury but to the Rail­
road Fund, whose assets were to be used to acquire more shares.131 
The Railroad Fund established the mixed system of railroad building in 
Prussia. The far-reaching supervisory powers that the government granted 
itself in the Railroad Law of 1838 were now balanced by financial subsidies 
and dividend guarantees to private railways. The mixture of private enterprise 
and state support roughly corresponded to the earlier suggestions of Camp­
hausen, Hansemann, and others.132 The state support for these five trunk lines 
signaled a new government commitment to the industry, which entrepreneurs 
believed would benefit all Prussian railroads. Indeed, railway companies not 
among the privileged five did receive state help. In 1843 the Rhenish Rail­
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way was granted a loan of 1.25 million thalers, and the Berg-Mark Railway 
received a million thaler loan in 1844. 
Under the mixed system, railroad securities experienced a boom between 
1842 and 1846, exceeding state paper and all other enterprises in dividends.133 
The boom underscored a new position of strength for railroad businessmen, 
who could profit from their own enterprises but still have the assurance of 
government commitment. The arrangement also put to rest the question of 
whether the state should monopolize ownership. "Since so many private rail­
roads were in operation, in construction, or in the planning stage," wrote 
Hansemann's biographer, "it could now only be a question of a mixed sys­
tem of private and state railways, and the experience in Belgium and Baden 
showed that the state built much more expensively than private companies." m 
Above all, the mixed system worked. Between 1842 and 1848, sixteen pri­
vate railroads were chartered in Prussia, capitalized at 84,232,500 thalers.135 
By dint of Prussia's surge in railroad construction, Germany's railway mile­
age doubled that of France.136 
The mixed system reflected a spirit of cooperation, but this change does 
not entirely describe government-business relations in the 1840s. Stock mar­
ket laws introduced in April and May 1844 prohibited trading foreign stocks, 
buying on margin, and, above all, subscribing railroad stock without permis­
sion from thefinanceministry.137 The laws attempted to curb the mania for rail­
road securities that gripped Prussian society after 1842—drawing in even arti­
sans and the lower echelons of the bureaucracy, many of whom lost substantial 
savings on reckless, inexperienced trading. The radically increased volume in 
securities multiplied the number of illegal stock-jobbers, thus weakening the 
regulatory power of the state. The railroad boom also threatened temporarily 
the viability of both state bonds and the mortgage bonds of provincial land 
banks.138 The latter were the foundation of Junker economic life; since the late 
eighteenth century these bonds had generated the funds that financed the tran­
sition of noble estates from a local subsistence economy to an agrarian market 
capitalism. Strengthening bureaucratic controls on buying stock while curtail­
ing the number of railroad securities to be traded in Prussia reflected the sus­
picious attitude of both state officials and landed nobles toward the new joint-
stock operations. The action of conservative elites against the new money 
class demonstrated their fear of industrial capitalism and the ambivalence of 
state economic policy, which simultaneously hindered and helped business. 
The government law intended to crack down on questionable ventures 
and brokers, but it also contributed to the first modern stock market panic. In­
vestors halted further payments on stocks, banks withdrew their investments 
from Berlin, and the impossibility of future stock issues threatened the sol­
vency of many existing companies. Contemporaries referred to a Geldkrisis: 
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a shortage of liquid capital because of the government's conservative policies 
on money supply and commercial loans, compounded by its refusal to allow 
joint-stock banks to operate in Prussia.139 This shortage of investment capital 
was now heightened by a lack of confidence in the stock market. The panic of 
1844, a direct reaction to the new law, depressed the value of railroad stocks 
by 20 percent.140 
The panic became the overture to a short-term depression (1846-49) trig­
gered by crop failures between 1844 and 1847. The potato blight of 1845 and 
bad harvests in 1846 raised the average price of basic foods 50 percent and 
doubled the price of potatoes and rye. It produced a misery that had not been 
seen since the famine of 1816-17 and the economic privation suffered under 
the Continental System.141 In conjunction with bad harvests, the lack of con­
fidence in investment and the drop in production contributed to the social 
unrest caused by the unemployment, hunger, and social distress of Germany's 
laboring classes in the years before 1848. 
In spite of the harsh laws against highfinance, clear entrepreneurial oppo­
sition to government is not evident. At the same time as these hostile laws, the 
government and business circles developed a dialogue that was less paternal­
istic than in past times. The government recognized its failure to consult those 
directly affected by the 1838 Railroad Law. In February 1843 thefinance min­
istry issued a rescript, asking its provincial officials (Landrate, Regierungs­
prasidenten, and Oberprasidenten) to consult property owners and railroad 
companies on how to revise the Railroad Law.142 The report to the Branden­
burg Oberprasident that summarized the results of local officials' inquiries 
showed a broad enthusiastic response from railroad companies and property 
owners. The Berlin-Potsdam, Berlin-Anhalt, and Berlin-Frankfurt railways 
presented a list of complaints, "endorsing more or less Hansemann's Critique 
of the Railroad Law, and the Berlin-Anhalt referred to it directly."143 Prussia's 
bureaucracy began to consult businessmen. 
By granting a charter in 1846 to the Association of Prussian Railroad 
Administrations, the government recognized the competency of businessmen 
to administrate railroad affairs and to propose sensible reforms. Ten railway 
companies attended the association's meeting in November 1846, convened 
primarily to draft a unified, thoroughgoing revision of the 1838 Railroad Law. 
The twenty-five substantial revisions proposed by the committee were pub­
lished for circulation a year later by a Friedrich Kuhlwetter, a Diisseldorf-
Elberfeld Railway director, and two directors of the Rhenish railway, Mevis­
sen and Quadflieg.144 Revolution interrupted this process of modifying the 
law. The association also presented the state with a list of its supervisory 
abuses.145 In addition, it began to formulate regulations for unifying both time­
tables and operational procedure. By 1848 the association—now expanded to 
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other German states—coordinated all railways to one time standard (Berliner 
Normalzeit).146 
The government further acknowledged the rising importance of com­
merce and industry in state policy with the creation of a Trade Department 
in 1844, which was a subsidiary office of the finance ministry, and the Royal 
Bank in 1846, a semipublic central bank of issue. Both changes were roundly 
denounced as insufficient reforms: business factions in the provincial diets 
had demanded a trade ministry and felt slighted with a mere department and, 
similarly, the Royal Bank fell far short of relieving the problems of money 
supply and commercial credit that had plagued businessmen in the last two 
decades.147 Although the Trade Department was not an autonomous ministry, 
the office did ensure greater participation of the business class in economic 
policy. Responding to the Berlin Trade Corporation in 1844, the president of 
the Trade Department wrote: "No laws that touch on trade and commerce will 
be passed, no changes in tariff policy will be adopted, no export and shipping 
laws with other countries will be settled without the Trade Department, which 
will in all such occasions consult the ranks of businessmen to apprehend their 
experiences and views and get to know their wishes."148 These half-measures 
pleased few, but the creation of the Trade Department nonetheless showed that 
bureaucratic absolutism was grudgingly retooling state machinery for entre­
preneurial needs. 
The higher status and recognition that the state accorded the business 
class by the mid-1840s was further exhibited in 1846 when the government 
appealed to chambers of commerce for advice on whether abolishing the 
1844 laws would alleviate the business depression. The response was lively 
but hardly showed a united front of businessmen against government eco­
nomic policy. Whereas some chambers endorsed maintaining the laws (Dan­
zig, Hagen, Krefeld, Koblenz, Elberfeld) because they were not the cause of 
the economic distress, others (Cologne, Aachen, Stettin, Kbnigsberg, Magde­
burg, Halle, Erfurt) strongly endorsed their abolition. For Friedrich Engels 
the lack of common aims among business groups and their failure to mount 
an effective political front indicated political immaturity.149 Indeed, only 
Aachen's chamber of commerce pointed to the unfulfilled promise of a con­
stitution to explain the crisis of 1844.150 But the division more likely points to 
a belief among businessmen that the Prussian state still advocated economic 
progress and, more important, showed signs of integrating commercial and 
industrial interests into state policy. Initiating a dialogue to adjust unfair laws 
suggested the state's willingness to weigh business interests. And to avoid 
greater devaluation of the securities market in the 1840s, the government did 
not levy the tax on railroad companies stipulated in the 1838 law—a rare in­
stance of a government passing up already approved revenues. 
It is clear that the position of state bureaucrats toward businessmen's 
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groups (chambers of commerce, corporations, lobbies, diets, etc.) had evolved 
by the mid-1840s. The Prussian state bureaucracy's longstanding claim of 
governing effectively in all areas of public life had worn thin among entre­
preneurs. It was evident in numerous areas of economic life that the state 
lacked expertise, and, significantly, the state tacitly acknowledged this. In 
matters of taxation, tariffs, trade relations, transportation, and industrial devel­
opment, the state bureaucracy did not always follow its traditional procedure 
of autonomously formulating policies and instead availed itself of business 
groups' views for drafting legislation. In matters of banking, credit, and com­
mercial law, such business groups as the Berlin Trade Corporation ceased to 
be merely councilors but rather became technical experts in drafting policy. 
Kaelble's research on Berlin businessmen shows that in the 1840s state bu­
reaucrats yielded ground to allow bankers, merchants, and businessmen into 
the "decision-making sphere" in matters of commercial and credit laws.151 
Although possessing no formal right to participate in policy decision making, 
business elites were expanding their participation in governmental affairs with 
meetings and written recommendations.152 
For certain business elites, then, a qualitative equality existed between 
themselves and bureaucrats. Hansemann wrote in 1839, "I speak and write 
freely about the deficiencies of the bureaucracy to people in high places— 
very high places—and none can fault me and must hear me whether they 
like it or not."153 In his memoirs, Rudolf Delbruck, an official in the min­
istry of finance, acknowledged the respect that such businessmen as Hanse-
mann commanded in questions of commercial and industrial policy. In one 
instance, Delbruck recalled feeling "ashamed" when a position paper on tar­
iffs in 1846 by "outstanding" Rhenish businessmen was brusquely dismissed 
by thefinance minister; the shame stemmed from the misguided arrogance of 
a minister not heeding the views of men who were self-evident authorities on 
the question of differential tariffs.154 Although examples of haughty bureau­
cratic behavior toward the business class persisted, it is because of such civil 
servants as Delbruck who respected the views of businessmen that critical 
negotiation, not outright opposition, remained for many businessmen the best 
means of changing bureaucratic policy. The probability of bourgeois entre­
preneursfinding like-minded middle-class bureaucrats was great. "Bourgeois 
membership," writes Eric D. Brose, "in the ministries, institutes, agencies, 
corps, and services which made up the state stood, variously, between 46-100 
percent."155 
The blurred line between business and government interests can also be 
seen in how chambers of commerce reacted to the legislation against unfet­
tered stock speculation. Although the law of 1844 was patently hostile to the 
railroad industry, some business circles agreed with the government. The Ber­
lin Trade Corporation, for example, stated in 1846 that diverting the flow of 
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capital away from railroads would help settle the crisis,156 thus endorsing the 
state's attempt to rein in the corporation's business partners in Cologne, Bres­
lau, and Aachen. This endorsement is a reminder of the care one must take 
not to exaggerate the distance that stood between the business class and the 
bureaucratic-noble elements of the Prussian establishment. 
The division between the public and private spheres is further blurred by 
an examination of the careers of businessmen and bureaucrats before 1848. 
Many state officials worked for railroads as engineers, geologists, legal ad­
visers, and directors. The Rhenish Railway directors Ammon, Open, and 
Hauchecorne were all civil servants on leave, as were the engineers Pickel 
(Rhenish Railway), Neuhaus (Berlin-Stettin Railway), Hermann (Berg-Mark 
Railway), Hartwich (Stargard-Posen and Rhenish railways), and Henz (Rhen­
ish Railway).157 Friedrich Wilhelm von Reden, an official in the foreign service 
in the 1840s, also worked as "special director" of the Berlin-Stettin Railway. 
Friedrich Kiihlwetter, a civil servant who later became a minister and a pro­
vincial governor, was a director of the Diisseldorf-Elberfeld Railway in the 
1840s. Hans Viktor von Unruh, the director of the Magdeburg-Leipzig line 
and later a revolutionary leader, began his career as a state engineer. The 
lieutenant colonels Podewils and von Krawel were directors on the Berlin-
Hamburg and Berlin-Frankfurt railways respectively.158 The Puttkammers, a 
family of Junker civil servants, invested heavily in the Berlin-Potsdam line. 
Robert von Puttkamer used his influence as a company director in October 
1845 to persuade Provincial Governor von Meding to secure a state loan for 
the railway.159 
Ernst von Bodelschwingh, the Rhenish provincial governor in the 1830s, 
complained in 1838 that a Rhenish government councilor and other officials 
defended the interests of joint-stock companies all too eagerly, owing to their 
investments in them.160 Conflicts of interest grew so great in the bureaucracy 
and the officer corps that the king issued a secret decree in 1844 barring fur­
ther direct involvement with railroad finance.161 In short, business and govern­
ment circles overlapped. Businessmen drew on both technical experience and 
political connections when employing state bureaucrats. Conversely, many 
officials welcomed new economic sectors that offered good salaries to profes­
sionals frustrated by the lack of advancement in civil service in the 1840s.162 
Railroad directors were also successful in attracting influential nobles to the 
business. The Hohenzoller Prince Carl, Furst Radziwill, and Graf zu Dohna 
were just some of Prussia's high-ranking nobles who sat on "honorary" rail­
road committees in return for railway shares.163 The porous divisions separat­
ing government and business perhaps encouraged businessmen to work within 
the bureaucratic system and not categorically oppose it. The above discussion 
reveals the empirical weaknesses of characterizing the Prussian state as pre­
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dominantly dominated by the interests of nobles (Junkerstaat), or by a gov­
ernment whose officials retained a caste-like loyalty (Beamtenstand) which 
superseded interests of class. Historians should jettison both explanations of 
the Prussian state and instead recognize the growing interpenetration of state 
and society in the 1840s that forced the Prussian state to reconstitute its ruling 
establishment during the first industrial revolution. 
The closely knit web of relations that existed among businessmen, bu­
reaucrats, and nobles, however, did not preclude businessmen's criticism of 
governmental politics. Not only did businessmen express their annoyance at 
the state's dilatory tempo in responding to the needs of modern finance and 
industry, but they also objected to the arrogance of the Prussian state in de­
laying further the promulgation of a constitution. The publication of Friedrich 
Wilhelm Ill's testament in 1840, which directly referred to a "central assem­
bly of the estates," renewed the constitutional movement,164 and such entre­
preneurs as David Hansemann, Gustav Mevissen, Hermann von Beckerath, 
and Ludolf Camphausen—all railroad directors—were among the principal 
spokesmen of Rhenish liberalism.165 These men strove to transform Prussia 
into a constitutional monarchy founded on the rule of law.166 Writing for an 
American newspaper in 1852, Friedrich Engels wrote that by 1840 the bour­
geoisie of Prussia had "arrived at a stage where it found the development of 
its most important interests checked by the political constitution . .  . [and] as­
sumed the lead of the middle-class movement of Germany."167 
The conflict between business and absolutistic government came to a 
head in 1847, when Friedrich Wilhelm issued a patent on 3 February calling 
for a United Diet. This was hardly the king's wish—state finance necessi­
tated it. Among the more pressing financial projects was the so-called Eastern 
Railway. Although the king's primary goal in creating the Railroad Fund was 
to build a line between Berlin and Konigsberg, the province of Prussia still 
had no railroad. The link between the eastern provinces and the capital was 
economically important for Junkers and militarily necessary for the Prussian 
army, but it offered little attraction for private investors.168 When the lack of 
transportation prevented available grain stocks from relieving starvation in 
the eastern provinces, the pressure to build mounted. Despite the lack of inter­
ested entrepreneurs, the king gave orders to begin preliminary work in Octo­
ber 1845.169 The Eastern Railway's construction, however, demanded thirty-
three million thalers. After several conferences with the cabinet in 1846-47, 
the king decided to build it at state cost.170 
The United Diet consolidated representatives from the eight provincial 
diets into a central body that, if Friedrich Wilhelm Ill's ordinance of 1815 and 
1820 had been followed, would have assembled annually and had the power 
to approve legislation, taxes, and loans.171 But Friedrich Wilhelm IV's patent 
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of February 1847 to assemble the diet did not follow this prescription. It made 
no mention of the constitutional promise of 1815. Under the patent the king 
alone could summon the body, which was composed so that the noble estate 
predominated. Although the patent recognized the United Diet's power to ap­
prove new taxes and loans, the diet had no power to initiate legislation. In the 
event of conflict, the king could dismiss the chamber and return to the Stand­
ing Committee and provincial diets.172 In response to the king's pronounce­
ment that no piece of paper be permitted to come between himself and his 
people, Rhenish liberals drew up a statement of eight points that distinguished 
their conception of the United Diet from the patent.173 
Heinrich Simon, a lawyer from Breslau, best expressed liberals' disap­
pointment with the king's patent in an essay, "To Accept or to Refuse?" in 
which he exhorted the chosen deputies to boycott the United Diet. Liberals 
did not boycott but instead used the diet as an "organ of opposition against 
the constitutional conceptions of the king."174 The range of political issues 
debated at the United Diet was broad,175 but the most demonstrative opposi­
tional action taken by liberals was their refusal to grant credit to build the 
Eastern Railway. "If the deputies could not meet regularly and could not con­
trol finances," August von der Heydt declared on the floor of the diet, then 
they must "take the uncomfortable, highly embarrassing, but necessary step 
of denying assent to all loans."176 More succinctly, Hansemann stated: "In 
matters of money, friendliness ends."177 Put in the humiliating position of 
stopping all work on the Eastern Railway, the government parried with the 
statement: "The government refuses to develop the United Diet further into 
a constitutional parliament."178 With the Diet dismissed, the hopes for legal 
constitutional reforms in Prussia dimmed. Political frustration compounded 
by unemployment, bad harvests, food riots, and, most important, news of 
revolution in Paris brought revolution to Berlin in March 1848.179 
The United Diet offers, indeed, a dramatic closing to the Vormdrz period 
in government-business relations, a climactic end in which a formally consti­
tuted political body that included Prussia's leading business elites rejected the 
crown's political manipulations to forestall constitutionalism. But it would be 
wrong to place too much emphasis on this event as an encapsulation of how 
government-business relations developed in the 1840s. Although the Diet's 
proceedings emphatically stressed entrepreneurs' oppositional stance to the 
state, relations between businessmen and government officials in the 1840s 
were not one-dimensionally negative. An examination of the efforts of private 
railroad companies to assert their interests reveals the noteworthy point that 
business relations to the state had improved by the mid-1840s. The creation 
of the mixed system for railways, greater consultation with chambers of com­
merce over economic legislation, increased influence of railroad directors on 
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railway policy, and the select penetration of leading business elites into the 
bureaucratic decision-making process tokened a process of accommodation, 
albeitflawed, and not irremediable alienation from the state. 
The relationship of business elites to the state was multisided, and busi­
ness politics must be weighed equally with formal parliamentary politics to 
achieve a composite assessment. Although political rhetoric highlighted the 
differences between state and society in 1848, doubly underscored by social 
distress and governmental paralysis, the perspective of business politics sug­
gests that the Revolution of 1848 does not represent a complete breakdown in 
government-business relations. In many areas of economic activity, relations 
were on the mend. Such railroad entrepreneurs as Camphausen, Beckerath, 
Hansemann, Mevissen, Diergardt, Lewald, and others clashed with govern­
ment bureaucrats when advocating a constitution that would move Prussia be­
yond bureaucratic absolutism toward a representative government that could 
better respond to the needs of public society. But these aspirations should not 
overshadow the more diffuse political advances in economic policy, whose 
cumulative impact made business elites generally shift closer to the state 
rather than away from it. When looking at business politics and business prac­
tices of entrepreneurs during the 1850s, one sees important strains of con­
tinuity with the Vormdrz period. The practice of criticizing the state while 
simultaneously working with it, so evident in the 1840s, would likewise char­
acterize the political-economic behavior of the business class in the postrevo­
lutionary period. 
The Railroad Question in 1848 
The tumultuous days of March in Berlin witnessed slain demonstrators, the 
erection of barricades, and a brief period of anarchy. In response to the mobi­
lization of popular forces, the king appointed Ludolf Camphausen and David 
Hansemann as ministers to demonstrate the crown's receptivity to change. 
Although the "liberal cabinet" of Minister-President Camphausen was largely 
cosmetic (key cabinet posts remained in the hands of conservative nobles), 
the two businessmen nonetheless sought to reform economic policy. They 
transformed the private A. Schaaffhausen'sche Bankverein into the first joint-
stock bank in Prussia, keeping afloat commercial investments affecting over 
200,000 workers. In April 1848 the two ministers also created the ministry 
of trade, commerce, and public works, thus elevating the status of commerce 
and industry in state affairs. Furthermore, this ministry drafted reforms for 
municipal, county, and provincial governments in the eastern provinces, and 
it submitted bills to tax both landed estates and the annual income of nobles.180 
50 • TWO

By emergency decree the ministry also resumed work on the Eastern Railway, 
primarily to remove radicalized unemployed workers from Berlin.181 
The Camphausen-Hansemann ministry lasted until June 1848, but Hanse-
mann stayed on until September as finance minister in the Auerswald Cabinet 
that replaced it. During this time Hansemann, in cooperation with Trade Min­
ister Karl Milde, a Silesian merchant and investor in railroads, turned his at­
tention to the railroad question. In August Hansemann devised a plan for the 
government to purchase all existing private railways, monopolize the industry, 
and further develop Germany's railroad network under the aegis of the state. 
After 1846 railroad companies suffered considerably from the depressed 
business cycle. By 1848, their future was bleak. "With the current critical 
state of all financial conditions," wrote Hansemann in a memorandum, "the 
dissolution and bankruptcy of numerous domestic railway enterprises is to be 
feared."182 Three railway companies, he noted, had halted construction; many 
had defaulted on interest payments; and most paid little or no dividend money 
on common stock. Many investors who had bought shares on margin ceased 
to pay their quarterly installments. 
Hansemann believed that the business depression compounded by revo­
lution jeopardized the ability of the railroad industry to develop under the 
joint-stock principle. The 109 million thalers invested in railroads—"a con­
siderable portion of the national wealth"—was threatened (65). The loss of 
this capital would not only affect railway companies and their investors, who 
came from all social classes, but also laborers "who work and produce for 
the railroads, namely, [those working in] iron and coal works, machine facto­
ries, passenger car and freight car factories, brickworks, and the many smaller 
trades employed by them" (67). The military dimension— "national defense" 
—was also to be considered (77). Hansemann further noted the local distress. 
Regional governments, whose administrative spheres were economically de­
pendent on railroad construction, had petitioned the state to fund building to 
avoid further economic hardship. Perceiving railroads as the foundation of 
Prussia's industrial economy, Hansemann sought to avert a collapse at all cost: 
"There is no doubt that the government must forcefully intervene" (65). 
Aiding individual railways, Hansemann believed, was not enough to avert 
this crisis; selective aid would only raise charges of favoritism. Rather, he 
proposed "that the state complete the construction of unfinished railways, 
take over the direction and administration of railways, and gradually unite 
all railways into an organic whole in the interest of the common good." He 
concluded, "In other words, the railroads must gradually become the prop­
erty of the state" (67). Under the laws of 1838 and 1842 the state could ac­
quire private railways over a period of fifty to seventy-two years, depending 
on how much the Railroad Fund had collected and the extent of government 
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financial involvement. Hansemann's scheme, however, envisioned immediate 
acquisition at an extremely good price. For the price of fifty million thalers, 
all existing railroads plus the Eastern Railway, valued together at 140 million 
thalers, could come under state control (75). The state would raise thirty mil­
lion through government bonds, ten million from treasury notes drawn on the 
collateral of state domains, and ten million from "railroad notes [Eisenbahn­
scheine]" which would circulate on the stock market (82, 86). 
The memorandum is not explicit on whether fifty million would buy out 
all stockholders or just a portion of them. Thefigure suggests that Hansemann 
initially strove to make the state the majority stockholder in each company, 
enabling the state to effect a complete takeover when money was available. 
On the other hand, Hansemann might have entertained the notion of immedi­
ate state acquisition in the catastrophic market of 1848.183 In either case quick 
action was needed. The scheme turned on the desperate mood of the financial 
world. Hansemann cautioned that the state should neither expropriate prop­
erty nor use the stock market to expedite the takeovers. The former would 
violate property laws, the latter would result in price gouging (73). Instead the 
government should negotiate with company directors, who were left with the 
choice between accepting the state's terms or facing imminent bankruptcy. 
Because the government would convert all common stock into 4 percent state 
paper, stockholders would welcome the state action and pay no heed to direc­
tors' advice to hold out (74-75). The state, he added, could balance its losses 
by streamlining overhead costs, enabling it to operate more efficiently than 
could private companies (82, 85). 
For a businessmen who for two decades had nothing but contempt for the 
inefficiency of state officials in commercial enterprises, Hansemann's claim 
that administrative costs would be cut with state bureaucrats was, to say the 
least, remarkable. The evolution of his vacillating position toward the state 
is largely connected with the business trends of the railroad industry.184 In 
the early and mid-1830s, when privatefinancing of railroads seemed unlikely, 
Hansemann advocated state ownership. After 1837, and after the successful 
and profitable stock subscriptions of several large German railroads, Hanse-
mann shifted his stance from complete state ownership to supplemental sup­
port of private enterprise. When railroads made money in the 1840s, Hanse-
mann praised private directors, who were accountable to their stockholders; 
civil servants, he claimed, could never match their efficiency.185 Yet when the 
business cycle radically turned downward in 1846 and made worse by revolu­
tion, Hansemann again shifted his view.186 
Hansemann's memorandum in 1848 exhibited the characteristics of the 
practical businessman, for it sought to cut a deal beneficial to all involved 
parties: the state, the stockholders, and, above all, railroad entrepreneurs. 
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(Whether the customer was genuinely considered is doubtful.) Hansemann's 
plan enabled the business class to avert a total financial disaster. By cutting 
their losses and receiving remuneration from the state, entrepreneurs could 
shift their investments to new areas. Business cycles shaped the political atti­
tudes of this important representative of the business class. 
Hansemann's scheme was never put into action in original form. Drafted 
in August, the plan died when the Auerswald-Hansemann cabinet was re­
placed in September 1848 by the conservative (and economically more cau­
tious) cabinet of Graf von Pfuel. On 1 November the king appointed Graf 
von Brandenburg as minister-president and Otto von Manteuffel as minister 
of agriculture. Manteuffel, a staunch advocate of bureaucratic absolutism, was 
viewed as the guardian of the government's reactionary faction and succeeded 
Brandenburg as minister-president in December 1850. 
On 8 December 1848, the king appointed the Elberfeld merchant-banker 
August von der Heydt as trade minister. The appointment came just weeks 
after the National Assembly had been moved from Berlin to Brandenburg and 
just days after the king promulgated a constitution by decree. This shrewd 
move introduced a government of mixed powers whose legislature was 
elected by universal suffrage.187 Although the constitution was put into effect 
by decree—thus marking yet another crucial "revolution from above" —it put 
Prussia on the map of representative governments. Although many liberals 
spurned the constitution as another example of Prussian autocracy, the news 
immediately stabilized financial markets.188 The bourse rebounded, reflecting 
the acceptance among business elites that order, no matter what its cost, was 
better than the anarchy of the "crazy year." "As much as one scorns Branden­
burg and Manteuffel and criticizes their infamous politics," wrote the Rhenish 
textile manufacturer Wilhelm Konig, "a bad government is better than no 
government."189 
CHAPTER THREE 
T 
The Search for Mutual Accommodation, 
1848-1857

"'T'his parvenu form of wealth, this most colossal creation of modern indus-
X try, this peculiar economic mongrel, whose feet are rooted in the earth 
but whose head rests on the stock market, gives aristocratic land ownership 
a mighty rival and the middle class an army of new troops."1 In this state­
ment of 1862, Karl Marx tried with the help of mixed and stretched meta­
phors to describe the importance of railroads for the ascendant business class 
in Europe. Yet railroads after 1848 were no longer the exclusive domain of 
private capitalists. Unlike the two decades preceding the revolution of 1848, 
when entrepreneurs enjoyed uncontested leadership in railroad ownership, 
during the 1850s they vied with the state for control of the business. In 1848 
the Prussian government neither owned nor administered a single kilometer 
of rail. By 1860 the state owned 1,494 kilometers of rail and administered an 
additional 1,270 kilometers of private rail, controlling 49 percent of Prussia's 
entire rail network of 5,674 kilometers.2 Competing with the business class to 
control policy and profit in the railroad industry, the state changed the entre­
preneurial dynamics of railroad building. 
The tension that developed between railroad businessmen and the govern­
ment arose from the economic importance of railroads. Massive capitalization 
and profits reveal the preeminent role of railroads in the industrial revolution. 
Railroad investment in Germany between 1850 and 1873 represented one-
quarter of all investment.3 In 1849 the 107 million thalers invested in Prus-
sia's nineteen private railroad companies netted profits of 9,271,084 thalers; in 
1856, 273.25 million thalers netted profits of 24,083,604 thalers; and by 1866, 
499.5 million thalers produced 65,789,856 thalers in net profit.4 The magni­
tude of such figures emerges more clearly when we know that the average 
cost of starting up a coal mine—no small business venture—was around one 
million thalers in the 1850s and that the Prussian state debt in 1850 stood at 
156 million thalers.5 
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The socioeconomic importance of railroads was, however, even greater. 
Besides employing tens of thousands in construction, maintenance, and ad­
ministration, they also created a new heavy machinery industry—mostly fac­
tories for locomotives, passenger cars, and freight cars. In 1842, the Borsig 
machine works had produced eight locomotives; by 1858, the company had 
made one thousand. Iron production soared with the growing need for rails 
and machinery. Coal consumption rose 183 percent between 1850 and 1860 
in Prussia, owing largely to the growing demand for railway fuel and ma-
terial.6 Whereas in 1844 80 locomotives and 666 freight cars carried 2.5 tons 
of freight, in 1856 more than 742 locomotives and 14,648 freight cars carried 
170,518,617 tons.7 Prussia's developing railway network produced new social 
realities: stagnation or prosperity for villages, towns, and whole provinces de­
pended on access to railway connections. For good reason economists refer 
to railroads as the "leading sector" in Germany's first industrial revolution 
and call the long-term upward business cycle from 1840 to 1873 the "railway-
Kondratieff."8 As the undisputed key to national wealth in the "age of capi­
tal," railroads provide an opportunity to study the political dynamic between 
government and business interests. 
During 1848-66 the relations between government and private enterprise 
passed through two business cycles of approximately nine years each. Both 
cycles were demarcated by depressions, in 1846-49, 1857-59, and 1866-67, 
the first and third of which were complicated by significant political events 
(revolution and war, respectively). Each cycle can be subdivided into simi­
lar stages—a period of weakness and recovery in which entrepreneurs were 
dependent upon the state (1848-52 and 1857-62) and a period of renewed 
strength in which they were inclined to assert their independence from it 
(1853-57 and 1862-66). The progress of these cycles is particularly evident 
in the railroad industry. This chapter studies the first nine-year cycle (1848­
57); chapter 7 will examine the second (1857-66). 
1848-1852: Recovery and Direct State Intervention 
August von der Heydt's acceptance of the trade minister post in the Branden-
burg-Man teuff el government at the end of 1848 surprised many contempo­
raries. He had been a vocal advocate of the constitutional movement in the 
Westphalian diet of the 1830s, the Standing Committee in 1842, and the 
United Diet in 1847. Because his past political career ran counter to Manteuf-
fel's agenda, his acceptance earned him much scorn. But Heydt's "liberalism" 
needs to be examined more closely; it stood closer to conservatism than many 
of his contemporaries believed. Although the young Heydt advocated pro­
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gressive reforms such as the annual assembly of provincial diets, the right of 
petition, civic equality for Jews, and a constitution for Prussia, these reforms 
could be reconciled with a "thoroughly conservative mindset, which was the 
case in the house of von der Heydt."9 
The foundation of this conservative mindset was the family's Calvinism 
and its profound respect for monarchy. Heydt's father (also named August) 
was a particularly stringent Calvinist whose two other sons, Carl and Daniel, 
led a large number of Elberfeld coreligionists to secede from the state church 
when it proposed a new liturgy in 1847. These "Wuppertal separatists," notes 
historian Jonathan Sperber, "would be politically the most extreme conser­
vatives and Prussian royal loyalists in the entire Rhineland during the 1848 
Revolution."10 Certainly August von der Heydt was affected by the conser­
vatism of his family's Protestant sect, just as he was by the family's ties to 
the Hohenzollern family. Heydt, in fact, developed personal ties to the crown 
prince, highlighted by Friedrich Wilhelm's two visits to Heydt's house in 1842 
as monarch. Accordingly, the king appointed him in 1845 to head a commis­
sion to reform laws on currency transactions in the Customs Union. Hence, 
when Heydt embarked on a phase of loyal opposition in the period 1842-47, 
espousing moderate reform, it aroused little suspicion in Berlin.11 Before the 
revolution Heydt publicly admonished the government that it should alter its 
positions on the Rhenish penal code and on biennial convenings of provincial 
diets, but his fealty to the monarch was above reproach. His opposition con­
sisted of anchoring Prussian monarchy in constitutional legality. 
The king, however, felt betrayed by Heydt's persistent support for a con­
stitution and his opposition to the king's religion patent at the United Diet in 
1847 (which sought to place Jews in a separate estate), but this contretemps 
was resolved by a long missive from Heydt that defended his actions as behav­
ior consummate with his allegiance to the king.12 Heydt clearly drew the line 
between reform and revolution, having no sympathy whatsoever for democ­
racy or republicanism. In 1848 he refused to run for the constituent assem­
blies in Frankfurt and Berlin, stating that he could not reconcile these political 
bodies with his belief in legal continuity.13 And certainly the course of the 
revolution in the Rhineland deepened his dislike of popular democratic poli­
tics and its excesses. He was a cofounder of Elberfeld's Constitutional Club, 
which sought to check the radical politics arising in the Rhineland.14 Elberfeld 
democrats publicly ridiculed him with a charivari (Katzenmusik) in August 
1848,15 and his brother Daniel was taken hostage and extorted for money by an 
angry mob in Elberfeld in May 1849. In sum, having passed muster with his 
relationship to king and state, Heydt's experience in municipal and regional 
government in addition to his skills in banking and commerce made him a 
thoroughly qualified choice to succeed David Hansemann as trade minister. 
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"This moderate, elegant, adroit banker possessed a background that made him 
unassailable for nobles and government officials."16 
For a private banker, one whose banking establishment (Heydt-Kersten & 
Sons, est. 1754) was among the Rhineland's leading lenders of credit to mer­
chants and manufacturers, Heydt's advocacy for state railroads appears odd. 
Although Heydt made large profits from railroads as a director and as a banker 
in the 1840s and 1850s, he nonetheless viewed state participation as indis-
pensable.17 As noted in the last chapter, the Rhine-Weser and Elberfeld-Witten 
projects of the Elberfeld commercial community collapsed in the 1830s be­
cause of the shortage of capital. These early impressions perhaps molded 
Heydt's view that the state, in enterprises of unprecedented capitalization, 
was the essential instrument for economic improvement. 
In contrast to his fellow Rhenish bankers and entrepreneurs, Heydt be­
lieved, furthermore, that the state possessed the right to direct the economy for 
its own purposes and should therefore never relinquish the controls of strong 
state paternalism. As minister, he proposed a more ambitious bureaucratic 
apparatus to regulate economic activity. Equating modernization with bureau­
cratization, Heydt's statism advocated the expansion of the regulatory and 
promotional roles of the state—an economic corollary of the state's increased 
political control.18 In this regard his philosophy as a bureaucrat scarcely re­
sembled the older Prussian mercantilist tradition, which was more modest 
in dimension, and largely differed with the Prussian Reform-Era philosophy, 
which sought to efface the state's presence in the private market. Rather, 
Heydt's views were part of a broader historical trend in the 1850s, when the 
Austrian, French, and Belgian states took a more a interventionist role in the 
economy. Promoting the state ownership of railroads, Heydt believed, served 
the dual purpose of encouraging economic growth in the private sector (for 
example, the newly liberalized coal industry) while integrating industrial de­
velopment with the commercial, fiscal, and military interests of the state. 
And yet portraying Heydt either as a progressive practitioner of Bona­
partistic statism or as a forerunner of modern-day state interventionism is 
only half the story. Equally important in explaining Heydt's zeal for state 
railroads was his love of power. As this book will amply show, he was an 
extremely talented administrator who, in turn, was entrepreneurial in accumu­
lating greater spheres of jurisdiction and influence. In his career as a public 
servant he antagonized not only the business world but also other ministries. 
He was consistently at loggerheads with the finance ministry, whose min­
isters Karl von Bodelschwingh (1850-58) and Robert von Patow (1858-62) 
advocated budgetary accountability and minimal state paternalism in a pri­
vate market economy.19 Heydt, on the other hand, as the ambitious head of a 
new ministry, interpreted his duties broadly, bending laws and encroaching 
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upon state revenues as benefited his ministry. To be sure, Heydt's calls in the 
1840s to check arbitrary government actions with constitutional legality were 
not always consistent with his actions as a minister. Biographical accounts 
of Heydt overestimate his regard for parliamentary control over government 
action. Succinctly described, Heydt was the consummate empire builder. And 
because bringing railroads (the most capitalized sector in the Prussian econ­
omy) under the aegis of the trade ministry became his pet project, it is difficult 
to separate his own personal ambition from his railroad policies. 
Heydt, then, enthusiastically adopted Hansemann's plan of a state railway 
system, albeit in modified form. Toward this end he attempted to negotiate 
a government takeover of the Rhenish Railway in the winter of 1849. Heydt 
believed the company was in desperate financial straits and that stockholders 
would welcome converting their shares into state bonds. Reluctantly, com­
pany directors acceded to the proposal and asked for 4 percent interest on the 
conversion from company common stock to state bonds. Heydt offered lower, 
believing the company had no choice but to accept. The directors held out for 
a better offer, and when the stock market slowly recovered over the course of 
1849, they called off the deal. Once financial markets visibly improved, the 
directors and major stockholders decided to keep the company private.20 By 
1849-50 it was clear that the quick killing envisioned by Hansemann was no 
longer possible. 
In the years 1849-53, plagued by low freight revenues, high construction 
costs, and obligations to pay dividends, private railroads struggled to stay out 
of debt. In this unstable period the government played a major role in aid­
ing railways with financial problems, including six in the western provinces 
of Westphalia and the Rhineland. Railroad companies started in the 1840s in 
these two industrially advanced provinces now had their solvency threatened 
by the catastrophic business years of 1846-49. In three instances, the railroads 
were uncompleted lines that declared bankruptcy during 1848. Two of these 
were Rhenish lines, the Aachen-Dusseldorfer and the Ruhrort-Crefeld-Kreis 
Gladbacher railways, with which the state agreed in 1849 to finish construc­
tion, administer business upon completion, and guarantee dividends, gaining 
in return an option to purchase the company shares at par whenever it wished.21 
The Coln-Minden-Thiiringer railway in Westphalia, however, was completely 
bought out in 1849; the state indemnified stockholders, dissolved the private 
corporation, and renamed the railway the Westphalische Staatseisenbahn.22 
Owing to similar financial difficulties and an inability to pay dividends, 
the Berg-Mark railway, the important Ruhr line that connected Elberfeld, 
Hagen, and Dortmund, agreed to come under state administration in 1850.23 
The state already owned 25 percent of Berg-Mark's stock, and because the 
railway connected with the state-run Aachen-Dusseldorfer line, it became a 
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logical choice as administrator.24 In 1853 the state would add both the Prinz 
Wilhelm and Coln-Crefeld railways to this Ruhr-Rhine network, making the 
state a major railroad administrator in the western provinces next to the large 
private networks of the Cologne-Minden and the Rhenish railways. 
In addition, the trade ministry agreed to guarantee 3.5 percent dividends 
on stock issued by other companies desperately in need of capital. The stock 
guarantees to such large, established companies as the Rhenish, the Cologne-
Minden, the Stargard-Posen, and the Upper Silesian railways enabled them to 
pay salaries punctually and continue the construction of branch lines.25 The 
government believed that this government support benefited all railroad com­
panies, for it propped up assets on the sagging securities market and restored 
general confidence in future railroad investment. The state guarantees, in 
short, helped companies stave off further disaster until the mutually reinforc­
ing relationship between iron production, coal mining, commercial manufac­
turing, and railroad transportation brought business back to prerevolutionary 
levels. 
Although neighboring railways in the Rhineland complained that state-
administered lines and state-subsidized dividends in the area would hurt their 
stock quotes, investors more generally believed that the state action of either 
honoring partial value of the company paper or offering subsidies was the 
best deal to salvage these ill-timed ventures.26 By stepping in and aiding these 
fledgling start-ups, the trade ministry was fulfilling its expected role of aug­
menting private enterprise with state support. Only the state could afford to 
resuscitate lines that were not economically viable in the short term. These 
actions by the trade ministry were in line with the expectations of the busi­
ness class when the ministry was created in 1848. 
And yet the early relationship between businessmen and the trade min­
istry was not without problems, chiefly because of more far-reaching plans 
for state ownership being hatched within the government. Heydt developed a 
long-term plan to achieve a state rail system through gradual purchase of pri­
vate railway stock and through the construction of new state lines. 
The key to a state railroad system was public moneys. The new constitu­
tion of December 1848 had created a legislature whose Chamber of Deputies 
possessed the power to approve loans and budgets. Thus the Prussian govern-
ment's decreed constitution solved the prerevolutionary dilemma of raising 
loans large enough to build railroads. With the National Assembly in Frank­
furt dissolved and the Erfurt parliament not yet convened, the Prussian Cham­
ber of Deputies debated in December 1849 a thirty-three million thaler loan 
to build the Eastern Railway as well as to complete two unfinished lines in 
the regions of Saarbriicken and Westphalia.27 As noted earlier, liberals in the 
United Diet had rejected a government request for a loan to build the East­
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em Railway.28 With a constitutional government in place, the Chamber of 
Deputies now backed the Eastern Railway with little hesitation. The minis­
try viewed the other two lines as commercially and militarily important and 
argued for their completion as a national task. The Prussian parliament ap­
proved the loan package on 20 December 1849.29 
A significant stipulation accompanied the bill's passage. The Chamber 
of Deputies' Railroad Committee announced that the government must "use 
every possible means" to transfer all Prussian rail into the hands of the state.30 
The Chamber, repeating arguments advanced in the Standing Committee in 
1842 and in the United Diet of 1847, gave its full approval for the government 
to pursue a policy of state ownership and supplant the "mixed system" of 
the 1840s that presumed the leadership of the private economy. Although ad­
vocacy of railroad nationalization was intermittently popular among elected 
officials in the decades after 1848, the commission's report of 1849 was the 
Chamber's most pronounced statement of support for state railroads between 
the years 1849 and 1866. The Chamber's enthusiasm for state ownership re­
veals the pessimism among public circles and businessmen over the problems 
of private ownership. 
And yet when Trade Minister Heydt launched an aggressive supervision 
of the industry, railroad businessmen criticized and resisted the ministry's 
claim to shape policy in the industry. In 1849-50 Heydt compelled Prussian 
railways to schedule night mail trains. Because the ministry issued the order 
during a time of heavy financial losses, many companies protested bitterly. 
We shall see in chapter 4 that this issue became a significant confrontation 
between private railroad companies and the trade ministry. The government 
levied fines and threats of suspension for those who refused to comply, and 
Heydtfiled lawsuits against three railways that persisted in their refusals. The 
government occupied the Bonn-Cologne railway, replacing its privately em­
ployed administrators with state officials for a month until the company re-
lented.31 
Private companies also resisted Heydt's orders to aid Police President 
Karl von Hinckeldey and Minister of Interior Ferdinand von Westphalen in 
discharging employees involved in the 1848 revolution. The government's 
order that company presidents draw up lists of politically questionable work­
ers was met with a poor response, prompting Heydt to turn the task over to 
the Royal Railroad Commissions, the government administration supervis­
ing railroad affairs. Considerably less informed about company employees 
and their histories, the commissioners' inquiry into railroad personnel and 
their politics produced meager results. In several instances, railroad compa­
nies refused to discharge workers believed to be politically undesirable and 
reinstated workers fired on orders of the government.32 In 1852 stockholders 
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of the Dusseldorf-Elberfeld Railway ignored the governmental wishes during 
the reactionary period and elected a director who had played a prominent role 
in 1848, prompting Heydt to nullify the election.33 Although companies even­
tually acceded to certain government wishes, their capitulation was grudging 
and carried out only as a result of repeated threats and monetary fines by 
the ministry. During the years of acute political reaction, 1851-54, private 
railroad companies, headed predominately by moderate liberals, did not co­
operate with attempts of the Prussian state to purge business and bureaucracy 
of democrats.34 The general reluctance to comply with the government's new 
political direction provoked Heydt to carry out a protracted effort in the king's 
cabinet from 1853 to 1857 to classify private railway officials as "indirect state 
servants" for purposes of security.35 
The most salient example of government-business friction in the early 
1850s was the controversial government takeover of the Lower Silesian-Mark 
Railway in 1850-52. Against the wishes of both directors and stockholders, 
Heydt replaced the private administration of the Lower Silesian Railway with 
state officials in 1850. Because the company was one of the largest and oldest 
railways in Prussia, the incident raised the question of whether the trade min­
istry wished to work with railroad companies or subsume them. Whereas 
government takeovers in previous cases had been viewed largely as benevo-
lent—mostly because they rescued unfinished railroad projects depleted of 
capital—contemporaries deemed this takeover as an unnecessary, hostile in­
trusion into the affairs of private business. The government justified the take­
over with a technical stipulation in a state loan to the company which allowed 
the state to manage the company if it failed to turn a profit in three years. 
The company complained that it was grossly unfair to expect a profit in 1847 
or 1848 and attributed the losses of 1849 largely to the expense of running 
Heydt's night trains.36 
Heydt's action was undoubtedly part of his nationalization scheme. The 
profitable Silesian line between Berlin and Frankfurt a.O. became the center 
for a large network of state-owned railways built in the eastern provinces over 
the next decade. In 1852 Heydt dissolved the company as a private business 
and incorporated it into the Prussian state railway system. The company con­
tested both Heydt's final appropriation of the company by executive fiat and 
the stockholders' vote he later manipulated to approve the state takeover.37 
Thefirst two civil court appeals backed the company's claim; the third (in Ber­
lin) ruled in favor of the state. The trade minister had won his case and in the 
process revealed his intent to use the legal, political, and economic leverage 
of the state to weaken the power of private management and assume control 
of Prussia's railway system. The incident sat well neither with entrepreneurs, 
whose projects seemed at the mercy of an arbitrary minister, nor with inves­
tors, who were denied a lucrative option on the securities market. 
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By the end of 1852, the government owned 912 kilometers of rail and ad­
ministrated an additional 332 kilometers of private rail. The 2,113 kilometers 
of independently operated, private rail overshadowed the state-owned system 
(63 versus 37 percent), but it was, by all calculations, a formidable start.38 The 
trade ministry had made good use of this recovery period after the Revolution 
of 1848 to establish the state as a railroad power. 
1853-1857: A Mixed Legacy 
The years 1853-57, the most prosperous of the decade, were a period of un­
paralleled expansion in manufacturing, mining, and overseas trade. The rail­
road industry also prospered, yet because Heydt's ministry consolidated its 
power over railroads, railroad entrepreneurs described their success in quali­
fied terms. The ministry not only increased the mileage of state railroads 
through more takeovers, but it also exercised greater indirect control over 
private companies through its supervision of company charters, stock issues, 
bonds, and the use of foreign capital. Although the mileage of private rail still 
exceeded that of the state, the trade ministry's restrictive supervision and ex­
pansionist designs put railroad directors in a defensive position. 
The trade ministry put new revenues to work to accelerate its nation­
alization plan. In May 1853 the Chamber of Deputies enforced the railroad 
tax, a provision of the 1838 law that had never been implemented because 
of economic crises of the mid-forties. The levy was progressive and drained 
off profits exceeding 5 percent from private railroad companies that had bor­
rowed from the state.39 These so-called extra-dividends flowed into a fund 
controlled by the trade ministry designated exclusively for railroad national­
ization through gradual stock purchase. Thus the profits of private railroads 
would fund their own eventual demise. This was indeed bitter fruit for such 
efficient, profitable companies as the Cologne-Minden and Upper Silesian 
railways, which together over the course of the 1850s contributed over four 
and a quarter million thalers in extra-dividends.40 As we shall see in Chapter 6, 
the passing of this tax produced lengthy debate in the Chamber where Georg 
and Karl von Vincke and their faction of old liberals protested the intrusion 
of the state. In the king's cabinet, Finance Minister Karl von Bodelschwingh 
strongly objected to Heydt's control over the fund independent from the state 
treasury. In spite of parliamentary and ministerial opposition, Heydt secured 
by means of the railroad tax additional revenue for quicker acquisitions. The 
purchased railways, Heydt stated, would "ensure the state a property of im­
measurable worth."41 
State regulation of transportation reached new heights in the mid-1850s, 
encroaching on private administration of railroad companies in a number of 
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ways. In 1857 the government introduced renewal funds for private compa­
nies, an additional sinking fund to supplement the already mandatory reserve 
funds. The latter was a stipulation of the 1838 railroad law that required com­
panies to set aside a portion of annual profits (from .5 to 1 percent of total capi­
talization) for renovation. Although the additional fund added more security 
to company assets, it also restricted private railways from offering higher divi­
dends in order to maintain a competitive profile on the stock market. The fair­
ness of the trade ministry's ordinance appeared especially questionable when 
it was not enforced on all state-owned railways.42 The exemption of some state 
railways from the sinking fund clearly put private railways at a disadvantage. 
The trade ministry intensified its supervision of private management in 
several different ways that companies interpreted more as interference than 
regulation. Heydt transformed the once perfunctory requirement of having all 
annual dividends approved by the government into a rigorous ordeal, often 
denying petitions from companies to issue higher dividends.43 In addition, he 
insisted that railroad companies publish their profits monthly and punished 
those directors who refused with heavy fines.44 Further, company directors 
needed permission from the trade ministry to issue bonds or a new series of 
common stock, the negotiations for which were long, arduous, and not always 
successful.45 Even worse for railroad directors was dependence on the trade 
ministry to guarantee company bonds and preferred stock, a power that Heydt 
used to his advantage. 
Moreover, the trade ministry favored the state lines by denying new 
charters to private companies. To cite but one example, the extension of the 
Rhenish lines southward to complete the north-south axis in western Ger­
many was delayed at least five years, in part because of military consider­
ations (Cologne and Coblenz were fortress towns), but also because Heydt 
hoped to win the concession for the state system and deny it to the Cologne-
Minden and the Rhenish railways.46 Overall, during the period 1849-62, the 
government allowed only two new railroad companies to be founded, reject­
ing dozens of petitions to build or extend lines.47 The shortage of funds and 
the difficulty in placing shares on the market were Heydt's standard excuses, 
but this answer was not consistently credible during 1850-57, a period when 
ninety-four joint-stock companies (coal mines and iron works making up fifty-
nine of these) placed shares amounting to over 107,985,699 million thalers 
with little difficulty48 It was not the stock market but rather state aims that 
frustrated both domestic and foreign businessmen in their effort to construct 
and administrate private railways.49 
Although the Prussian state's interest in owning and administering its 
own network of rails in all provinces put private railroad interests at a disad­
vantage, in some cases it helped railroad investors sell unprofitable lines. In 
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the years 1849-55, for example, the state attempted to take over the Miinster-
Hamm railway, a small line in Westphalia. The Munster-Hamm was a private 
line of less than thirty kilometers that was sandwiched between a Prussian 
state line on one end and the Hannoverian state railway on the other. Be­
cause this stretch logically figured in with the governments' planned network 
of state lines, the directors and stockholders approached the government with 
an offer and drove a hard bargain. The negotiations began in May 1849 and 
werefinally ended in 1855; the terms of sale to the state consistently changed 
to keep pace with the improving stock market and to fetch a higher price. 
In 1849 the company approached the state ministry offering the sale of its 
stock at 70 percent; in 1850, the terms were raised to 86 percent and an addi­
tional dividend guarantee of 3.5 percent; and by December 1853, the company 
agreed to sell the railway for state paper yielding 4 percent.50 The tenacity 
and persistence of the company nettled state officials, who broke off negotia­
tions three times beforefinally accepting the deal in 1855. Because the average 
dividend rate stood at 2.6 percent between 1849 and 1853, investors received 
a generous settlement. Unlike the Lower Silesian-Mark takeover, this private 
company was not opposed to state ownership or government takeovers; the 
stockholders were merely opposed to an unprofitable transaction and knew 
that they had the upper hand in negotiation. 
Overall, businessmen raised little general objection to state involvement 
in railroads in the early 1850s, for they assumed that the state would serve 
business needs. This expectation was partially fulfilled. By 1858, for example, 
the state administrated over 46.7 million thalers of Rhenish private railways, 
whose average dividend return was 1.37 percent. Privately administered rail­
roads in the Rhineland, on the other hand, capitalized at over 81.1 million 
thalers (chiefly the Coln-Minden and Rhenish railways) received an average 
5 percent dividend.51 Over the course of the 1850s the state had become the 
caretaker of indispensable but unprofitable private railways. This curious mix­
ture of private capital and state management in Germany's leading industrial 
sector is a feature that has not been satisfactorily integrated into the discus­
sions on the role of the state in industrialization. 
Objection to state involvement arose in particular instances when busi­
nessmen believed that government policy served only the state. Businessmen 
believed the state was unnecessarily aggrandizing its administrative influ­
ence when the state-managed Berg-Mark Railway absorbed the Diisseldorf-
Elberfeld company or retarded the expansion of such profitable lines as the 
Rhenish and Cologne-Minden railways because of conflict of interest. Simi­
larly, the Stargard-Posen railroad shrugged off the state's attempt to enlarge its 
role in the railway. The company was contractually obliged to accept state ad­
ministration in 1851 following three consecutive subventions to the company 
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from the government to guarantee a 3.5 percent dividend.52 But the company 
shareholders, in spite of government pressure to vote for a government take­
over, voted against complete state control in 1855. The trade ministry's offer to 
substitute 4 percent state paper for the company's common stock was rejected 
in the expectation that the railway could fare better as a private enterprise.53 
In the mid-185Os business circles increasingly criticized railroad take­
overs by Heydt's ministry, producing a new level of concern for state involve­
ment in business. Against the staunch opposition of stockholders and direc­
tors, Heydt took over the highly profitable Upper Silesian Railway in 1856. 
The railroad company had resisted and criticized state regulation through­
out the 1850s, especially concerning the question of freight rates for coal.54 
In 1855 the company protested the ordinance which allowed the provincial 
railroad commission to change unilaterally rates on third-class carriages and 
challenged the jurisdiction of a provincial state commission to meddle in pri­
vate business.55 Relations between the railway and the government were made 
worse when the directors involved themselves in politics and openly backed 
the opposition party. "In the fall election for the Chamber of Deputies," wrote 
a government official, "the most influential executives of the Upper Silesian 
railway—among them director Kuh—made appearances which aroused gen­
eral outrage among government loyalists."56 The political behavior of the di­
rectors annoyed the governor of the province considerably; it was "politically 
objectionable," he wrote to the trade minister, that a company employing over 
a thousand workers should be directed by such people.57 Shortly thereafter 
Heydt exploited his ministerial power to bring the railroad under state control. 
In the railroad industry charters were needed to incorporate as a joint-
stock company, lay new lines, and issue new series of stock. When, in Novem­
ber 1855, the railroad directory submitted its request for a charter to build a 
branch line into the coal fields of Tarnowitz and the surrounding coal seams 
of upper Silesia, Heydt refused. The company considered the procedure of a 
charter pro forma, for the railway had been promised the right to connect its 
trunk line with this valley: logic dictated that only this railway should have 
this charter. Heydt, however, withheld the charter and threw the company into 
a crisis; investors assumed this branch line, with its long-awaited profits, was 
a part of the Upper Silesian's network. 
Knowing that these branch lines were vital to the company's future, 
Heydt then offered the charter to the company on the condition that the state 
take over the railroad's administration. The tactic aroused much resentment 
from the company directors, who initially rejected it in strong language. They 
charged the government railroad commission with intrigue and dishonesty, 
accusations that provoked the commissioners to threaten the directory with 
suspension.58 The company directors were all the more appalled when the 
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railroad commission insisted—under orders from Heydt—that the board of 
directors present the option to the assembly of stockholders not as a demand 
from the state but, rather, as a request from the company. The Prussian gov-
ernment's attempt to cover up its initiation of the deal and not to appear as the 
aggressive party was, however, quickly leaked to the press.59 
The charter became Heydt's wedge to separate the board of directors from 
its stockholders. Heydt knew that the company directors could not justify any 
principled legalistic fight against the state over private administration to their 
stockholders if it meant inferior dividends. In this instance, defying the gov-
ernment's move on the basis of business principles ran counter to the com-
pany's prosperity and profits, giving little or no room for the private manage­
ment tofight. Resembling nothing less than economic blackmail, the "offer" 
had its intended effect—the directors capitulated.60 At the annual company 
meeting in August 1856 the Upper Silesian railroad directors presented their 
stockholders with the option of either remaining a completely private com­
pany with no charter (and lower dividends) or becoming a state-administered 
railway that would build the branch line and thereby ensure the future health 
of dividends. As a Breslau newspaper wrote, "The action of the government, 
in principle, is certainly not to be defended in all respects, but the transfer of 
the administration to the state is only a matter of time." 61 
The takeover needed a two-thirds majority, and it passed narrowly by 20 
votes. More stockholders voted against the measure than those that voted for 
it, but the latter held more shares. The state, which owned stock in the line 
and which normally refrained from participating in votes, cast its 54 votes for 
the takeover.62 Through clear abuse of governmental powers, the Upper Si­
lesian Railway fell into the hands of the government. Heydt received heavy 
criticism both in the Prussian parliament (the Landtag) and in the press, 
but the new arrangement came into effect nonetheless on January 1, 1857.63 
Months later, the government took over the administration of the Wil­
helmsbahn (Cosel-Oderberg), another large Silesian railway. Owing to over­
expansion and a depressed money market, the privately owned Wilhelmsbahn 
—Germany's most profitable line in 1855—went bankrupt in 1857.64 Dur­
ing the early 1850s the railroad undertook plans to extend two branch lines 
(Nicolai-Idahiitte, Ratibor-Leobschiitz) and build a new one (Leobschiitz-
Neiss) which would not only connect its lines to more Silesian coalfields but 
also unite with the Upper Silesian Railway in Idahiitte.65 The construction of 
these lines was approved by the government, but the initial construction costs 
were grossly underestimated, making it necessary for the company to seek 
an additional 5 million thalers in 1856 to cover costs. The company decided 
to raise half the sum by doubling the stock and to raise the other half with 
a 5 percent bond. In January 1857 Heydt's ministry granted permission to 
66 • THREE

the company directors to follow this course of action.66 This financial maneu­
ver was a risky undertaking; the bourse was already depressed and could not 
easily handle the volume of these issues. Moreover, new northern Austrian 
lines were completed which robbed the Wilhelmsbahn of its freight traffic to 
Galicia, Russia, and Austrian provinces.67 In March the directors publicized 
the precarious state of the company's finances. Investors were told to expect 
heavily slashed dividends, a move that sent the stock into a downward tailspin 
on the market. By April of the same year, the company could not pay creditors. 
Showing signs of severe insolvency, the directors submitted a proposal to 
the general assembly of stockholders for a state takeover. The assembly, which 
was controlled by an elite consortium of Berlin financiers (Bleichroder, Wolff, 
and Hirschfeld), voted overwhelmingly for state control, believing the gov­
ernment would compensate investors fairly in this fiasco. The state's below-
par indemnification of stockholders, however, was nowhere near to matching 
the prices that investors had paid for the stock in the 1850s, which had soared 
to quotes above 200. Stockholders lost fortunes. Many embittered investors 
spoke of collusion between Berlin banks and government and, more specifi­
cally, of ministerial criminality.68 
During the bankruptcy proceedings, the business community blamed 
company directors, but, significantly, the state railroad commission received 
equal, if not greater, condemnation. Investors and financiers were shocked 
that the commission, which supervised board meetings and ledgers, could 
allow the business to issue a 16 percent dividend to stockholders in 1855, yet 
watch it collapse months later. The ability of the state to supervise the indus­
try properly was gravely questioned. The state's assertion that it preempted 
private greed and overzealous ambition with a disinterested, above-party ex­
pertise was roundly criticized.69 The prestige of Heydt and his ministry was 
further compromised when, to finance the state takeover of the Wilhelmsbahn 
with a 1.5 million thaler bond, he raided the Silesian miners' welfare asso­
ciation to back a 5 percent bond.70 The miners' association (Oberschlesische 
Bergbauhiilfskasse), which was created by Friedrich the Great, became a de­
tail of special concern for one journalist who criticized Heydt in July 1862 for 
misusing the fund and "experimenting with it to death." (Heydt prosecuted for 
libel; the reporter's acquittal in 1862 was a cause cSlebre for the Progressive 
Party.71) In a similarly coercive move, Heydt forced Silesian coalmine owners 
to subscribe to the same 1.5 million thaler bond. Those who did not partici­
pate were threatened with higher state surcharges. He specifically browbeat 
the region's major coal magnates (Herzog von Ratibor, Herzog von Wiese, 
Kaufmann Dorno, and Furst von Pless) with a surtax of 2 groschen per ton 
if they did not accede to his wishes. The legality of such a surtax was highly 
dubious, but "the ultimatum," as the Breslau railroad commissioners wrote to 
Heydt, "seems to have had a decisive effect."72 The takeovers consolidated 
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the state system in the east, which, combined with the Eastern, the Stargard-
Posen, and the Lower Silesian railways, had grown into an extensive network. 
These issues of nationalization and increased government control of pri­
vate industry exemplified government-business confrontations of this era. The 
conflicts often centered on the personality of Heydt, who was alternately 
viewed as a bold, assertive proponent of state planning, or as an autocrat who, 
to paraphrase Rudolf von Delbriick, often confused the interests of the trade 
ministry with the common good.73 Few would question the competency of 
Heydt, whose technical, administrative, and financial skills were widely re­
spected. But there was certainly a conflict of interest at work in his role as 
minister whose ostensibly impartial status as arbitrator in commercial affairs 
clashed with his other role as director of state railroads. In another example 
of a conflict of interest, Heydt, who also oversaw the construction of public 
works, had no compunction in extracting large contributions from all Prus­
sian joint-stock companies for the building of the Berlin cathedral, an action 
that businessmen interpreted as unethical solicitation.74 As Hans Viktor von 
Unruh wrote, his "tendency toward arbitrary action and deficiency of solid 
principles" led railroad directors to believe that "the paralysis of private 
management appeared to be exactly the intention of the minister, who alone 
wanted to rule."75 
Economic issues took on a political edge. As already seen, the entrepre­
neurial circles that built and financed the Upper and Lower Silesian railways 
backed the opposition party in 1855, contributing to the election of a liberal 
wholesale merchant, Theodor Molinari, to the Landtag. The esteemed status 
of Molinari as president of Breslau's chamber of commerce rankled state offi­
cials, for he lent great credibility to the opposition party.76 Other chambers of 
commerce also adopted an overtly political attitude in lengthy introductory 
commentaries to their annual reports, criticizing the unwarranted interven­
tion of government into private business and emphasizing the need to end 
Prussia's patronizing tutelage in economic and civic affairs.77 The reports of 
Prussia's chambers of commerce grew so critical in the 1850s that the trade 
ministry issued a circular in 1857 ordering them to confine their reports to sta­
tistical materials—and to leave out complaints and political editorials.78 The 
many local committees in the eastern provinces that mushroomed after 1857 
to promote the building of railroad lines soon became political bases for the 
"Young" Lithuanian Faction (Fraktion Junglitauen), the nucleus of the future 
Progressive Party formed in 1861.79 Oppositional stances in elections, out­
spoken petitions and reports, and railroad committees transformed into politi­
cal caucuses demonstrated how intertwined economics and politics became 
in the 1850s.80 
The Prussian state's control of money supply —finance politics—also 
brought railroad circles into conflict with the government. Rhenish entre­
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preneurs, frustrated by the ministry's tight loan policy, founded commercial 
banks outside Prussia to fund large-scale enterprises like railroad construc­
tion. Similarly, in 1856, a number of prominent railroad men and bankers 
established commandite banks in Prussia, a maneuver that circumvented the 
need for a government charter. This act—the subject of chapter 5—greatly 
annoyed Manteuffel's cabinet, which interpreted it as defiance of government 
control. The Diskonto Gesellschaft and the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft were 
founded by a new breed of entrepreneurs opposed to state tutelage and de­
sirous of greater autonomy in business affairs. 
After 1848 the efforts of the Prussian state to participate directly in the 
railroad business led to the creation of several railroad associations whose 
purpose was to organize and collectively represent the interests of private 
companies. The creation of the Norddeutscher Eisenbahn-Verband (1848/52), 
the Verband mitteldeutscher Eisenbahnen (1852), the Rheinisch-Thiiringischer 
Eisenbahn-Verband (1853), the Ostfriesich-Thiiringischer Eisenbahn-Verband 
(1856), and the Westdeutscher Eisenbahn-Verband (1857) enabled private rail­
ways of different states to coordinate timetables, fares, and freight rates in­
dependent of government treaties. These associations introduced the innova­
tions of a general bookkeeping office, luggage transfer, and commonly owned 
freight trains. They also played a major organizational role in the mobiliza­
tion of the Prussian army in the Rhineland in 1859.81 
The associations strengthened the liberal argument that private commerce 
could handle the larger, overarching problems of the new industrial age with­
out state intervention. Their pragmatic achievements contradicted Prussian 
government assertions that only the state could coordinate and manage an effi­
cient, interlocking rail network. It was not coincidental that these Verbande 
arose in exactly the same period that Heydt's ministry asserted its increasingly 
larger claims to organize the industry. Their creation was largely a defensive 
response, and Heydt's uncooperative behavior toward these private adminis­
trations confirmed their success. Called upon by the king to justify a number 
of prohibitory decrees against the North German Railroad Association, Heydt 
admitted in June 1857 that the "prevalent" services of this Verband "weak­
ened the influence of the Prussian government."82 In spite of Heydt's arbitrary 
actions to control the growth of private railroad organization, the associations 
nonetheless throve and showed German governments that private companies 
could indeed serve public needs. 
In spite of numerous problems in government-business relations, the Prus­
sian state did have something positive to offer. The Prussian legal system, for 
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instance, often supported the interests of the business class. Central to the 
needs of businessmen was civil law, the juridical sphere that presumed "civil 
society was shaped by contractual relationships freely formed by equal part­
ners." 83 The octroyed constitution of 1850 upheld this tenet—first set down in 
the Prussian law code of the late eighteenth century—and thus provided com­
mercial circles with what Max Weber called "the calculability and reliability 
in the functioning of the legal order and the administrative system [that] is 
vital to rational capitalism."84 Furthermore, the continued use of commercial 
courts after 1848 greatly aided the resolution of financial disputes, and the 
civil courts handled eminent domain disputes fairly.85 Finally, by its role in 
drafting of a new Commercial Code for the German Confederation (1857 to 
1861), the trade ministry promoted German capitalism. 
The ministry of justice, furthermore, restrained the Prussian army on 
issues important to business interests.86 The minutes of the state cabinet record 
its resistance to the war ministry's desire to impose arbitrary ordinances on 
railway companies, fearing drawn out and unsuccessful court cases.87 On 
three occasions in the mid-1850s, the war ministry was forced to compromise 
with railway companies on the question of payment for military fortifications. 
Likewise, private railways abolished reduced fares for military personnel. 
Although the ministry had enforced such exactions on companies earlier, the 
litigious attitude of businessmen in the 1850s produced more cautious gov­
ernmental behavior. The protocols of private railroad companies reveal the 
businessman's confidence in both the independence of the judiciary and its 
ability to reach fair decisions.88 Yet the courts could not always check the far-
ranging independence of government ministries, whose ordinances often fell 
outside the purview of the legal system. For this reason, many merchants and 
entrepreneurs joined liberals in the New Era to demand that ministers be held 
accountable to the courts under the judicial code.89 
Positive aspects can also be seen in the relations between the government 
bureaucracy and private railroads, at least on the lower bureaucratic levels. 
Although the trade minister desired a tightly coordinated bureaucracy of 
clearly delineated hierarchies controlled from above, this was not always the 
case.90 The mediators between the Berlin ministry and businessmen were the 
local Royal Railroad Commissioners, who created a dialogue that permitted 
businessmen to dissent and negotiate. Often recruited from private compa­
nies, railroad commissioners possessed the technical expertise and practical 
experience to form opinions independently of both the trade ministry and the 
railway companies. Although local officials enforced the ministry's unpopular 
decisions, they were frequently sympathetic to the needs of private business. 
Commissioners in Cologne, Breslau, Mtinster, and Berlin often questioned 
the pragmatism (and legality) of Heydt's orders and provided a conduit for 
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businessmen to communicate their viewpoints to the higher echelons of gov-
ernment.91 In this respect, the dialogue between businessmen and the trade 
minister was, if not always harmonious, open and fluid. 
Entrepreneurs were thus ensured a voice in matters pertaining to their 
railroads. On such issues as freight rates, line construction, administrative 
procedures, taxes, personnel, and government bond guarantees, company di­
rectors were able to present their views to the government. Railroad directors 
had excellent access to railroad commissioners, deputy prefects (Landrdte), 
district governors, and provincial governors, allowing a company to enlist the 
support of other bureaucrats when commissioners or the trade minister were 
uncooperative. Rhenish and Westphalian companies made full use of their 
district governor, Eduard Moeller, who was receptive to commercial needs, 
and they successfully played him off against the more conservative provincial 
governor, Hans Hugo von Kleist-Retzow.92 In the Saxon province of Prussia, 
businessmen played a similar game with Provincial Governor Witzleben and 
the trade minister.93 
Many railway directors also infiltrated bureaucratic and court circles. 
Although overwhelmingly bourgeois in social origin, some had earned the 
honorary titles of commercial councilor (Kommerzienrat) and privy commer­
cial councilor (Geheimer Kommerzienrat), a status that allowed them to attend 
court, where connections and influence were found. 
The Eisenbahn-Zeitung's lists of Prussian railroad directors attending the 
annual conference of the Verein deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen in 1850, 
1857, and 1860 provide clues to the social composition of Prussian railroad 
directorships in the 1850s. Of the 68 directors who attended in 1850, 60 were 
of middle-class origin, with three bearing honorary titles; the remaining eight 
were aristocrats, with two bearing honorary titles in addition to their noble 
patent. In 1857, 29 of Prussia's 32 attending directors were bourgeois, and 
15 of these carried honorary titles; of the remaining three, one was a noble 
with the honor of Regierungsrat, while the other two were military officers. 
Finally, in 1860, 39 bourgeois and four noble Prussian directors attended; 28 
of the 39 bourgeois directors had honorary titles, as did two of the four nobles. 
Although the percentage of bourgeois directors remained constant from 1850 
to 1860 (88 versus 91 percent), those who had closer contact with the bureau­
cracy and the court by dint of their cachet rose (5 versus 66 percent).94 In 
short, bourgeois businessmen apparently gained access to the Prussian estab­
lishment and used its networks to their advantage. There is little evidence, 
however, to correlate honorary titles and political docility. In the many dis­
putes between the government and railroad companies, most of the directors 
of the larger railroads bore honorary titles.95 Access to court did not stop them 
from criticizing and resisting orders from the trade ministry and other gov­
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eminent agencies. The increase of honorary titles among businessmen points 
more to an entrepreneurial pragmatism, the exploitation of influential affilia­
tions, rather than to obsequious "feudalization."96 
Access to higher echelons of the government bureaucracy presupposed 
a certain social status. Government officials perceived these businessmen as 
members of the commercial estate (Handelsstand), which had the right to 
petition and negotiate with the government. Prussian ministers followed the 
growth of rail networks in neighboring countries—especially France—and 
respected the practical achievements of Prussia's entrepreneurial class. Rail­
road entrepreneurs also saw themselves as an urban elite, leaders in the coun-
try's commercial affairs. These patricians, bankers, and entrepreneurs wanted 
a greater voice in the bureaucracy's decision-making process. Nurtured by 
a long tradition of state promotion of economic enterprise, businessmen ex­
pected close contact with the Prussian state—and the influence that accompa­
nied it. 
This attitude toward the state was not necessarily inconsistent with busi-
nessmen's ties to liberalism. These businessmen had grown up in the milieu 
of notables' politics, the prerevolutionary tradition of elites assuming leader­
ship in urban civic affairs. Although they opposed the aristocratic belief in 
the privilege of birth and rank, business elites nonetheless believed that men 
of wealth and property deserved a greater weight and representation in the af­
fairs of government than those with little or no means. As noted earlier, such 
railroad entrepreneurs as David Hansemann, Ludolf Camphausen, and Gus­
tav Mevissen all participated in designing the three-class voting system, first 
used in the Rhenish local government law of 1845.97 This suffrage system, 
which distributed voting power according to income, suggests why the busi­
ness class was made up of moderate liberals in 1848. The system was intended 
to assign wealthy businessmen and landed aristocrats equal political power. 
Their advocacy of such a system in the 1850s demonstrates the businessmen's 
consistency; their aim was not to undo completely the underpinnings of status 
society but to attain greater recognition within it for the new monied class. 
Understanding railroad entrepreneurs not only as market-oriented business­
men but also as notables with presumed privileges and honors is not unim­
portant. Recognizing the residual persistence of status relationships and the 
slow, uneven movement toward a class society in mid-century Prussia helps 
explain the negotiating behavior of business elites.98 
In spite of shared elitist attitudes, it would be extravagant to characterize 
this interaction as "symbiotic."99 Local government officials often imposed 
controversial ordinances on railway companies. As the agents responsible for 
overseeing all public stockholder meetings, attending board of director meet­
ings, and inspecting company books, local commissioners embodied the gov­
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ernment's suspicion of private association and private commercial enterprise. 
What resulted was not a mutually beneficial friendship but, rather, a hard-
fought process of negotiation. Mutual respect existed, but both sides recog­
nized the fundamentally adversarial relationship between the trade ministry 
and the business world, whose interests and aims were often diametrically 
opposed. Hardly symbiotic, relations between businessmen and the state are 
better described as tenuous, fluctuating, and variable. The business class dis­
played its willingness to use semipublic institutions such as the chambers of 
commerce to achieve reforms. But when these internal channels of represen­
tation ceased to deliver results, businessmen turned to public criticism and 
the Chamber of Deputies. It is the combination of using the new power of 
the public sphere (the public opinion of Landtag and press) while continuing 
to negotiate directly with the state that characterized the ambivalent political 
practices of the business class. It welcomed the new constitutional advances 
but in no way wished to surrender the older privileges of the Handelsstand 
acquired during the era of absolutism. 
In July 1859, Anton von Polski, an aggrieved railroad investor, approached 
August von der Heydt while dining in his Bad Kissingen hotel (Bavaria) and 
publicly slandered the state minister in a menacing manner. Von Polski hurled 
a packet of worthless stocks at Heydt, insulting him loudly with an impressive 
string of expletives.100 The act of slander brought von Polski immediate arrest 
and eventual prosecution for public defamation of character. The man had lost 
40,000 thalers in the Wilhelmsbahn crisis of 1857. He believed that the Prus­
sian government had illegally colluded with Berlin banks to drive down Wil­
helmsbahn stock to enable the state to take over the railway's administration. 
His verbal abuse of the minister was the culminating act of a long fruitless 
campaign in 1858-59 to petition the trade ministry, the parliament, and the 
king for just recompense.101 "The blood of investors, widows, and orphans," 
he wrote King Friedrich Wilhelm IV, "stains the state moneys that purchased 
the railroad."102 
The image of a wronged investor publicly sullying a Prussian trade minis-
ter's good name is striking. Rarely did the actions of high railroad finance and 
government economic policy cause public scandals, and such financial dailies 
as the Berlin Borsen-Zeitung were quick to report 'Taffaire Heydt" with tinges 
of schadenfreude. But as exceptional as von Polski's response was, it does 
point to important changes in Prussia's economy in the 1850s, a period when 
the Prussian government significantly altered its prerevolutionary relation­
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ship with the leading sector in big business. In the years 1848-57 it became a 
prominent competitor in the railroad business, realigning its connections with 
the business class. In this period the Prussian state not only regulated private 
railways with a new severity in regard to finance, taxes, personnel, and day-
to-day procedure but also constructed five state-owned railways and, in addi­
tion, administrated twelve out of the twenty-six private railways in Prussia. Of 
the 301,264,000 thalers capitalized in Prussian private railroads in 1858, over 
one-third (105,343,000) stood under state administration.103 
Prussia's economy in the 1850s underwent great changes and clearly af­
fected the politics of businessmen. While there is some validity in pointing 
to 1848/49 as a significant mark on the political economy of the Prussian-
German state, one must not exaggerate the revolution's impact on business-
men's dealings with government officials. The creation of the constitution, bi­
cameral legislature, and the trade ministry were indeed important milestones. 
Yet this "turning point" did not achieve a fixed settlement in government-
business relations, and it does little to explain to explain how the Prussian 
state and the business class came to terms with one another over the politics 
of making money. As the railroad industry demonstrates, there was much to 
be resolved on the question of state power and private profit. 
The changes in the original terms of the mixed system produced in turn 
a mixed legacy in the years after the recovery, 1853-57. Although railroad 
entrepreneurs showed a willingness to do business with the state and accept 
the Prussian government's role as owner and administrator of railroads, they 
were also quick to contest state actions believed to be unfair and injurious to 
businessmen. Spurred by an unprecedented boom in economic growth, the 
business class articulated positions independent from the government. Con­
flicts between the trade ministry and business interests reinforced the identity 
of the business class as a new interest group.104 Mixing equal doses of conflict 
and cooperation, businessmen were resolute in insisting on an economic and 
political framework that would accommodate business as well as government. 
The relationship between the business class and government elites is ex­
plained not in discrete events (such as 1848 and 1866) but rather as a fluid, 
opportunistic, politically ambivalent process. The most marked feature of 
government-business relations is not clear oppositional identities but, rather, 
the shifting, unfixed postures of both government and business. During the 
1850s the Prussian government vacillated between two positions: whether to 
continue a two-hundred year tradition of directing and intervening in eco­
nomic life or to allow businessmen the freedom to pursue profit as they 
pleased—and tax them accordingly.105 While relinquishing its "direction prin­
ciple" in coal mining in favor of a laissez-faire policy, the state intervened 
and asserted control over the railroad industry. The trade minister repeatedly 
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attempted to weaken private railways, but he failed to break their power. He 
vacillated and steered a course that simultaneously hindered and promoted 
private railways. The inconsistency was caused partly by the lack of state 
funds to pursue a more radical policy of takeovers and by the exigencies of 
time, which demanded that Prussia keep pace in railroad construction to main­
tain its preeminent role in the Zollverein. As we shall see in chapter 6, Heydt 
was forced to capitulate to public and parliamentary resistance in 1859 and 
accept the supremacy of private railways. 
The numerous spheres of conflict that arose between business and gov­
ernment in the 1850s suggest that explanations assuming an unproblematic 
alliance between business and government fail to recognize the economic and 
political complexities in reconciling an expanding capitalist economy with 
Prussia's conservative political establishment. Instead, the 1850s are better 
characterized as a decade-long search for mutual accommodation between 
business and government, a search for an equipoise between private entre­
preneurial profit and state power. The search for this balance was an ongoing, 
case-by-case process and one that was never adequately completed in the re­
actionary period, 1850-58. The following three chapters amplify this theme. 
In 1857-59 significant changes in Prussia's political economy would alter 
the course of government-business relations, making this brief period an eco­
nomic and political watershed. The depression of 1857-59 clipped the wings 
of industrial and financial circles that strove simultaneously for expansion in 
industry and greater independence from state economic policy. After 1857, 
curtailed production and scarcity of investment capital reinforced an older 
pattern of large-scale enterprises looking to the state for aid and favorable 
legislation to promote long-term development. The depression, however, was 
accompanied by important political changes in central Europe, among them 
the moderate-liberal cabinet of Wilhlem I in the "New Era," the brief period 
of political thaw (November 1858-March 1862) between the decade of re­
actionary politics and the Constitutional Conflict. After November 1858, the 
new Prussian trade minister's economic policy eased strained relations be­
tween businessmen and government officials. This economic and political 
rapprochement between the business class and the Prussian state (the theme 
of chapter 7) would have a long-term impact on the course of liberalism, capi­
talism, and state building in Prussia-Germany. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
• 
The Conflict over Night Trains 
In the spring of 1849, Minister of Trade, Commerce, and Public Works Au­gust von der Heydt issued an ordinance requiring Prussian railroad com­
panies to schedule night trains to expedite the country's mail. The directive 
from Berlin came as a harsh blow to private railroad companies. With day 
and evening trains running at significant losses, the order to introduce night 
trains, whose unprofitability was foreseen, came as a complete surprise. The 
revolution had brought trade and industry to a near standstill, and the rail­
roads were the first to suffer from the overstocked warehouses, silent fac­
tories, and severely depressed financial markets. There was little freight to 
transport and even less confidence in investment. Stock quotes in 1848 fell to 
new lows and improved only slightly in the first half of 1849.1 Railroad com­
panies drastically cut back on personnel and schedules to stave off total ruin. 
Three railroad companies went bankrupt and numerous others defaulted on 
dividends and loans. 
Decreed in the name of general welfare, the government order was per­
ceived by business circles as an act of unnecessary intervention and a new 
example of bureaucratic paternalism, a trait that entrepreneurs had long de­
plored. The order overlooked the industry's poor financial condition, and the 
government failed to consult the company directors. It was doubly crushing 
that the order had emanated from the trade ministry—a creation of the revo­
lution, a so-called concession to the middle classes. 
The problem was significant for government-business relations. Issued 
four months into Heydt's career as a state minister, the order established a 
tone for ministerial relations with capitalists investing in the expanding Prus­
sian infrastructure. Combined with Heydt's attempt to exploit below-par stock 
prices and buy out private lines, the policy of introducing night trains against 
the wishes of railroad companies alerted stockholders, financiers, and railroad 
directors at an early date that Prussian state interests did not always coincide 
with the needs of private capital. The standoff over night trains illuminates a 
frame of mind in the business community toward the government, an attitude 
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that does not correspond to the assumption of a cooperative alliance between 
the business class and the Prussian government. Rather, the relationship is 
better characterized as defensive and, at times, oppositional. The incident sug­
gests that in the harshest years of the reactionary era, 1851-54, when the state 
sought to impose its political order through purges and decrees, directors of 
private railroad companies did not passively accept government dictates limit­
ing their business freedoms.2 
The protest from private railroad companies was considerable, both in 
magnitude and form. Eleven companies representing 95 percent of all Prus­
sian private rail—60 percent of the country's total rail lines—protested in 
one form or another to the government, ranging from written remonstrations 
to lawsuits to refusals to comply with government orders.3 The controversy 
lasted from 1849 to 1852 but its legal decisions stretched into 1855 and its 
political tone resonated into the New Era. 
In April 1849 Heydt ordered the Lower Silesian-Mark Railroad to run night 
trains between Breslau and Berlin. Although protesting the command with 
strong words, the company directors submitted but asked for funds to defray 
the cost. A subsequent stockholders' meeting amended the directors' deci­
sion and voted to pull the trains by horse rather than by locomotive, a measure 
partly to cut costs, partly to defy the government. Heydt threatened all direc­
tors with fines if they did not comply, and night trains pulled by locomotives 
began to run in May. The losses that year for the railway amounted to 350,000 
thalers; 80 percent of that deficit, 280,000 thalers, stemmed from the cost of 
the night trains.4 
Over the next three years similar demands were made on a number 
of Prussian railways. The Bonn-Cologne, Cologne-Minden, Prince Wilhelm, 
Rhenish, Berlin-Stettin, and Berlin-Hamburg railways all introduced night 
trains against their wishes. Every company protested. The order to introduce 
a night train on the Berlin-Hamburg Railway was especially questionable, be­
cause the line traversed the territories of Prussia, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and 
Lauenburg and terminated in Hamburg. A branch line extended to Liibeck. An 
international treaty signed in November 1841 by five states—Denmark repre­
sented Lauenburg—had enabled the company to lay rail. The treaty stipulated 
that the railway company was to treat all governments equally; Prussia would 
act as the supervisor but could only expedite orders on which all parties 
agreed.5 Hamburg and Mecklenburg-Schwerin were major shareholders in the 
railroad and possessed an additional veto right. 
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Both the governments and the stockholders opposed the idea of night 
trains, but Heydt persisted. He maintained that the company had to follow 
Prussian law, because the company was registered in Prussia and its directors 
met in Berlin. When in April 1852 the board of directors refused to sched­
ule night trains, Heydt threatened directors with one-hundred thaler fines for 
every night without a train. The fines totaled three thousand thalers before 
Heydt threatened the directors with a takeover and notified the now nation­
alized Lower Silesian-Mark Railway to prepare for the absorption of the 
Berlin-Hamburg administration.6 The company capitulated before the dead­
line of 15 April but sought redress in the Prussian courts and through diplo­
matic channels. In the following years, the company lost an average of 130,000 
thalers annually, which amounted to 1.5 percent loss in dividend earnings.7 
It is of particular interest to follow the actions of railways in the Rhine­
land, for the evidence available on these lines provides us with a closer view of 
business attitudes toward the state in the immediate years after 1848. Like the 
Silesian and Berlin Railways, companies in the Rhineland and the Ruhr also 
protested. The first affected was the Rhenish Railway. It, too, was ordered in 
May 1849 to start night trains to Paris via Antwerp. In contrast to the Silesian 
and Berlin lines, however, the trade ministry initially underwrote the costs 
of the company's night trains until January 1850.8 Thereafter the minister ex­
pected the company to absorb the losses, which promptly halted night service. 
A director of the Rhenish Railway, Dr. Gerhard Compes, a lawyer by 
trade, drew up a brief outlining the company's objections. His summary at the 
board meeting emphasized the ministry's tacit recognition of the act's ille­
gality by initially paying for full costs without objection. After seven months 
of subsidies, the revocation of financial assistance for night trains constituted 
an inconsistent and arbitrary action. Moreover, he noted, the government had 
no right to change company statutes or alter timetables, for the company stat­
utes, drafted in the early 1830s, predated the Railroad Law of 1838. Techni­
cally, then, the company did not need to seek approval for timetables as other 
Prussian lines did. Fundamentally agreeing with his position, the board re­
quested that Compes, assisted by two other lawyers, review more closely the 
rights of the company and draw up a legal recommendation.9 With this rec­
ommendation, the board could then decide what course of action was most 
appropriate. 
Gustav Mevissen, the president of the company, dissented and opened 
a discussion that proposed a more cautious, diplomatic approach. He noted 
that the Royal Railroad Commission wished to reach a settlement regarding 
the transport of royal mail wagons. An agreement had already been reached 
with the Cologne-Minden, the Rhenish Railway's important counterpart on 
theright bank of the Rhine. Because the commission was anxious to coordi­
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nate schedules in the western provinces, Mevissen implied that the issue was 
not one that could be ultimately won. Thus the problem regarding long-term 
strategies with the government loomed as more important. If the company 
decisively rejected the government demands, even if it had the legal right to 
do so, it had to be that much more careful in opposing Minister Heydt when 
he himself had legal recourse. 
In this instance Mevissen believed that Heydt still had a legal leg to stand 
on, if only a slim one. The Railroad Law (paragraph 36, clause 3) gave the 
government the right to have their post coaches transported at no charge.10 
Because the stipulation of night trains was not so disadvantageous, the com­
pany should look on it as an onerous concession whose long-range advantage 
outweighed the immediate burden. By accepting the present demand from the 
government, Mevissen reasoned, the company might be able to sign a sepa­
rate contract more agreeable to the specific needs of the company. Through 
tactful compliance the company could effect a better settlement with the gov-
ernment's railroad commission, perhaps even demonstrating that night trains 
were not needed for speedier mail service to Belgium. Persuaded by this argu­
ment, the board agreed to submit to the demand of night trains but to pursue 
the necessary steps for a legal defense.11 The company's acceptance of the gov-
ernment's order for night trains was couched in terms of general cooperation 
with minor technical disagreements, a tactic that delayed a final governmental 
decision. Meanwhile, a team of lawyers worked out the legal position that up­
held the government's obligation to compensate the company for night trains.12 
The delaying tactic worked until 13 November 1850, when the trade min­
istry ordered the resumption of night trains as of 1 January 1851 without com­
pensation. Punitive threats accompanied the directive; the ministry demanded 
that the Railroad Commission fine each director one hundred thalers for fail­
ure to obey the order.13 The company's directors, strengthened by the unani­
mous assertion of seven lawyers that compensation was necessary, defied the 
order, drafted a letter of rejection to Heydt, and waited for the trade ministry 
to bring suit against the company.14 From January to March the directors, in 
cooperation with their technical and administrative directors, refused to run 
night trains. In April Heydt threatened the company with sterner measures. 
Faced with a possible government takeover of the company's administrative 
posts, the directors temporarily capitulated and reintroduced the night trains 
while preparing for the lawsuit. A victory in court, the protocol reassuringly 
noted, would reimburse the company's losses.15 
News of the lawsuit prompted other Prussian railways to take action. 
Heinrich von Wittgenstein, former district governor and president of the 
Cologne-Minden Railway, wrote the directors of the Rhenish Railway and ex­
pressed his company's disapproval of Heydt's imperious behavior. He, too. 
The Conflict over Night Trains • 79 
had protested against the "dictated changes" in the train schedule, "partly be­
cause they [the changes] are unfeasible, partly because they oppose the com-
pany's interests."16 Wittgenstein stressed that they were not alone. Many of 
the neighboring railways, he believed, would reject the demands as decisively 
as the Rhenish Railway. "Like us," he wrote, they were "equally worried that 
the interests of railroad companies were endangered to a great degree, if the 
overbearing behavior of Berlin toward railways regarding mail connections 
was not vigorously opposed." Wittgenstein invited the directors to attend a 
conference of all private railway companies within the jurisdiction of the 
Rhineland-Westphalian Railroad Commission in order to adopt a common re­
sponse to the "increasing encroachment of the trade ministry."17 
On 23 April 1851 directors of the Rhenish, Cologne-Minden, Prince 
William, Bonn-Cologne, Munster-Hamm, and Diisseldorf-Elberfeld railways 
met to form a united front protesting the schedule changes dictated by Heydt. 
The written protest disputed the government's interpretation of paragraph 36 
of the Railroad Law that allegedly empowered the state to introduce night 
trains against the will of the railroad companies. In addition, the meeting 
brought about the collective decision to disobey Heydt's order to run night 
trains for the summer schedule.18 The meeting's resolutions were the first acts 
of disobedience against the new trade ministry. The conference further re­
vealed railroad directors' willingness to organize in defense of private busi­
ness interests. A corporate spirit of mutual cooperation began to evolve. 
The protest to Heydt, drawn up by the directors of the Bonn-Cologne and 
the Cologne-Minden Railways, addressed the problem of coordinating rail­
road schedules with postal administration. According to paragraph 36 of the 
Railroad Law, the two operations should be adjusted "so far as the nature 
of the business permits it." Relations had soured, the directors inferred, be­
cause the ministry failed to apprehend the "nature" of railroad companies and 
what was "permissible" as a business practice.19 Railways operated under the 
joint-stock principle, which obliged directors to fix prices so that capital in­
vestment yielded a dividend for their investors. The essential factor for a joint-
stock company was efficient management. Its directors, entrusted with stock­
holders' money, were obligated to promote profit.20 Imposed regulations that 
drastically minimized profits could inflict irrevocable harm to the "nature" of 
railroads. The falling value of railroad stocks was inversely proportional to the 
rising scarcity of investors inclined to offer funds under such conditions.21 Not 
only were expansion and prosperity put in doubt, but the order also threatened 
the viability of the entire industry. The diminution of already poor dividends 
would imperil investment, the lifeblood of a capital-starved industry. 
In this instance, the economic philosophy of these railroad directors was 
clearly one of laissez-faire liberalism. The market decided the necessities of 
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life. The interests of the public and joint-stock companies, argued the direc­
tors, go hand in hand: "Like manufacturers and merchants, companies must 
satisfy the customer. A train that is needed and meets a demand will be occu­
pied and pay for itself. Its installment would not be objected to. It is another 
question, however, when a train is installed to transport merely a mail bag, 
especially when a rider and horse could punctually expedite the matter with­
out much cost and difficulty."22 
The companies did not oppose promoting the general good, which was in­
variably Heydt's defense; they merely measured it by the yardstick of market 
conditions. If the government insisted on nightly mail trains, it must subsidize 
them until the service became profitable; it could not expect the investors to 
do so. This "immoderately extended use" of the government's right to influ­
ence timetables robbed directors of their managerial role, for a government 
agency was assuming responsibility for the financial interests of company 
stockholders.23 More crucially, the letter expressed a sharp distrust of the way 
the trade ministry interpreted the law and questioned the ministry's actual in­
tentions. The minister's implementation of the law contradicted, the directors 
believed, the "obvious intention of the law to define reciprocal privileges." 
The unreasonable demands amounted to "an interpretation that subjects one 
party to the arbitrary will of the other."24 
But why was the spirit of the law broken so blatantly by the trade min­
istry when the finance ministry and railroad companies had cooperated with 
one another for years? The entrepreneurs believed the answer lay in Heydt's 
desire to nationalize railways and in his intent to use night trains to drive down 
dividends in order to purchase railways at a radically cheaper price. The Rail­
road Law allowed the government the right to appropriate railways, provided 
the company was fully remunerated. The criterion of full remuneration was to 
pay the company twenty-five times the average of yearly dividends paid out 
in the last five years. By driving down dividends to unacceptable levels and 
thereby maintaining the bear-market trend that had begun with the financial 
crisis of 1846 and continued through 1849-50, the government could purchase 
companies at unrealistically low prices. The implication of Heydt's aims was 
guardedly formulated but nonetheless accusatory: 
When, now, it lay in the legal power of the state to enforce orders against 
the wishes of private companies—orders that did not absolutely fulfill the 
needs of general welfare—which lowered the income or dividends to a pre­
ferred minimum, so also would the buying prices of railroads be lowered. In 
other words, the state could become the judge in its own affairs and possess 
the means to render illusory—under the appearance of legality—the noble 
intention of the law and thus dispossess a private party, which in good faith 
had given its trust to the government.25 
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The accusation was not based on mere speculation. By introducing night trains 
on the Lower Silesian-Mark Railway, Heydt had indirectly caused immense 
losses, which in turn allowed the government in 1849 to take over the ad­
ministration of the railroad. The petition charged the government with unfair 
trading and mocked its self-image as an impartial arbiter of the public welfare. 
A "judge in its own affairs," the ministry interpreted the commercial code to 
favor its own financial interests.26 But Heydt continued on his course. In di­
rectives to several railway companies in the Rhineland he ordered new night 
trains for the summer schedule and rejected the Rhenish Railway's request for 
either compensation or suspension of its night trains to Belgium.27 
In June 1852 he took even harsher steps against the Bonn-Cologne Rail­
way, a local railroad line of forty-three kilometers with little significance in 
the Prussian rail network for either freight, passengers, or mail. This small 
railroad company refused to obey the new order for night trains without a sub­
sidy, maintaining that the government, in imposing such dictates on private 
companies, was overextending its authority.28 In response Heydt authorized 
Hans Hugo von Kleist-Retzow, the newly installed provincial governor of the 
Rhineland province, to give the company a deadline of five days to comply. 
When the deadline was not met, the government fined the company directors 
one hundred thalers each per day and, more important, drew up a protocol 
that transferred control over the company's administrative duties to the Royal 
Railroad Commission.29 Heydt insisted that the company pay for the costs in­
curred by the government's assumption of administrative duties and, further­
more, proposed to create a new government agency solely to administer the 
railway if the company "persisted in its oppositional behavior." Of course, 
Heydt noted, the "obstinate company directors" would have no role in this 
new administration.30 
The Bonn-Cologne directors held out for over a month, which both sur­
prised and worried the government. Three weeks after the administrative 
takeover, Heydt, concerned by the directors' persistence, authorized the Rail­
road Commission to offer the return of administrative powers to the company. 
The commission stipulated that the company must run the prescribed night 
trains, but it could contest the order in court. Otherwise, the government 
would have to proceed with the costly step of installing a permanent state ad-
ministration.31 
Although this proposal was rejected, a deputation of Bonn-Cologne di­
rectors met with Heydt a week later to negotiate an out-of-court compromise 
and achieved a modicum of success. Directors Stahl and Miihlens argued that 
the company had not refused to run night trains per se, but merely refused 
to run them without compensation. Heydt proposed that the directors resume 
control of the company, operate the night train as ordered, and lodge a protest 
against the executive order with the proper authorities.32 As recorded in the 
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company protocol, he added "that as far as he was concerned, the company 
should receive special consideration if the cost of night trains significantly in­
jured its financial interests."33 The next day the directors officially accepted 
the terms of settlement, though still noting that they did not recognize the 
legality of the government order.34 
The settlement was advantageous for both sides. Heydt and his minis­
try were spared the burden of finding administrators to run the railway effi­
ciently. The month-long occupation had produced a number of problems for 
the government. Among them was the failure of the Railroad Commission to 
integrate night trains into an acceptable work schedule for locomotive drivers 
and machinists; it instituted eighteen-hour work days in four-day rotations 
with a half day off—a clear safety hazard.35 In turn, the company directors 
were given honorable terms of defeat. Although they were bound to run night 
trains, Heydt recognized their right to seek redress and conceded that the rail-
road's situation constituted a potential exception to the law. They had neither 
won nor lost but could interpret their actions as a spirited defense of company 
interests at the next stockholders' meeting. Heydt had shown courtesy when 
asking the company to return, and there was still a chance—as shown by the 
case of the Rhenish Railway—that a lawsuit could bring the compensation 
they thought the railway deserved. 
The reconciliation between ministry and company, however, was short 
lived. Three weeks later, Heydt refused to retract the fines imposed on the di­
rectors, citing their "unjustified obstinacy."36 
That the small Bonn-Cologne Railway had the courage to defy the trade min­
ister was owed to the victories of larger lines over the government in the 
courts. In April 1852 the Rhenish Railway won its decision against the trade 
ministry. The lower court found no merit in the ministry's claim that the law 
permitted the government to assume certain supervisory duties.37 The minis­
try appealed the decision, of course, but the first round was a clear victory for 
private business.38 The Berlin-Hamburg Railway also won its first decision in 
1853. The two cases sent a powerful signal to the business community that its 
interests could be defended against the government. 
Throughout the dispute the government characterized the companies' 
opposition as a stubborn defense of Manchester liberalism, a fear of innova­
tion, or a pure willfulness to disobey the trade ministry.39 Heydt criticized the 
companies as blind to the bigger picture of national economy and thus de­
serving of harsh treatment.40 Whether this indictment of the private railroad 
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system was warranted is questionable. Rhenish railway companies recognized 
the need for a Berlin-Cologne night train and never opposed it, demonstrating 
a pragmatism that Heydt did not want to acknowledge. Passengers traveling 
from Paris or London had been obliged to stay the night in Cologne because 
of the lack of a night train to Berlin. Although the same companies opposed 
certain night trains exclusively for mail purposes, the directors responded to 
this need. Acting under the auspices of the North German Railroad Associa­
tion, the directors of all railroads involved in expediting the Cologne-Berlin 
express met in 1852-53 and worked out the particulars.41 The success of the 
night express had hinged on the willingness of the Hanoverian and Brunswick 
governments to grant persons and baggage direct transit through their lands 
without changing or unloading. The state railway administrators of the two 
territories agreed to participate, and in 1853 an agreement was worked out. 
The Prussian government, however, annulled the schedule contract, told 
the Brunswick and Hanoverian governments that the three governments must 
inaugurate a night train, and that the private companies must not influence the 
decision.42 The Prussian ministry subsequently altered the original treaty in 
several ways, which the directors believed outweighed the advantages of the 
night train. Even the Railroad Commission, Heydt's own instrument, admitted 
that certain provisions of the treaty (regarding the order for the Berlin-Anhalt 
Railway to run a fourth night train) were entirely useless.43 It was not the resis­
tance of private companies but the insistent claim of the Prussian government 
to determine policy in northern Germany that added fuel to the continuing 
conflict. In this situation, as in others, Heydt worked to check the innovations 
of private railroad associations.44 Even though the Cologne-Berlin night train 
appeared to be unprofitable, private companies demonstrated a willingness to 
look beyond their own ledgers and consider greater interests. Heydt's inter­
vention in this case appeared to be motivated more by political principle than 
by administrative need. 
Heydt's fiats often appeared to be simply assertions of ministerial power, 
but he always justified them with the need to serve the general good. Evoking 
the needs of the postal system in 1853, Heydt ordered the Magdeburg-Leipzig 
line to run another night train. After a year and 70,000 thalers in company 
losses, however, night service was eventually canceled, because the postal au­
thorities stated they were never interested in the train and it was a burden to 
them as well as the company.45 Not without irony, the Berliner Borsen-Zeitung 
noted in March 1859 that the trade ministry canceled a night train on the state-
owned Upper Silesian Railway because of financial losses.46 Clearly Heydt's 
interest in regulation was not always exercised for the welfare of the post 
or better schedules for freight and passengers. The examples of the Berlin-
Cologne night train and the Magdeburg-Leipzig mail train suggest that there 
84 • FOUR

was a reasonable side to the companies' requests and that efficiency and prag­
matism did not always motivate the ministry's actions. 
Over the long run, though, the railroad companies' opposition to night 
trains diminished, for the directors' principal objection—hindrance to effi­
cient management—lost its sting after night trains showed signs of profit­
ability by the end of 1852. The frequency of night freight shipments steadily 
increased, mostly because of the coal industry, and night trains became a 
component of the competitive edge to draw customers. In fact, the trade min­
istry offered the Rhenish Railway in May 1853 the right to suspend their 
night trains from Cologne to Belgium; the Aachen-Diisseldorf-Ruhrorter line, 
a state-administered railway, the Railroad Commission explained, could as­
sume its routes. The company, however, refused the offer. Using the same 
principle but reversing their previous position, the Rhenish Railway directors 
sent a letter to Heydt, stating they had never recognized the ministry's right 
to influence their timetables and they intended to retain their night trains, 
"merely to promote competition with the Aachen-Diisseldorf trains."47 Simi­
larly, the Berlin-Hamburg Railway, although actively involved in a suit against 
the Prussian government over night trains, admitted in its 1853 report to stock­
holders, "One large railway line after another has introduced night trains and 
it cannot be denied that the public, especially the businessman, have deci­
sively demanded them—our railway cannot be left behind."48 Thus the legal 
issue over the government's right to impose night trains on private railroad 
companies quickly became a moot point. Competition for freight contracts 
had forced the issue—in Heydt's favor. 
It was in this changed climate that the ministerial litigation against the 
railway companies swung in favor of the governmental position in the sec­
ond and third appeals. In September 1855 the government finally won its right 
to refuse compensation.49 The court case with the Berlin-Hamburg Railway 
never actually addressed the original complaint of the stockholders and the 
foreign governments: the legality of imposing night trains on a private com­
pany. The Berlin court stated it had no jurisdiction to decide such a matter; 
the company could merely sue for compensation. The court proceeding, then, 
changed in significant ways. The question over the legal right of the Prussian 
government to order night trains fell into the background; the civil suit merely 
centered on whether such an order should be accompanied by compensa­
tion. Consequently, the railroad company's role shifted from the accused to 
the accuser, the former always holding an advantage.50 Similarly, the Rhenish 
Railway case was decided not on the letter of the law but on a broader inter­
pretation by a judge who believed trains to be the instrument of the general 
welfare. In so doing, commented one railroad director, the judge went beyond 
the law code into the sphere of national economy, something that he knew 
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nothing about.51 The most damaging evidence against the companies' cases, 
however, was that by 1855 they had voluntarily accepted night trains in the 
face of higher revenues and competition. 
The Berlin-Hamburg line attempted to play its last card in the Federal 
Diet in Frankfurt. The Diet discussed the matter until 1858, but no decision 
was reached—a small yet telling example of how the Diet in its last years 
failed to meet the practical needs of German economic life.52 The Rhenish 
Railway stoically accepted the decision, letting it pass in its board and stock­
holder meetings with little comment. 
It would be wrong to dismiss the night train dispute as an ephemeral affair 
that ended in defeat for Prussian businessmen. On the contrary, the issue re­
mained a central question for stockholders, financiers, and railroad directors 
from 1849 to 1852; railroad companies held their ground, defied government 
orders, and won in court. It was only after railroads started to schedule night 
trains voluntarily that the courts accepted the government position. 
As early as 1849 it was clear that the Prussian government was not entirely 
wedded to private railroad interests and that companies had to resist govern­
ment control. The Rhenish Railway's protocols are especially revealing, for 
the company directors weighed their two basic options of either hard-line 
legal confrontation or appeasement. On the one hand, some directors evinced 
confidence in the Prussian tradition of lawful rule and believed their claim 
could be upheld legally. Yet even more revealing is the position of Mevissen, 
the company president, whose estimate of Minister von der Heydt and his bu­
reaucracy was shrewd. He advised the company not to exercise its legal pre­
rogatives for fear of the minister's long-term wrath and suggested the greater 
advantages of maintaining a dialogue with the trade ministry. He recognized 
that success in litigation would be a Pyrric victory if it antagonized this power­
ful minister. Although the Rhenish Railway opted for open confrontation on 
this occasion, we will see that this same company joined others in adopting 
the more pragmatic modus operandi of responding flexibly to problems with 
state railroad policy and negotiating a reasonable settlement out of court and 
the public eye. The night train dispute confirms that the business agenda was 
not set by the government and that cooperation between business elites and 
government officials could not be taken for granted. In the harshest years of 
Manteuffel's reactionary era, railroad entrepreneurs advocated free enterprise 
against state interference, showing their alacrity to use the courts to check the 
government's arbitrary action. 
The matter was not forgotten. It became an integral part of businessmen's 
grievances during the elections of 1858 and in the New Era. The night trains 
dispute served to display the continuity of disagreements between business 
and government since 1848 and strengthened the argument of commercial 
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newspapers that businessmen had to elect deputies willing to defend business 
interests.53 The issue was furthermore used to attack Heydt personally in 1858, 
when it was rumored that he would not survive the New Era. The week-long 
rumor of Heydt's imminent dismissal in November 1858 occasioned many 
philippics against the minister (presumably to reinforce the prince regent's 
decision), and the night train dispute was incorporated into the arguments that 
Heydt was never a friend of Prussian business.54 This controversy spilled over 
into the political sphere, where businessmen frustrated by Prussia's business 
policy influenced the political agendas and platforms of liberal parties. 
When we place this incident in the greater context of the aggressive gov­
ernment takeovers of railroads from 1849 to 1857, the introduction of an un­
popular railroad tax in 1853, the controversial second reserve fund in 1857, 
a restrictive bank policy throughout the 1850s, the parliamentary opposition 
to state railways from 1855 to 1859, and the continuing policy of paternal­
ism over joint-stock companies, we see that this issue was not an isolated 
phenomenon. Rather, it was an early indicator of a decade-long trend. The 
thousands of thalers in fines, the government takeovers of administrations, the 
collective action of private businesses against the government, and, of course, 
the protracted court cases evidence strained government-business relations in 
Prussia in the early 1850s. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
T 
Banking and the Business Class 
The emergence of commercial investment banks after the Revolution of 1848 was an institutional breakthrough for modern capitalism and one 
of the central factors in the accelerated development of the industrial revolu­
tion in Germany between 1848 and 1871. The accumulation and mobilization 
of capital in concentrated and accessible forms was indispensable for under­
taking such large-scale projects as railroads, coal mines, and iron works. 
Long-term promotional loans that enabled entrepreneurs to start up new busi­
nesses became an evident necessity in the growth of modern business. As one 
bank director noted, "Capital, more than water, steam, or electricity, put the 
machines into motion." l In view of the unprecedented magnitude of capital 
needed to build railroads, the railroad industry's need for joint-stock commer­
cial banking was crucial. 
Given the immeasurable importance of commercial investment banks for 
industrialization, the establishment of such banks as the Bank fur Handel 
und Industrie in Darmstadt (hereafter the Darmstadter Bank), the Disconto 
Gesellschaft, and the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft in the 1850s represented 
a milestone for the political and socioeconomic aspirations of Prussia's busi­
ness class. Economically, investment banks were the catalyst for what we now 
know as the "industrial take-off," the attainment of sustained, irreversible 
economic growth in Germany after 1851. Politically, these institutions were 
the expression of an assertive middle class, enabling businessmen to practice 
trade free of government wishes and restrictions. The liberal aspiration for 
freedom of association and self-administration in commercial and civic affairs 
was partially realized by the creation of joint-stock commercial banks. 
Although German banks have never suffered from a lack of histori­
ans, rarely are they studied in a political context. Alfred Kriiger, Karl Erich 
Born, Wilhelm Treue, W. O. Henderson, Richard Tilly, Fritz Seidenzahl, Hans 
Jaeger, Hubert Kiesewetter, Hans Pohl, and Manfred Pohl have all written ex­
tensively about the development of German banking in the 1850s, but most 
gloss over the political aspects of the story, primarily because they are inter­
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ested in questions of continuity in the national economy or the role of the 
state in industrialization.2 Surveys of German economic and political history 
reflect this deficit.3 Karl Obermann and Helmut Bohme are two exceptions to 
the trend; both splice together economic and political events for a more inte­
grated argument. Obermann first attempted to ascribe some political meaning 
to the bank foundings of the 1850s. In orthodox Marxist fashion he argued 
that the bank openings were the result of the alliance between the bourgeoisie 
and the crown-aristocracy following the estrangement of the middle classes 
from the proletariat after 1848.4 The new joint-stock banks of the 1850s, Ober­
mann argued, formed an essential part of the bourgeoisie's "compensation" 
for "recognizing the political power of the king and aristocracy." By assum­
ing, though not demonstrating, that the Prussian state supported the joint-
stock principle to promote the bourgeoisie's economic needs, Obermann in­
terpreted joint-stock banks as the crucial link between the failed revolution of 
1848 and the "revolution from above."5 
Bohme, too, ascribed the development of the banks to an alliance between 
the bourgeoisie and Junkers, thus viewing the bank foundings as an outgrowth 
of the reactionary period.6 He sketched how proposed bank reforms in 1848, 
which intended to serve a more liberal society, emerged in 1849-50 as a bank­
ing policy that served the interests of reactionary government. Bohme's nar­
rative portrayed David Hansemann as the lone champion of progressive eco­
nomic reforms. Hansemann's attempt as a government official to charter credit 
associations for lower middle-class artisans (and thus continue the liberalizing 
process of the revolution) threatened the monied interests of both the rural and 
urban elite: "What Hansemann strove for, wealthy businessmen, bankers, and 
large landholders wanted to hinder."7 Thus Bohme argued that because both 
private bankers and government officials stood to lose economic and political 
influence with banks independent of state interests and old money, Hanse-
mann became politically isolated. This led to his dismissal as finance minister 
in 1848 and his resignation as chief director of the Prussian bank in 1851.8 
Although Bohme's account of Hansemann's political struggles with the 
Prussian government over the course of 1848-51 is instructive, it conveys the 
mistaken impression that Prussia's leading businessmen uniformly sided with 
the Prussian state. Hansemann, however, was neither politically isolated from 
entrepreneurial elites nor the sole critic of Prussian economic policy. Bohme's 
thesis, although seemingly well documented, is less than convincing. In 1851 
Gustav Mevissen, a director of the Schaaffhausen'sche and later of the Darm­
stadter Bank, assisted Hansemann in working out the statutes of his credit 
bank, the Disconto Gesellschaft, and later asked Hansemann to be president of 
his Darmstadter Bank.9 Mevissen and Abraham Oppenheim, two key Rhenish 
entrepreneurs who were railroad directors as well as bankers, were also being 
Banking and the Business Class • 89 
sued by the trade ministry during this period for their unwillingness to comply 
with ministerial orders to schedule night trains (see chap. 4). Further, they and 
other private railroad directors were inclined to disregard government direc­
tives to discharge workers connected with the Revolution of 1848, exhibiting 
a reluctance to cooperate with reactionary policies (see chap. 3). In sum, the 
argument for an alliance between businessmen and authoritarian government 
in the postrevolutionary era is flawed and needs modification, for it does not 
recognize the many frictions between Prussian entrepreneurs and the state. 
The bourgeoisie should be recognized as an additional force in Prussian 
politics; their political ambivalence in the 1850s both defied and accommo­
dated the conservative Prussian government. Having practiced business be­
fore 1848 in a bureaucratic-absolutist state that accepted principles of free 
trade, entrepreneurs of the 1850s learned to use the Prussian bureaucracy 
and simultaneously practice free enterprise in piecemeal fashion to achieve 
their interests. Consistent neither as unfailing parliamentarians nor as obedi­
ent subjects of the crown, Prussian businessmen were nonetheless resolutely 
unwavering in attaining bourgeois social and economic needs. And, more im­
portant, the ambivalent position of the entrepreneurial class toward authori­
tarian government expressed a strategy of successful negotiation, not defeat­
ism or compliancy. The banking sector is just one area where the business 
class adopted a position independent of the crown, one which was tantamount 
to defiance. 
To underscore the element of friction and defiance between the state and 
the bourgeoisie in Prussia's banking history, this chapter focuses on an epi­
sode that has hitherto failed to be integrated into the secondary literature: a 
decree (Octroy) drafted and signed by the king and the cabinet on 12 July 
1856 to ban commandite banks.10 This decree is the most concrete evidence 
we have documenting the failed attempt of the Prussian state to control the 
political and economic power of the business class. The principal business­
men involved in this episode were connected to the railroad industry. 
That historians have neglected the decree is somewhat understandable — 
it was never promulgated. Otto von Manteuffel, the minister-president, op­
posed the bill on political grounds and worked persistently to block publica­
tion of the signed law. Although originally outvoted in the cabinet, Manteuffel 
quickly undermined the majority position by obtaining a postponement of the 
law's promulgation. In late August, Manteuffel convinced the king and cabi­
net to bury the law permanently and averted what he believed to be a serious 
misadventure. Yet the successful maneuvers of Manteuffel do not diminish the 
decree's significance. Though never put into action, it reveals a crisis within 
the Prussian government in the summer months of 1856 regarding commercial 
banking, the control of capital, and the political power that might be derived 
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from high finance. And it dispels the idea that commandite banks were ac­
cepted, if not welcomed, by the Prussian government.11 For these reasons this 
incident deserves analysis, because it illustrates concretely how businessmen 
confronted government restrictions and how officials reacted to their circum­
vention. 
The decree was the cabinet's reaction to the bold move of David Hanse-
mann and Gustav Mevissen, two railroad entrepreneurs who established 
capital-share investment banks using the commandite principle. Commandite 
companies were a substitute for joint-stock banks, which the government re­
fused to charter. Inactive or "silent" partners in a commandite contractual 
relationship were protected with limited liability, while active partners—com-
pany directors—were burdened with unlimited liability. Commandite compa­
nies also did not possess the legal character of a juridical person; property, for 
example, could not be bought in the company's name. But not having the legal 
status of a juridical person brought one great advantage: a commandite com­
pany was not a legal corporation and therefore did not require a charter, the 
mechanism by which the government controlled commercial development. In 
fact, because Prussian businessmen had used commandite companies infre­
quently and on a small scale, only two paragraphs in the Rhenish and Gen­
eral law codes addressed the status of such companies.12 The establishment 
and practice of joint-stock companies, in contrast, were carefully prescribed 
in laws passed in 1838 and 1843.13 
Hansemann set the precedent in January 1856 by reorganizing his credit 
association, the Disconto Gesellschaft, into a commandite bank. A consor­
tium, organized by Gustav Mevissen, followed in July by founding the Ber­
liner Handelsgesellschaft. In the same month, commandite banks were opened 
in Breslau, Konigsberg, and Magdeburg, as well as in Coburg and Hamburg.14 
The decree expressed the reaction of an angry government regarding these 
banks which, totaling over forty million thalers in nominal capital,15 had no 
charters from the state yet had been established in full accordance with the 
law. The lack of a charter requirement meant freedom from government pro­
scription and supervision. Promotional investment banking, heralding a new 
era in the movement of capital, had arrived in Prussia against the will of the 
government. 
Prussian businessmen resorted to the commandite principle as the last 
step in a long confrontation with the Prussian government over banking privi­
leges. Banking freedom (Bankfreiheit) had been a point of contention between 
entrepreneurs and government officials since the 1820s.16 The government's 
tight control on the money supply and its continued refusal to set up more af­
filiates of the Royal Bank produced a sizable store of ill will among business 
circles.17 In spite of its professed aims to liberalize the economy after 1806­
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13, the Prussian state, with an eye toward its own financial problems, failed to 
meet the needs of businessmen in leading sectors of the economy in the fol­
lowing decades.18 Owing to public and internal pressures, some concessions 
were granted, however slight. In 1846 the Royal Bank of Prussia was trans­
formed into a semipublic central bank of issue; ten million thalers of share 
capital were added to its reserves, and in 1847 it was renamed the Prussian 
Bank. An advisory board of shareholders exercised some degree of input, but 
the state still retained dominant control.19 The multiple requests for bank re­
form at the United Diet in 1847 confirmed the continued dissatisfaction of the 
business class.20 
During the revolution, the "liberal" cabinet of Camphausen and Hanse-
mann transformed the A. Schaaflhausen'sche Bankverein into the first joint-
stock bank in Prussia in August 1848. In March 1848 the imminent collapse 
of the private bank, whose investments in the Rhineland and Westphalia af­
fected over 170 factories and 40,000 workers, had compelled the government 
to accept the reform as preferable to further radicalization of the Rhineland. 
Yet the bank's low share-capital base (5,187,000 thalers) and its restriction on 
note issue did not appease Rhenish businessmen. And once the crisis of 1848 
abated, the government canceled any plans for further joint-stock charters. 
The A. Schaaflhausen'sche bank owed its joint-stock status not to a progres­
sive policy shift of the Prussian state but, rather, to the emergency conditions 
ofl848.21 
After 1848 the problem became more acute, for it was clear that the 
twenty-one million thalers of the Prussian Bank, the central bank of issue, 
were grossly inadequate for the growing economy of Prussia. In 1848 the 
Camphausen-Hansemann ministry introduced normative statutes (which had 
been codified in 1846 but never enforced) for banks of issue to issue notes as 
well as engage in Lombard and discount. Banks in Berlin, Cologne, Magde­
burg, Stettin, and Breslau were accorded the privilege, but this did not quell 
criticism. The maximum on note issue, set at one million thalers per prov­
ince and at eight million thalers for the entire country, made the reform more 
cosmetic than meaningful. Moreover, the restrictions on discounting bills and 
receiving deposits by these banks limited their usefulness; critics claimed it 
deterred rather than promoted the growth of banks of issue.22 This de jure "re­
form" of banks, however, did aid the government in staving off criticism from 
the Landtag and chambers of commerce and help the Prussian state maintain 
its mercantilist policy on money supply and private banking.23 Thus, from 
businessmen's perspective, Prussian banks at the beginning of the boom busi­
ness cycle of 1851-57 were woefully undercapitalized.24 
The refusal to charter joint-stock banks was the most prominent cause 
of the bourgeois discontent with the Prussian government. Businessmen felt 
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greatly disadvantaged, for the joint-stock bank, with its capacity to amass and 
lend capital, was the motor of business expansion. Although government offi­
cials dwelled on the problem of note issue, the businessman's primary concern 
was credit. Unlike the traditional banks that handled mostly state paper and 
safe investments in established enterprises, these new banks actively sought to 
start up businesses and promote underdeveloped branches of commerce and 
industry. The banks' principal attraction was floating long-term loans to new 
companies, but they also gave clients lines of credit, advanced raw materials 
for production, accepted future consignments of manufactures as collateral, 
and recognized promissory notes, securities, mortgages, and bonds as legal 
tender. The Societe General du Credit Mobilier, the institution set up under 
the auspices of Napoleon III in 1852, set the standard in promotional bank­
ing with its capacity for massive loans, its know-how in the business world, 
its speculative willingness to start up new companies, and its unprecedented 
stock dividends. With its capital base of sixty million francs, the Credit Mo­
bilier was a dramatic breakthrough in commercial finance.25 
The example spread quickly to Germany. The first such joint-stock bank 
to be established on German soil was the Darmstadter Bank fur Handel 
und Industrie, founded by Cologne merchant-bankers Abraham Oppenheim, 
Wilhelm Ludwig Deichman, Viktor Wendelstadt, and Gustav Mevissen.26 
Oppenheim was a charter shareholder in the Credit Mobilier and was in fact 
related by marriage to one of its principal owners, Benoit-Fould. With this 
connection, Oppenheim secured the backing of the Credit Mobilier to invest 
in a German counterpart. Because of the hostile behavior of both the Prus­
sian government and the traditional banking houses of Frankfurt, Oppenheim 
turned to the Grand Duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt, whose government granted 
him a charter on the provision that the bank raise the capital to complete the 
Hessian railroad line from Mainz to Aschaffenburg.27 The bank opened for 
business in April 1853. After an initial rough start (due mostly to the difficulty 
of placing its shares at a satisfactory quote on German exchanges), the bank 
soon established itself as a leading industrial investor in Germany. In 1856 it 
raised 1.6 million gulden for the establishment of joint-stock companies; by 
1870, it participated in no fewer than thirty-four major railroad transactions 
between 1853 and 1870.28 By 1856, sixteen such credit institutions existed in 
Austria and the German states. 
The Prussian government's response to the Darmstadter Bank's opening 
indicated its general position on large-scale joint-stock banking in and out­
side Prussia for the coming years. Calling the new bank a form of "French 
propaganda" and its founders "agents" of the French, by whom Cologne was 
"most endangered," King Friedrich Wilhelm IV warned his cabinet, "This 
institution is intended to transfer to Germany the credit swindles that have 
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raged in Paris to exploit the entire Rhineland, and [it] . . . will have an un­
deniably disadvantageous political influence."29 In consequence, the cabinet 
drafted a diplomatic note to the Hessian government expressing its utmost 
disapproval, assured the king that the bank's plans (as stated in its statutes) to 
open branches in Prussia would be stopped, and authorized Heydt to prohibit 
any transaction between the Darmstadter and the Schaaffhausen'sche bank, 
whose directors included Mevissen and Oppenheim.30 
Undaunted by their government's dislike of joint-stock credit banks, Prus­
sian businessmen and merchant bankers invested in prominent joint-stock 
banks at Leipzig, Dessau, Luxembourg, Karlsruhe, and Vienna—as well as in 
other smaller institutions ringing the borders of Prussia. In turn, these banks 
did not shy from investing in Prussian enterprises. The Darmstadter Bank, for 
example, advanced millions of florins to the Rhenish Railway to complete the 
construction of its Rhine lines.31 Because the official money supply (21 million 
thalers) was patently inadequate, these banks provided the welcome stop-gap 
measure of feeding the Prussian economy with currency. In return they used 
Prussian enterprises for investment and speculation. The Prussian government 
responded to this with a law in 1855 that forbade the use of foreign notes under 
ten thalers. The law did not produce the desired effect, prompting Heydt and 
Bodelschwingh, the trade and finance ministers, to publish an article in the 
Staatsanzeiger, the Berlin journal of record, exhorting commercial circles to 
cease using foreign money substitutes. Reflecting in retrospect on this effort, 
Rudolf Delbruck, a member of Heydt's ministry, wrote, "Voluntary help from 
the commercial estate [Handelsstand] regarding foreign notes was not to be 
counted on, for its most influential members themselves were founders and 
directors of these foreign banks."32 (Delbruck failed to note, however, that 
he and other top officials had also invested in Darmstadter bonds.)33 Conse­
quently, another law was introduced in 1857 that extended the ban to all for­
eign currency.34 
By 1856, joint-stock credit institutions had been erected in all corners of 
the Continent. Their influence extended from "the plains of Castile to the val­
ley of the Danube, from London to Constantinople and from Moscow to Tri­
este." 35 Even the ultra-conservative Habsburg government consented to the 
Credit-Anstalt in 1855. The trend toward joint-stock banks seemed irrevers­
ible, and Prussian businessmen believed that their government would eventu­
ally capitulate and recognize such institutions as indispensable to industrial­
ization and economic growth. 
In February 1856 two prestigious consortiums petitioned the government 
to permit the chartering of joint-stock credit institutions. The simultaneity 
of the petitions was not coincidental; they were part of a larger European 
struggle between the upstart Credit Mobilier and the Rothschilds vying for 
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supremacy in the years 1852-56. Waged first in Madrid and Vienna, the battle 
then shifted to Berlin.36 Mevissen, Oppenheim, Mendelssohn, and the Cre­
dit Mobilier headed the first project, the "Prussian Credit Institute for the 
Promotion of Agriculture, Trade, and Industry," and proposed a base capi­
tal of thirty million thalers with the expectation of raising it to fifty million. 
The Rothschild House, P. L. Ravene, and Gerson Bleichroder backed the sec­
ond project, the "Prussian Society for the Advancement of Commercial and 
Agricultural Industry," and requested twenty-four million thalers as an initial 
capital base with the option to expand to eighty million. 
Submitted within four days of one another, these two proposals—because 
of the magnitude of the propositions, the prestige of their proponents, and 
the public attention they received—stirred the government to reconsider its 
stance on joint-stock commercial banking in Prussia. The petitions noted that 
the country was in danger of falling behind France and Austria in the tempo 
of industrialization but stressed that investments in agriculture in the east­
ern provinces were the banks' first concern. To underscore the latter point, 
prominent aristocrats not only signed the petitions but also agreed to sit on the 
board of directors. The Erbprinz zu Bentheim was featured in the Rothschild 
petition, while the Herzog von Ratibor, Graf von Redern, Graf von Arnim-
Boitzenberg, Graf von Solms-Baruth, Graf von Keyserling, and the Furst von 
Hohenlohe-Ohringen lent their names to the Mevissen proposal.37 
A two-month ministerial debate ensued on whether the charters should 
be granted. The debate divided the cabinet into camps supporting and op­
posing the enterprises. The argument for approval came chiefly from Heydt 
and Marcus Niebuhr, an adviser in the king's Privy Council. Their memoranda 
argued that rigid opposition to promotional banking was no longer a viable 
option. Blanket condemnation of joint-stock banking, Heydt maintained, had 
not enabled the government to control commercial and industrial investment. 
Moreover, this policy was out of step with rapid expansion in recent years. 
Fully aware that the government's railroad funds were already overextended 
for the coming years and that the Prussian Bank and the Seehandlung did not 
possess the capacity to service the existing enterprises in Prussia, Heydt re­
luctantly recognized the desirability of more joint-stock banks. Although in 
public the trade minister held firm to the government's restrictive position, 
he began around 1855 to question the policy in government memoranda. He 
stated that the government should return to the philosophy embodied in the 
bank reform of 1846, which worked toward a compromise between private 
banking and state control. After 1848, Heydt noted, the government had be­
come "frightened in following the newly embarked course."38 
Niebuhr advanced a stronger argument by asserting that the government 
"no longer has a free choice with this charter." Prussia's restrictions on do­
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mestic banks had encouraged joint-stock banks in neighboring Dessau, Bruns­
wick, Rostow, Weimar, Gera, Thuringia, and Darmstadt (two), and now a 
rejection of a credit company would produce "more than one on our bor­
ders. This would be far worse than allowing one within the country, because 
a border credit mobilier would draw all its business from Prussia and simul­
taneously be free of all government control."39 In pleading for a joint-stock 
investment bank, neither Niebuhr nor Heydt sought to abandon the state's 
philosophy on controlling finance and the use of capital. (Niebuhr, an early 
protege of Ludwig von Gerlach, was part of the ultra-conservative Kreuz­
zeitung circle.40) Instead, they argued that new conditions required a change 
in tactics to meet this end. Introducing joint-stock banking to Berlin would 
diminish the business of foreign border banks and allow the state to exercise 
greater control over financial affairs. Heydt conceded that these banks would 
influence Prussian business whether or not they had their seats in Prussia; 
hence the state should garner what control it could. 
Actually the proposals came at an opportune time to dovetail with other 
planned changes by the government. In May 1856 Heydt and Bodelschwingh 
increased the note issue of the Prussian Bank more than threefold, from 
twenty-one to seventy-one million thalers, in an effort to reassert the state's 
control over the economy and permit the government to ban all foreign cur­
rency. Allowing a major credit institution to operate in Berlin would enhance 
the plan, for it would use government notes and stand under the trade minis-
try's supervision. He proposed that rewording the statutes in more restrictive 
terms to prohibit activities outside of Prussia and limiting the type of enter­
prises funded in the country would preempt the major dangers. With such 
arguments, it was clear that Heydt and Niebuhr did not ground their advocacy 
of the charters in the liberal doctrines of self-administration and economic 
freedom. Firm advocates of a bureaucratically controlled economy, the two 
government officials saw the charter as a way for the state to guarantee "a 
long-lasting and influential intervention."41 
The tactic, however, did not sit well with the minister of the interior, the 
minister of agriculture, and the directors of the Prussian Bank, who together 
formed a bulwark against the new charters. Heydt had perhaps anticipated 
their opposition, for he appealed to the king for his consent without a cabinet 
vote. All three parties protested this action, stating that these charters touched 
on their spheres of administration and therefore required a cabinet vote.42 In 
consequence, they submitted written rejections. The Prussian Bank directors 
disclaimed any need for new credit banks. The enormous economic growth 
in the last five years hardly bespoke of lethargy or the danger of being out­
stripped by France and Austria, the report stated. On the contrary, the bank 
directors warned Heydt of too much activity and drew a parallel between the 
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current speculative fever and the financial panic of 1844. Moreover, they saw 
no guarantee that the bank's capital would flow to agriculture instead of com­
merce and industry. Not least, they objected to the Prussian Bank's potential 
loss of status as the primary instrument for shaping the domestic financial 
market and controlling the interest rates.43 
Minister of Agriculture Karl von Manteuffel also argued that a private in­
stitution would eclipse the power of the state bank and thus limit the freedom 
of the government to make decisions. For the state to be beholden to such an 
institution for loans would be regrettable.44 Yet Manteuffel undercut his own 
position with the admission that, if the government was predisposed to per­
mit such banks, he favored chartering not one but both banks. In this way 
the "government can avoid the accusation that it chose one company over 
another without sufficient justification." 45 This fear of adverse public reaction 
suggests the extent to which potential public pressure affected even the most 
arch-conservative members of Otto von Manteuffel's government. 
The forceful rejection of the charter came from Ferdinand von West­
phalen, the minister of the interior, whose criticisms were clustered around 
the two interconnected themes of economics and politics. The economic ob­
jections centered mostly on the minister's belief that the proposed institutions' 
primary aim was to pursue stock speculation. As evidence he cited the inten­
tion of the Rothschild consortium to reserve eighteen of the twenty-four mil­
lion thalers in stock for the bank's ownership, including eight million for Roth­
schild alone. A liability of such large dimensions, he argued, would strengthen 
an already overly strong hand and invite rash and risky speculations.46 The sole 
interest in quick profits was apparent in the stocks of credit mobiliers, whose 
volatility could only be attributed to deliberate manipulation.47 And, he con­
tinued, credit institutes in Berlin would be no different. "Among the founders 
of the Prussian Credit Institute are people whose connection with the Darm­
stadter Bank is notorious; and among the promoters of the other company are 
founders of the credit mobilier in Vienna. The businesses of both institutions 
and their stockholders have until now merely been active in unsolid enter­
prises and stock-jobbing."48 He dismissed as farcical the petitioners' assertion 
that the banks would make a "solid contribution" to the economy. 
The minister's political objections addressed the potential power that 
would accrue to the credit institutions and the corresponding loss of power 
to the state and the Junker class. Initially Westphalen criticized joint-stock 
banks as injurious to the moral well-being (Sittlichkeit) of the lower classes 
and to the benevolent, nonpartisan status of the state, but the actual reason 
for rejecting such banks lay in their deleterious effect on the Junker class. He 
remonstrated that the recent new stocks were devaluing state paper, above 
all the mortgage bonds (Pfandbriefe) issued by the Kurmark, Neumark, and 
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Pommeranian Landschaften, the land banks (first established by Frederick the 
Great after the Silesian wars) that had become the financial bulwark of the 
Prussian landed nobility.49 Whereas these bonds held bravely at par through 
thefinancial panic of 1846 and the revolution, their market value fell 2 to 3 
percent in the bull market of the 1850s. Speculation, he maintained, explained 
the low quotes; there were too many new industrial and commercial securi­
ties promising lucrative, short-term profits that overshadowed the older, more 
stable equities. The slackened growth of the provincial mortgage bonds in 
the 1850s was cause for alarm.50 The sluggish trend endangered the viability 
of a newly established agricultural institution in Posen and, overall, might 
force landowners to resort to normal mortgages as a substitute. "The worth of 
these bond mortgages," he reminded Heydt, "is that they cannot be called in 
and make ownership of land a stable, conservative element."51 More directly, 
Westphalen stated, "The credit of the larger landowners . .  . rests in the credits 
of these agricultural institutions and in the worth of the bonds they issue."52 
Westphalen feared an expanded stock exchange that would drain capital out of 
land banks. To invite promotional banking to Berlin was tantamount to shut­
ting off investment in agriculture. 
In his first written opinion, Westphalen suggested not an outright rejec­
tion but two major revisions. First, the two proposed institutions were to be 
amalgamated and the base capital reduced from thirty to ten or twelve million 
thalers. Second, the securities should be issued not as common stock with 
fluctuating dividends but, rather, with afixed dividend, much like a bond or a 
preferred stock.53 The offer of a compromise might have been nothing more 
than a tactic, for the two consortiums would not have accepted such condi­
tions. Two days later, however, Westphalen retracted the proposal in a brief 
final Votum and flatly opposed approval of both charters.54 Nonetheless, the 
reluctant spirit of compromise displayed by both Westphalen and Manteuffel 
merits interest: even the most conservative members of Friedrich Wilhelm's 
government were resigned to some form of modernization, as long as the state 
possessed preeminent control. On this dictum the whole cabinet could agree. 
Of central importance was the position of the king, who was initially in­
clined to support the projects in some form. On 11 March he wrote Heydt, "I 
have decided to demand either the merger of both companies or to confirm 
one of the two."55 Confident of approval, Heydt had already opened negotia­
tions for a merger of the two credit institutions.56 But the king, troubled by 
the various arguments mounted by the conservative side, wavered and finally 
decided to support the ministerial vote on 26 March 1856 that ended in defeat 
for any kind of reform. The cabinet's recommendation to the king to reject 
both charters summed up the arguments of Karl von Manteuffel, Westphalen, 
and the Prussian Bank, and the king accepted and authorized the rejection of 
98 • FIVE

both charter petitions. The report drew attention to the danger of neutraliz­
ing the aims of the Prussian Bank, of unwarranted stock speculation, and of 
threatening the stability of railroads and agriculture. Lamprecht, the Prussian 
Bank director, stressed the possibility of an impending money crisis on the 
international market and the need for Prussia to act prudently.57 The attempt 
of the merchant class to modify Prussia's banking system with the coopera­
tion of the government had failed. 
The refusal to charter joint-stock banks proposed by the two most presti­
gious banking circles in Germany sent a powerful signal to the Prussian busi­
ness class, and it was this decision that most likely convincedfinanciers of the 
need to employ the commandite principle. Trade Minister Heydt drew this 
connection in a memorandum to the Privy Council, stating that "for reasons of 
an objectionable nature, many big Berlin bankers have prepared an enterprise 
[Berliner Handelsgesellschaft] that has not yet been made public in which the 
rejected joint-stock credit mobilier will be established as a commandite com­
pany." 58 The connection was also evident in the identity of the founders of the 
Berliner Handelsgesellschaft. Most had been backers of the two joint-stock 
proposals.59 In March 1853, Mevissen, who helped organize the consortium, 
wrote: "We are patronized by Berlin in one letter after the other in a manner 
of which I do not at all approve. The gentlemen in Berlin, who are entirely 
ignorant of finances, want to give us special directions, draw balances, etc. If 
that continues for long, I will seriously consider the idea of transforming the 
[A. Schaaffhausen'sche] Bankverein into a commandite company and double 
its capital."60 Mevissen, then, had long toyed with the option of a comman­
dite company as a counterstroke to government obstinacy and saw the need 
for the commandite principle after the government's reaffirmation of its re­
fusal to charter joint-stock banks. 
In 1856 the commandite principle, hitherto applied to small firms involv­
ing one entrepreneur (unlimited liability) and a few dozen notables (limited 
liability), was now used to found large companies with a wide ownership. By 
using the legal status of a trading company, which, because unincorporated, 
fell outside legal restrictions imposed on joint-stock companies, directors of 
a commandite company could acquire investment capital from "inactive part­
ners" not unlike the directors of a joint-stock company. In effect, such a 
company was no longer a genuine commandite association but, rather, a com­
mandite joint-stock company {Kommanditgeselbchaft auf Aktien): a distinc­
tion that enabled financiers to mobilize capital and split it up in shares, while 
simultaneously avoiding government supervision. 
The loophole was worked out by degrees. David Hansemann first em­
ployed the strategy in 1851 soon after resigning the directorship of the Prussian 
Bank. While still director he petitioned the government in 1849 for a charter 
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to start the Berlin Credit-Gesellschaft, a credit bank designed to aid craftsmen 
and shopkeepers in Berlin during business slumps. In 1848 the Belgian gov­
ernment had responded to the scarcity of money by creating the Union du Cre­
dit in Brussels, and Hansemann proposed a similar institution in the Prussian 
capital. After a delay of eleven months the government refused Hansemann's 
request. The refusal angered Hansemann greatly and was one of several inci­
dents that prompted his resignation from office.61 Once a private businessman, 
he pursued the idea further and realized that the law allowed him to operate 
a credit bank if the statutes were established along the lines of a trading com­
pany (Handelsgesellschaft), a form of association that did not require a gov­
ernment license.62 In October 1851 the Disconto Gesellschaft began business. 
The government treated Hansemann's maneuver with disdain; the Prussian 
Bank refused to discount any bills of the Disconto Gesellschaft or otherwise 
recognize it as a financial institution.63 
The credit company's initial reserves of approximately 500,000 thalers 
did not threaten the government's bank policy, and, moreover, its statutes for­
bade speculation with securities or promotional investment. Hansemann's idea 
in January 1856, however, was to reorganize his credit company into a share-
capital commandite company and to issue stock in two series totaling ten 
million thalers—an elasticized application of the limited partnerships. Having 
had a charter rejected as a high-ranking government official and having subse­
quently experienced mixed relations with the trade ministry, Hansemann did 
not apply for a charter to issue public shares. His willingness to accept the 
risk of unlimited liability was motivated by the need to bypass the petition­
ing process.64 Within days the stock was privately subscribed and Prussia's 
largest private bank (in respect to capital) was launched.65 The bank's success 
in attracting investment capital ensured its long-term viability and became the 
precedent for widespread use of the commandite principle.66 The bank, how­
ever, only became a lodestar for other bankers in the spring of 1856 after the 
government turned down the two bids to bring joint-stock banking to Prussia. 
Forewarned by Hansemann of the statute changes,67 Heydt did not at­
tempt to forestall it. Most likely he tolerated it because he had to—there 
was little the trade ministry could do legally to block it. Tacitly, the govern­
ment granted Hansemann a privilege, earned perhaps through a conservative 
and sensible banking practice in its first five years.68 Heydt should have been 
more concerned about the second statute change in November 1856, when the 
Disconto Gesellschaft partners empowered its directors to speculate with its 
reserves on the stock market and promote new businesses. But again the min­
ister and cabinet did not react. By its failure to check the changes inaugurated 
by the Disconto Gesellschaft and by its continued rejection of joint-stock 
charters, the government opened the way for investors to follow Hansemann's 
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lead. "The Hansemann'sche Disconto Gesellschaft," wrote Heydt, "has, as is 
well known, opened up the escalation of large joint-stock commandite com­
panies . .  . this has had the necessary consequence that every enterprise which 
shies from a government license for joint-stock status appears as a comman­
dite company."69 
Reacting to rumors of imminent commandite bank openings, the king 
asked the cabinet to convene and discuss the advisability of outlawing com­
mandite banks. The cabinet met on 1 July. Unable to reach a unanimous de­
cision, the report to the king contained a majority vote and a dissenting opin­
ion. The majority decision, led by Heydt, Westphalen, and Bodelschwingh, 
supported the idea of imposing a regulation on the crypto joint-stock banks. 
These ministers recognized "justifiable objections," namely, doubts about 
the constitutionality of the decree, and consequently recommended immedi­
ate action—a provisional decree, allowing the Landtag's subsequent approval. 
The founding of a few large-scale commandite banks compelled the state 
to establish new regulations. The decree must distinguish between normal, 
small-scale commandite companies, deemed to be a healthy component of the 
economy, and the newer stock-issuing commandite companies, whose emer­
gence was clearly a circumvention of the commercial code. Hence the report 
recommended that the decree restrict the number of silent partners to 100, 
ban transferable shares (thus canceling their attraction for the bourse), and 
institute bureaucratic controls to supervise all new commandite companies.70 
Otto and Karl von Manteuffel mounted the dissenting opinion. These 
ministers did not believe that "an emergency situation was at hand" justifying 
"a deep invasion" into the rights of business enterprises."71 Without deny­
ing the negative aspects of these banks, the Manteuffels maintained that such 
"outgrowths cannot at all be avoided, if one does not want to destroy simulta­
neously the healthy development" of business in Prussia.72 Such "aggressive 
intervention" (gewaltsame Eingreifen) against commandite companies would 
prevent undesirable companies but would also hinder the establishment of 
"solid and useful enterprises."73 The cure, they argued, was not to be found in 
government intervention but in the market; speculators would soon learn not 
to invest in unsound enterprises. Finally, the two ministers claimed that such 
an ordinance did not justify departing from the normal legislative process.74 
Outnumbered in the cabinet, Otto von Manteuffel sought to assert his will 
by telegraphing additional appeals to the king's councilors. Writing from the 
Hague on 8 July, Manteuffel sent a long telegram to Privy Councilor Illaire, 
an influential adviser attending the king during his cure in Marienbad. He an­
nounced that two new commandite companies had been founded, but their 
moderate reception by the market confirmed his opinion that the Berlin public 
was "coming to its senses by itself." In view of the imminent decree, Manteuf­
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fel questioned whether these companies should receive the same privileged 
status as Hansemann's company or whether Hansemann should be denied the 
privilege as well. The legal questions were unclear and he believed that the 
problem would best be solved by leaving it alone. Heydt, Manteuffel wrote, 
"favors decisive intervention, but I see neither a legal nor a political reason 
why the government alone should take on itself the odium of adopting an 
aggressive measure instead of sharing it with the Landtag."75 The argument 
failed to convince the king and the decree on commandite companies was 
drafted and signed on 12 July. 
On the following day Manteuffel sent another telegram to Illaire exhort­
ing the king to delay publication of the decree. He argued that the legality 
of the measure was "at the very least dubious." The constitution's article 63 
granted the crown the power to rule by decree only in times of emergency. 
It was difficult to argue that an emergency existed. The decree, he wrote, "is 
impractical and therefore impolitic." A law severely restricting commandite 
companies, he reiterated, had to be reached in agreement with the Landtag, 
which would most likely approve the measure. Arbitrary intervention with a 
decree, on the other hand, would only alienate those parties in support of the 
government's position, for the means were too questionable. The larger pub­
lic would disapprove of the decree, argued Manteuffel, because it appeared 
to favor the "Capitals-Aristocratie"; moreover, the public would recognize 
that to restrict competition would increase interest rates. Only the established 
commandite companies would approve.76 
Manteuffel's opposition to the decree was grounded more in his govern-
ment's fragile relationship with the House of Deputies than in a principled 
regard for the constitution, which he saw fit to alter on numerous other occa­
sions. Banking policy had been an issue in the lower house during the 1850s 
and one that aroused strong opposition. Friedrich Harkort, citing the "insuf­
ficiency of the Prussian [state's] credit organization," called in February 1851 
for a twenty-one member commission to examine the government's compe­
tency to meet the country's growing banking needs.77 Although the govern­
ment contested the right of the lower chamber to occasion a formal inquiry as 
an unjustifiable expression of mistrust, the commission and three subcommit­
tees were nonetheless formed in April 1851. The committee's massive report 
to parliament a year later raised several problems. It criticized the govern-
ment's reluctance to issue small loans to artisans; the restricted money supply, 
especially the eight-million thaler ceiling on notes issued by the provincial 
banks of issue, which impeded growth and encouraged the inordinate im­
port of foreign currency; and, finally, the government's unwillingness to lift 
the restrictions on joint-stock banks in Prussia. In particular, the commission 
faulted the government's rejection of Hansemann's credit bank. The commis­
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sion recognized the government's right to oversee general banking practices 
and to prohibit the circulation of foreign currency but concluded that the 
credit needs of an entire land could not be met by one state bank. Prussia's 
banking system, it concluded, must be reformed. In subsequent debate on the 
report during May 1852, the Landtag rejected both the commission's draft for 
a bill and its own reworked bill. Harkort submitted a new bill in February 
1856, which underwent intense debate but was dropped in April.78 In spite 
of the liberals' failure to bring about a new law, it was generally recognized 
that Prussia needed reform.79 To have promulgated the decree three months 
after the government had narrowly defeated a reform bill would have been 
politically unwise. The government's economic policy and its reputation as 
the Zollverein's leader would have suffered, as would Manteuffel's attempt 
to steer a course between the Camarilla's reactionary neoabsolutism and the 
democratic parliamentarism of 1848.80 
The minister-president's second telegram warning the Privy Council to 
take heed of the parliament and public opinion had its intended effect: the king 
began to doubt. Unable to make the final decision, he ordered on 14 July that 
the decree's publication be delayed until further counsel with the minister-
president and his cabinet.81 Between sojourns in the Hague and his estate 
in Lausitz, Manteuffel returned to Berlin and submitted another recommen­
dation (18 July) that the decree be abandoned. Two additional commandite 
companies in Berlin were now in business, he noted, and the decree's efficacy 
was all the more diminished. The cabinet had met to discuss the issue, he re­
ported, but only two ministers were in town, Minister of Interior Westphalen 
and Minister of War Waldersee. Both thought it wiser to delay the final deci­
sion until their colleagues returned.82 
Westphalen, however, recognized Manteuffel's delaying tactic and saw an 
opportunity to thwart it. When the minister-president left Berlin three days 
later, Westphalen submitted a memorandum directly to the king. With diffuse 
moral arguments he implored the king to publish the decree. The minister as­
serted that the new commandite companies were speculating in grain, driving 
up prices already elevated by the forecast of a bad harvest. Their price gouging 
endangered the welfare of the poor, the "less well-off classes of the popula­
tion," and especially "the minimally paid civil servants." The stock-jobbing of 
these companies furthermore harmed the general welfare by attracting capital 
for quick profits and not for useful investment. "They are nothing more than 
a means of circumventing the existing restrictive laws on joint-stock compa­
nies, and therefore I must believe that the enactment of the ordinance is fully 
justified."83 
Heydt, too, attempted to counterbalance Manteuffel's efforts by sending 
one of his top aides in the trade ministry, Rudolf Delbriick, to Marienbad to 
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persuade the king of the decree's necessity. "The matter," wrote Delbriick in 
his memoirs, "did not belong to my jurisdiction, rather to Herr Hoene's, but 
my minister believed that I, because favorably received by the king, would 
be able to exert some influence on the decision." Although the king had in 
principle no objection to the decree, "for he despised anything resembling 
stock swindles," Delbriick noted, Friedrich Wilhelm hesitated to oppose his 
minister-president. After three days Delbriick left the spa with the postpone­
ment of the decree's proclamation still in effect.84 The king wished that the 
decree, technically a law since 12 July, be reviewed again by the cabinet be­
fore its promulgation. 
By the time the cabinet congregated on 19 August to submit an opinion 
to the king, the situation had changed enough to force a shift toward Manteuf-
fel's position. Five commandite companies had been established in Prussia 
(two in Berlin, three others in Breslau, Magdeburg, and Konigsberg), thus ren­
dering the decree, in practical terms, useless. The original intention had been 
to prevent companies that had been denied corporate status from establish­
ing themselves in some other form. Although the decree would prevent future 
companies from reorganizing as commandite banks, the damage already in­
curred by the recent company start-ups had greatly reduced the efficacy of the 
decree. The opinion concluded that it was not worthwhile to depart from the 
normal legislative process, for the "aim has been thwarted."85 
The cabinet opinion, however, took particular notice of the persisting 
division of opinion: collegial unanimity did not exist. All ministers save the 
two Manteuffels recognized the legitimacy and legality of the king's decree 
and refused to concede to the minority opinion that it was "neither politi­
cal nor constitutional." And yet the cabinet recommended that the decree be 
abandoned for purely pragmatic reasons. To avoid further discussion on con­
stitutional and legal questions, the majority agreed to forgo a second vote and 
acquiesced in the minority position. In return the minority surrendered the 
right to elaborate its position in writing.86 The waiver was a magnanimous 
gesture that swept the legal and political issues under the carpet, emphasizing 
instead the decision's practical side. Having received his wish to drop the de­
cree, Manteuffel avoided rubbing salt in the wounds of royal prerogative and 
ministerial authority. 
Manteuffel's victory translated into a silent, grudging consent to com­
mandite banks and companies. With the decree formally buried, the govern­
ment took no action, issued no statement. The lack of reaction did not go 
unnoticed. Mevissen, for example, both publicly and privately pointed up the 
government's hypocrisy in rejecting the petitions of the credit institutions yet 
allowing the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft to form as a commandite bank with 
no difficulty whatsoever. The Bremer Handelsblatt echoed this complaint.87 
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To the public the government presented a fitful, contradictory policy that was 
logically indefensible. Behind the scenes, however, the government's effort 
to be consistent in its banking policy was frustrated by quick-acting business­
men, a potentially troublesome Landtag, and Manteuffel's delaying tactic. 
The incident of the abandoned decree is important chiefly because it 
documents a vital stage in the decline of the government's power to control 
and direct the Prussian economy. During the same decade that witnessed the 
Prussian government's abandonment of the direction principle in the coal and 
iron industry, it grudgingly relinquished to private enterprise its authority to 
channel and restrict the availability of credit for industrial expansion. The 
Prussian government opposed the establishment of commandite banks in 
Prussia and resented entrepreneurs who evaded their control over banking and 
finance. Clearly the relationship between the government and business class 
was not one of "alliance." 
Later, the Darmstadter Bank, Disconto Gesellschaft, and Berliner Han­
delsgesellschaft became financial pillars for the Prussian-German state. But 
they were founded in a circumventive, rebellious operation, launched in the 
face of governmental opposition. The economic recession of 1857 drastically 
curtailed the program of promotional underwriting that these banks envi­
sioned; it forced them to retreat for a while from the large-scale, company 
promotion that the government had feared.88 After 1859 these banks partici­
pated in the "Prussian Consortium," which found it profitable to float gov­
ernment bond issues that financed the wars of German unification. Their later 
relationship to the government is not descriptive of the time of their origin. 
These frictions in business-government relations during the 1850s raise 
questions about the validity of attempts to explain the ruling establishment 
in Prussia during 1848-66 as an unholy alliance or unhealthy symbiosis be­
tween capital and authoritarian government. In such vital areas as banking the 
relationship was hardly conflict free. Clearly the politics of the Prussian busi­
ness class were more complex than has been generally assumed. The story of 
the suppressed decree of 1856 shows that the progress of industrial capital­
ism in this critical decade was not the result of cooperation between officials 
and entrepreneurs. The archives reveal the contrary. The business community 
had to oppose and outmaneuver the government in order to further its vital 
interests. 
The crisis over commandite banks, furthermore, should not be consigned 
merely to economic or banking history. The alacrity with which the king and 
the cabinet resorted to a decree shows that bank openings had political over­
tones. The decree poses the question why the king and his cabinet felt such 
urgency to bypass the Landtag on a commercial matter. Royal commands 
were provided for in the 1850 constitution (the "Notenverodnungsrecht" in 
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article 63) but only for emergency situations—and the opening of comman­
dite banks hardly constituted a state emergency. The move to unconstitutional 
executive action underscores the perceived threat of the business class's opera­
tions and the growing frustration of the government in its effort to harness the 
influence of this group. The incident demonstrates that the government did 
not always grant economic concessions to ensure the quiescence of the busi­
ness class. More crucially, this instance contradicts the binary paradigm of 
economic concession versus political reform.89 The Prussian government per­
ceived this particular economic reform as a political issue. Friedrich Wilhelm 
and the ministers Westphalen, Karl von Manteuffel, and Heydt objected to 
bank reform on grounds that were partially political. The king attributed the 
demand for credit banks to an insidious French influence; the ministers West­
phalen and K. von Manteuffel believed bourgeois self-administration in bank­
ing would expand capitalism and destabilize the traditional social order; and 
Heydt rejected the change because it threatened his capacity to determine how 
industrial growth should serve state interests.90 The government documents 
bearing on this issue show no clear separation between economic and politi­
cal spheres.91 
Minister-President Otto von Manteuffel also viewed the problem in politi­
cal terms, albeit differently from his cabinet members. Manteuffel, usually 
characterized as the architect of reactionary state policies, emerged as the un­
likely defender of bourgeois interests. His support is largely attributed to the 
role the Prussian parliament played in Manteuffel's policies in the 1850s, a role 
that has not yet been fully appreciated.92 His defense of commandite banks 
was part of a greater strategy for maintaining his brand of bureaucratic abso­
lutism, which needed the constitution and a body of elected deputies as an 
essential counterbalance to check the patriarchal conservatism of the Junker 
class—most visibly embodied in the Camarilla. For this reason he chose to 
tolerate commandite banks rather than unduly injure his status in parliament 
by forbidding them. Although this decision was unpopular with his cabinet, 
Manteuffel recognized that a royal decree on banking practice would greatly 
harm his relations with the lower house by revealing too starkly its impotence 
under the constitution. Manteuffel's political strategy had, however, a double-
edged quality; to neutralize the ultraconservative right as well as the demo­
cratic left, his government was required to concede undesirable measures to 
the moderate liberals of the center. The influence of public opinion and the 
presence of the Landtag—albeit indirect—had grown more powerful. Man-
teuffel's repeated references to the decree's unconstitutionality and the adverse 
impact it would have on public opinion and in parliament reveal the silent 
pressure of business interests on his policy. For this reason, his protestations 
that the decree was a "deep invasion into the rights of businessmen" rang true. 
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No longer could the crown impose its will without considering how the busi­
ness class would react. In other words, the Rechtsstaat and the parliament pos­
sessed some genuine worth.93 That parliamentary commission reports, cham­
ber of commerce protests, and newspaper articles could affect government 
policy reveals an erosion in the state's autocratic power over the economy. 
In this respect the question of agency is of central importance. The party 
exhibiting instrumentality, demonstrating action, and exerting power was the 
middle class and not Prussian state officials. The business class introduced 
modern banking to Prussia in spite of and not through the government. The 
increased accessibility to capital in northern Germany resulted from a shrewd 
evasion of government controls by businessmen who wrested rather than 
received reforms from the government. That reform was hard-earned and 
achieved in spite of official resistance enhanced the bourgeois belief in the in­
evitability of political progress. 
Although the transformation of governing authority from bureaucratic 
control to a negotiated consensus between government and a broader range of 
elite groups was a gradual process over the course of the 1850s, the decree of 
1856 presents a concrete instance in which to view the change.94 This example 
of assertive middle-class evasion of state control gathers greater significance 
when placed in the larger context of Prussian political culture in the 1850s. 
Providing new reference points to examine how the bourgeois class interacted 
with an authoritarian government in the 1850s (and vice versa) will enable us 
to reconstruct and understand a political style that was neither democratic nor 
defeatist. If the construct of German exceptionalism is to have any application 
to the 1850s, it should presuppose an active, assertive bourgeois class willing 
to resist the government and successfully affect the decision-making process. 
Deficiencies and omissions of the bourgeoisie do not explain the middle-class 
disregard for parliamentarism, but rather the success such groups as the busi­
ness class had in the 1850s in attaining material and social goals that weakened 
the need for democratic procedures. The July decree was one of the last at­
tempts of the Prussian crown to assert its will arbitrarily in the marketplace. 
Its repression provides a sharp illustration of the latent power in the capi­
tal and commercial networks of the business class. It allows us to understand 
how the business class accrued more influence in the Prussian ministries and 
why the business class became particularly successful in arranging its terms 
with the Prussian state on a more favorable basis. 
CHAPTER SIX 
• 
The Railroad Fund, 1842-1859 
In 1842 the Prussian government established the Railroad Fund, a special account to aid private investment in railroad construction. This fund was 
the financial basis of Prussia's mixed system of railroad building: private busi­
nesses assumed ownership and administration of railways, while the govern­
ment, in keeping with its tradition of state paternalism, fostered the infant 
industry with favorable legislation and financial assistance. After 1848, how­
ever, the role of the Railroad Fund changed under Trade Minister Heydt's 
administration. Heydt used the fund to bridge Prussia's transition from a pri­
vately owned railway network to a state-run system. The ministry's vision of 
a speedy transition to state ownership, however, was not shared by all, and 
opposition from other governmental ministries, parliamentary factions, and 
the liberal press contributed to the dissolution of the Railroad Fund in 1859, 
thus ending Heydt's bid for state ownership. 
Uniting the financial power of the fund with other government monies, 
the trade ministry became the largest, most important investor in Prussia, 
building over 2,960 kilometers of railway by 1860. The fund reached sixteen 
of Prussia's twenty-three railway companies, underwrote 33,907,003 thalers 
in direct loans, and indirectly generated 140,590,000 thalers in share capi­
tal through interest guarantees. Private railways received 5.3 million thalers 
in direct construction funds and a further 2.4 million in dividend subsidies; 
19.8 million were given to state construction and 2.5 million for dividends. 
Thus, the trade ministry's activities represented one-quarter of Prussia's en­
tire railroad market. Hence, while recent historiography has taken great pains 
to redress earlier overstated claims about the state's role in industrialization, 
the importance of state involvement in the railroad boom of the 1850s should, 
at the same time, not be underestimated.1 
The debate over the Railroad Fund sheds light on a transitional period in 
Prussian history, when governing circles were uncertain as to what role the 
state should adopt in the new capitalist economy. The execution of a coher­
ent economic policy from the executive branch of government was hindered 
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by the lack of harmony between Finance Minister Bodelschwingh and Heydt, 
the ministers jointly responsible for governing the state's economic activities. 
Although this division was in part a personality conflict, the clashing attitudes 
of the finance and trade ministers embodied broader differences. They advo­
cated two predominant economic policies of the 1850s. 
Finance Minister Karl von Bodelschwingh advocated a minimal role for 
state paternalism in the private market economy that the government had pro­
moted since 1806. By introducing liberal economic principles (abolition of 
serfdom, freedom of occupation and movement, free sale of noble estates, 
self-administration of cities) during the Reform Era, the Prussian state had 
taken a pathbreaking step in Central Europe in unleashing the energy and in­
dustry of individual initiative.2 This viewpoint found ideological buttresses in 
Immanuel Kant and Adam Smith, whose philosophies of individual freedom 
supported the tenets of economic liberalism. Bodelschwingh stood for con­
tinuing this policy and applying it to railroad building: private capital should 
assume leadership and the fund should nurture the growth of private railroads. 
Staunchly conservative, Bodelschwingh advocated not a laissez-faire econ­
omy but an economy that subordinated state involvement to private activity. 
His outlook was further shaped by a prevailing value of Prussia's prerevo­
lutionary bureaucratic caste that, since the near bankruptcy of the Prussian 
state in 1806, looked upon all large state expenditure as an anathema—unless 
absolutely necessary. The state's willingness to allow private business to initi­
ate economic modernization and avoid state expense accounts for the relative 
compatibility between liberal businessmen and Prussian state officials in the 
early nineteenth century.3 
Heydt, on the other hand, strongly believed in state control of the econ­
omy and had no compunctions about expanding the bureaucratic apparatus of 
the trade ministry to meet this end. As we have already seen, Heydt exercised 
strong state paternalism in the railroad industry and with other joint-stock 
enterprises and broadly interpreted the powers of his ministry to reconcile 
economic activity with the interests of the state. Although willing to con­
cede that the coal industry would best serve Prussian state interest as part of 
the private sector (reinvigorated and expanded through private capital), Heydt 
averred that the state with its own system could profit from railroads while 
promoting the needs of commerce and industry. Thus, the fitful ambivalence 
that characterized Prussia's economic policy in the 1850s can be traced largely 
to the shifting balance of power between Bodelschwingh and Heydt. 
Heydt's policy with the fund, however, had one chief problem: funding. 
By 1856, the Prussian government had invested over 65 million thalers in 
railroads, over one-quarter of Prussia's state debt. The railroads' prominent 
role in swelling the state debt from 150 million thalers in 1850 to 250 mil­
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lion in 1856 drew the attention of the press and, eventually, both houses of the 
Landtag. Pressure from the parliament and the liberal press, which together 
produced a public discussion on state finance, constrained Heydt's railroad 
policy and was partially responsible for dissolving Heydt's fund in 1859. Prus-
sia's legislature (the Landtag) exercised a political influence that, if still weak, 
could nonetheless at times check and modify the policies of the king's cabinet. 
The original aims of the Railroad Fund were modest. The immediate goal in 
1842 was to promote the construction of rudimentary east-west and north-
south corridors that would unite Berlin with its provinces. Thefinance minis­
try (under the auspices of Christian von Rother and Ernst von Bodelschwingh) 
laid aside the one-time subsidy of six million thalers for direct investment of 
the railway companies' start-up capital. It also created a running account to 
cover the payment of dividend subsidies (between 3 and 3.5 percent) that the 
government offered the fledgling railway companies to attract investors. The 
account received annual replenishment from the finance ministry (500,000 
thalers), the state salt monopoly (an unfixed sum), and the interest off the 
fund's investments. Equally important, this expense account had a limit: the 
law of 1842 stated that the Railroad Fund's running account could not exceed 
an annual expenditure of two million thalers. 
The fund stayed within these restrictions until Heydt's trade ministry 
took over its administration from the finance ministry in 1848. Heydt's first 
task was to remedy the fund's chief shortcoming: the failure to attract entre­
preneurs to build the Eastern Railway between Berlin and Kbnigsberg. He 
used the newly constituted lower house to approve a loan that would enable 
the state to build the Eastern Railway itself. The loan would also be used to 
complete two other lines, the Westphalian Railway, which would connect the 
western provinces with the rest of Prussia, and the Saarbriickener Railway, 
which would integrate Prussia into the commercial corridor between England, 
France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria. The total building costs for these 
three lines was thirty-three million thalers. Heydt submitted a bill for a loan 
of twenty-one million thalers to the lower house in December 1849, with the 
promise that the fund would cover twelve million thalers of the building costs 
as well as underwrite subsidies on the preferred stock for the Westphalian and 
Saarbriicker lines. Both houses passed the bill and supported Heydt's long-
term aim to purchase all railways in Prussia.4 
The Landtag's compliance with Heydt's loans and dividend subsidies 
in 1849-50 was criticized by the liberal press. Newspapers questioned the 
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houses' approval of the thirty-three million thaler loan in 1849 without insti­
tuting control mechanisms to check how the money was actually used: "Be­
cause we are not in the position to prevent any unlawful use, we will never 
recognize the legal validity of the houses' vote."5 Why, asked the editors of 
the National-Zeitung and the Ostsee-Zeitung, allot the loan in one lump sum 
instead of annual increments to maintain supervision of the finances? The 
Kolnische-Zeitung expressed their dissatisfaction in even blunter terms: "You 
so-called constitutionalists, are you so afflicted with blindness as not to see... 
that the counter-revolution stands in our midst fully organized and builds 
a finely linked chain throughout all of Germany, and you put in the hands 
of these counter-revolutionaries the only thing they are lacking—money"?6 
The rhetoric of such editorials smacked of the bitterness of liberal setbacks 
in 1848, but their mistrust of how the Prussian government would use the 
money was not far off the mark. One clear misuse of the Railroad Fund can 
be cited. When the threat of war loomed in the Lower Danube and the Crimea 
in November 1852, and the Prussian government prepared for the possibility 
of mobilization for war, the king's privy councilor Marcus Niebuhr drew up 
a mobilization loan for twenty-six million thalers, whose collateral was to be 
drawn from the unused funds of the 1849 railroad loan.7 The truism of liberal 
journalists that "the financial administration [of a government] goes hand in 
hand with the political system" indeed had validity.8 
Early criticism of state railroads also stemmed from the laissez-faire be­
lief that the less intervention and expenditure by the state, the better. Echo­
ing the doctrines of Jean Baptiste Say, Adam Smith, Christian von Schlozer, 
Wilhelm von Humboldt, and David Ricardo, such free-trade organs as the 
National-Zeitung criticized the burden of dividend guarantees on the taxpayer. 
The newspaper complained, for example, that the Prussian taxpayer would 
pay over one million thalers in 1850 for state railroad subsidies.9 The Vossische 
Zeitung, observing the parliamentary debate on dividend subsidies for two 
Rhenish railways, questioned whether the unnecessary expenditure was also 
destroying competition and creating unfair business practice.10 This criticism 
spilled over into the upper house's debate on whether to extend government 
support to the Aachen-Diisseldorfer and the Cologne-Crefelder railways. The 
motion passed with a slim majority of six votes (69 to 63).11 
The terms of payment on the 1849 loan taxed the fund's resources con­
siderably. Within one year of its management, Heydt had technically ex­
hausted the fund's supply for the next six years. Amortizing the principal on 
twelve million thalers, covering the interest on twenty-one million thalers, 
and meeting the subsidy obligations on other lines fully absorbed the fund's 
assets until 1856.12 Heydt, however, sought to change the restrictions of the 
fund's spending limits and radically aggrandize its capacity as railway owner. 
The best evidence of Heydt's changed policy was his proposed loan of 
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thirty-four million thalers in 1852.13 The fund's financial outlook had changed 
enough, Heydt believed, to plan bolder investment for the mid-fifties. By 1852 
the fund's running account had risen to 1,513,000 thalers and would stand at 
1,800,000 after 1855.14 According to Heydt's calculations, railroads that once 
burdened the fund with heavy subsidies (the Stargard-Posen and the Lower 
Silesian-Mark railways) now demanded only 200,000 thalers, in contrast to 
the 1,137,000 thalers required in 1849-51.15 In conjunction with the fund's 
rising income, the relatively low dividend subsidies plus administration costs 
(70,000) left 1,530,000 thalers free. With this 1.5 million thalers, Heydt pro­
posed on 16 June 1852 to float a loan that would build seven lines at the cost 
of twenty-eight million thalers: in the west, lines between the Sieg and Ruhr 
valleys, Rheine and Osnabriick, Miinster and Rheine, Saarbriicken and Trier, 
and the Rhine bridge at Cologne; in the east, lines between Breslau and 
Posen, and Bromberg and Thorne.16 The fund's running account would act as 
the sinking fund to pay for the loan's interest and principal. This annual cost 
Heydt figured as 700,000 thalers, thus leaving over half of the running ac­
count for the original use of meeting subsidy payments.17 The loan, he insisted 
to the finance minister, was "not a matter of preference, but rather a politi­
cal and financial necessity." The state could not rely on private speculation 
to build its railroads when competitive neighbors threatened to outstrip Prus-
sia.18 Two months later (23 August), Heydt asked for another 6,161,495 thalers 
for the further construction of the Eastern Railway (Creuz-Frankurt/Oder 
via Landsberg and Custrin), bringing the loan's sum to thirty-four million 
thalers. 
The loan proposal shows the trade ministry's new view of the Railway 
Fund. Heydt had ceased to see it as a discrete pool of money limited to two 
million thalers designated for subsidizing private railroads. Rather, he per­
ceived the account as venture capital, a sum of money to be exploited to its 
greatest value by his ministry. The fund, he believed, should be put to work 
as collateral for large building loans and thus give the state the leading role 
in railroad construction. With clever management, Heydt noted to Bodel­
schwingh, the loan could be followed by an even greater loan that would allow 
the state to build ten other important lines.19 
Heydt's vision shifted the fund's function from state promotion of private 
railways to state ownership of Prussia's newest lines. In a memorandum to the 
finance minister, Heydt clearly stated his preference for state-owned railways. 
In reference to the seven railway lines in question, he admitted that the rail­
ways could indeed be built by private enterprises with state subsidies. But, he 
noted, "insofar as it is a choice between a dividend subsidy or state construc­
tion, I am decisively for the latter, because experience has not shown us that 
joint-stock companies build railways more inexpensively than the state, and 
under state administration railways are much more useful for the direct inter­
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ests of the state and the public."20 Heydt further advocated state ownership for 
revenues: "After the state has taken over the administration of the Stargard-
Posen, bought the Lower Silesian-Mark, and nears completion of the Eastern 
Railway, there can be no question that filling in the gaps in the provinces in 
which the state itself owns railways is not only in the interest of more efficient 
travel but also more profitable for the entire eastern state rail network."21 
Although Heydt stressed efficient, profitable lines in the eastern prov­
inces, his overall selection of proposed lines suggests a keener interest in 
establishing an equally large network in the west. Eleven of the seventeen 
projects proposed by Heydt in 1852 were in the Rhineland and Westphalia.22 
Most connected with the older private lines of the Berg-Mark, Cologne-
Minden, and Rhenish railways. The proposal of state construction and owner­
ship for such lines as the Sieg-Ruhr, Dortmund-Soest, Miinster-Rheine, and 
Deutz-Frankfurt indicated that Heydt wished to deny the older, private rail­
ways their logical points of expansion and growth. By establishing an inte­
grated state network in the western provinces by the end of the decade, Heydt 
would have concentrated blocks of state railways in the most strategic prov­
inces, thus making nationalization of all railways in Prussia a greater likeli­
hood. 
This strategy added up to a policy shift. Starting with the 1849 loan of 
twenty-one million thalers, Heydt sought to transform the Railroad Fund into 
an open-ended source for government loans to construct a state railway sys­
tem. Under Heydt the fund ceased to promote only private railroad interests 
and, in fact, worked against private interests. The state network was intended 
to compete with private companies, deny them room for growth, and eventu­
ally take them over. The loan signified a radical break with Prussia's mixed 
system. 
Finance Minister Karl von Bodelschwingh opposed Heydt's use of the 
Railway Fund and from 1852 on acted as the principal brake on state spending 
in railroads. As supervisor of the general treasury and the state budget, Bodel­
schwingh believed it was incumbent upon him to oversee the fund's uses and 
challenge its independent status. He used his leverage as chief of finances to 
fight a policy he strongly opposed. The ministers' conflict over the use of state 
revenues became a highly personal, decade-long feud that occasioned long 
cabinet disputes and a mutual unwillingness to compromise on this issue. The 
two ministers would lock horns over the Railroad Fund in 1851, 1852, 1855; 
1856, and 1857-58. The patent incompatibility of the two ministers leads one 
to ask why the king did not dismiss one of them to effect a more consistent 
economic policy. A divisive cabinet is perhaps what the king sought. Fried­
rich Wilhelm IV, Bismarck noted in his memoirs, cultivated an antagonistic 
triangle between Minister-President Manteuffel, Heydt, and Bodelschwingh 
to help maintain a balance between royal and ministerial power.23 
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Bodelschwingh's reply to Heydt's 1852 loan proposal argued against the 
loan and the idea of a state railway system. Earlier Bodelschwingh had op­
posed Heydt's argument for state construction of two of the lines included in 
the loan proposal.24 In February, furthermore, he had participated in a pro­
tracted battle of principle to oppose the government's takeover of the Lower 
Silesian-Mark Railway.25 In justifying the twenty-million thaler purchase of 
the railway to the legislature, the cabinet had stated that this was an iso­
lated case and did not mark the beginning of a state system.26 The jump 
from proposals for individual lines to railway systems that encompassed en­
tire provinces, however, alerted the finance minister to a new attitude: "If 
not explicitly stated, it must be factually recognized that this is the first time 
the proposal of state construction has arisen."27 Bodelschwingh recognized 
Heydt's intent and criticized both its budgetary oversights and its assumptions 
about the Railroad Fund. 
Bodelschwingh dismissed the plan on both fiscal and philosophical 
grounds. He declared that the numbers Heydt presented to show that the fund 
had the money to finance the loan were misleading. Heydt's proposal, further­
more, disregarded continuing obligations for the 1849 loan and considerably 
underestimated the reserve needed for dividend guarantees. When these obli­
gations were added to the costs of the new loan, Bodelschwingh estimated 
that the fund exceeded its legal limit by nearly two million thalers28 
Bodelschwingh attributed Heydt's attempt to hide the Railway Fund's 
financial obligations to the trade minister's basic view of the fund. The trade 
ministry, he wrote to Heydt, claimed there was an essential difference between 
the fund and the general treasury. According to this viewpoint, the fund's bud­
get, however fraudulently balanced, was free from the scrutiny of the finance 
ministry's bookkeeping principles. This claim to independence was wrong. 
Whether a loan was contracted by the fund or by government agencies, Bo­
delschwingh argued, the loan still represented an increase in state debt: "The 
revenues that make up the Railroad Fund flow from the same source and are 
subject to the same changes and conditions as other state revenues." Ulti­
mately, then, the proposed loan touched on the administrative sphere of the 
finance ministry, whose primary duty was to safeguard the fiscal health of 
the state29 
Moreover, the state could never replace private enterprise as Prussia's 
railroad financier. Not only did the state not possess the capital to undertake 
such immense investments and meet the demands of every region, but the 
contingencies of state finance also militated against tying up large sums for six 
years at a time. The development of a political crisis "would necessarily post­
pone execution of the whole plan."30 Echoing his earlier stance on the state 
takeover of the Lower Silesian-Mark Railway, Bodelschwingh concluded that 
this loan had no proper place in the budget. 
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The crux of Bodelschwingh's critique, however, lay not in the accuracy of 
numbers or the realities of state debt but rather in the basic policy of railroad 
construction in Prussia. The proposed loan radically deviated from the origi­
nal purpose of the Railway Fund, which was designed to aid, not supplant, 
private investment. State support, he reminded Heydt, was intended only for 
exceptional cases and could only be implemented through dividend guaran­
tees. The fund, Bodelschwingh wrote, was intended to awaken and stimulate 
investment and should never intervene in such a way as to paralyze it. "Fun­
damentally, railway construction can and must be left to private enterprise."31 
The function of the fund's annual account as a supplementary stimulant 
for private investment explained its low ceiling of two million thalers. Bo­
delschwingh lectured Heydt on the philosophy that underpinned the fund's 
design: "Private speculation forms the wide foundation upon which the Rail­
road Fund can build. The Fund's administration and application presumes that 
this base should not be weakened, shaken, or removed. Thus the state should 
intervene only where general interest justifies it and when the particular con­
ditions of the enterprise demand it."32 The central problem with Heydt's plan 
was that "development of private speculation was excluded from the start." 
Bodelschwingh questioned whether the state could assume "the entire respon­
sibility for the punctual completion of the railway network. Once departed 
on this course, the state will not be able to leave it."33 The danger of Heydt's 
loan was dual: it undermined the investing power of the private market and 
presupposed a state role in finance that it could never fulfill. 
Bodelschwingh further inveighed against the centralization offinance that 
encouraged people to look to the state and not to local initiative. He pointed to 
the unfortunate pattern of investment in contemporary Prussia, a time when 
"a surfeit of disposable capital is thrown into state paper and railroad secu­
rities, while local interests have become accustomed to expect everything 
from the state."34 Earlier Bodelschwingh had rebuked Heydt for allowing two 
railway companies to hoodwink the state into subsidizing the Rhine bridge's 
construction. It was a task, he opined, that the companies and the city gov­
ernment of Cologne could have easily accomplished themselves. Similarly, 
Bodelschwingh asked why the state should intervene and build the Sieg-Ruhr 
line withoutfirst tapping local capital that would directly benefit from the rail­
35 way.
Local enterprises, Bodelschwingh asserted, could attract this capital 
themselves if they were called upon or forced to do so. Such newspapers as the 
National Zeitung agreed with Bodelschwingh: "In recent times the receptivity 
toward new railroad projects has been ambitious in most cases private in­
vestment is fully sufficient and would assert itself even stronger if it was not 
hindered by so many legislative obstacles."36 Heydt, however, claimed to see 
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no relationship between state expenditure and diminished local investment. 
In a memorandum to Manteuffel, he pointed to the great number of petitions 
requesting charters to start new railways as evidence of private initiative, yet 
defended the need for state lines with the assertion that his specific lines did 
not attract private investment.37 This defense, however, shows a disingenuous 
argument. All of Heydt's lines in his 1852 proposals had private bidders save 
two.38 It also contradicted his earlier argument with Bodelschwingh that the 
state was the preferred, not the necessary, builder.39 Indeed, Heydt failed to 
note to Manteuffel that although many new companies actively sought char­
ters, few received them. In the 1850s, the trade ministry granted only two 
charters to establish new railway companies.40 By denying new companies the 
initiative to build, Heydt created a need for state construction. 
Bodelschwingh's opposition defeated Heydt's proposal. Heydt succeeded 
in bringing the issue to cabinet meetings (3 and 6 November 1852) by con­
vincing Manteuffel to put it on the agenda.41 The king, Minister of Interior von 
Westphalen, and Minister of War von Bonin reacted favorably to Heydt's idea, 
but the finance minister's strong resistance was enough to stop it.42 Although 
Heydt's position on state ownership of railways actually carried a majority 
in the cabinet, the king and minister-president were reluctant to act against 
the finance minister's wishes in budgetary matters. Heydt later protested to 
Manteuffel about the unreasonableness of the finance minister's opposition,43 
but Bodelschwingh persevered. In a final memorandum to Manteuffel, Bodel­
schwingh demonstrated that the fund lacked the assets to float a thirty-four 
million thaler loan.44 Heydt's bid to transform the fund into a protonational­
ization program failed. 
Nevertheless, Heydt's energy in keeping the state a leading promoter in 
railways did not diminish. The failed 1852 loan made clear, to be sure, that 
Heydt would have to tolerate and work with Prussia's private railways and 
thus continue the mixed system. Heydt, however, did not abandon his hope of 
using the fund to float large loans. The trade ministry's administrative report 
for 1852-54 explicitly included this option.45 Nor did it stop Heydt from find­
ing other ways to generate new sources of capital to enlarge the fund's sphere 
of influence. The Railroad Tax is one example. 
In 1853 Heydt submitted a bill to the Landtag to activate the Railroad Tax 
(Eisenbahnabgabe), a provision of the 1838 Railroad Law that empowered the 
government to tax the net profits of railways. The law freed railway compa­
nies from the normal commercial tax (Gewerbesteuer) but included a possible 
levy on net profits as just recompense for the losses to the state from lower 
highway tolls and diminished mail-coach revenue. The law stipulated that the 
tax revenues be used to replace monies lent to railway companies and there­
after to purchase their stocks46 
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The Railroad Tax, however, had never been levied. The fragilefirst years 
of railway construction and the money crisis of the 1840s dissuaded the gov­
ernment from ever imposing it. But with the financial crisis over and with 
many companies earning good profits, 1853 appeared to Heydt a propitious 
time to introduce the tax.47 For Heydt, the crucial aspect of the tax was that 
it did not flow to the general treasury but, rather, to a stock-acquisition pro­
gram, now administered by the Railroad Fund. "The tax," Ludwig von Ger­
lach stated two years later in the lower house, "is actually no tax at all: it is 
the price tag for a monopoly." 48 For this reason Heydt emphasized that the 
tax revenues be called "extra-dividends" to emphasize their status as an ac­
celerator of state railway ownership.49 
The Railroad Tax of 1853 became a prominent public issue. In the Land-
tag the debate for its legislation stretched from February to April and ex­
tended the legislative period past the Whitsuntide recess. Eleven versions of 
the bill were debated in the lower house; the discussion in the upper house 
was equally long.50 Ludwig Kiihne, an old-liberal in the lower house, intro­
duced an amendment that would have siphoned the tax into general treasury 
funds.51 The lower house voted down Kuhne's amendment but narrowly ap­
proved the tax. The upper house also approved the tax but not without ques­
tioning the future debts of the state, the putative advantage of shareholders 
with state involvement, and whether the state could match the progress of pri­
vate railways.52 The Landtag thus continued to support Heydt's aim of state 
ownership, albeit with more restraint and qualification than in 1849. 
The debate on the bill's passage centered on the legality of taxing the rail­
way companies progressively and the rates at which they should be taxed. A 
petition from five railway companies to the lower house protesting the tax's 
progressivity found support among many deputies, resulting in a long, "rather 
strong" debate.53 The petition asked that one fixed tax percentage be agreed 
upon for all profits and that legal procedures be instituted to ensure the gov-
ernment's proper execution of stock acquisition.54 The first point revealed the 
railway directors' self-interest in not paying new "socialistic" taxes; the sec­
ond manifested a distrust of Heydt. The request for stock-purchase controls 
was a response to a motion by Marcus Niebuhr, who was also the financial 
adviser in the king's privy council. He proposed to strike the passage in the 
original law that required the government to reinvest stock in the same pro­
portion in the company that it taxed. Redacting this provision gave the trade 
ministry greater freedom in shaping its stock portfolio and prevented delay in 
"acquiring all railroad equities."55 The houses passed Niebuhr's amendment 
and, of the eleven versions, passed the one that least modified the executive 
branch's bill. The lower house succeeded in removing the highest tax rate 
from the law (30 percent from net profits exceeding 70 percent) and, contrary 
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to Heydt's wishes, the legislature's final version recommended that the gen­
eral treasury supervise the stock-acquisition program.56 
While the Landtag quibbled mostly over the tax's form, newspapers ques­
tioned its substantive legality. The Spenersche Zeitung attacked the injustice of 
taxing stockholders twice, once with the stamp tax upon purchase (Stempel­
steuer) and then again on annual net profits. It also called progressive taxation 
a "dangerous thing," a product of "socialistic, national economic theories," 
and a "central doctrine of Proudhon."57 The National-Zeitung argued that the 
tax was a dead letter of the 1838 law. To revive the law's original intention— 
that the state should be the sole owner of railways—ran counter to the prin­
ciples of railroad economy. We should not blame the legislators in 1838 who 
could not have known better, wrote the editors, but rather the politics of 1853: 
Where thefinance minister is at a loss tofind a need to justify a new tax, the 
trade minister enters and declares, "I must buy the railways." And where 
the trade minister is at a loss to find the means to undertake such an im­
mense undertaking, the finance minister enters and declares, "I must find 
an equivalent of a commercial tax for the railroads and thus introduce a 
long-promised tax." Out of this conundrum of reasons arises a law that robs 
from stockholders a portion of their legal profits and purchases their prop­
erty with this money. That is nothing more than the gradual expropriation 
of stockholders without compensation.58 
The tax's intent to divest the private market of railroads provoked the news­
paper to liken the tax to the work of "naked communism" and to the French 
socialist Utopians of the day, "Cabet and the Icarians." Taxing property at all 
was linked to radical socialism: "What one calls here ground rent, Proudhon 
regards as theft."59 This hyperbole that denounced progressive taxation and 
sanctified private property illustrates well the extreme dogma of free traders 
in the 1850s. 
On 24 April 1853 the Landtag approved the Railroad Tax, which the king 
signed into law on 30 May.60 The law fixed progressive tax rates for these 
so-called extra-dividends, since they had never been set in the original law. 
Accordingly, net profits of 4 percent or less of the company's nominal capi­
talization yielded 2.5 percent of that profit to the government; 5 percent, 5; 6 
percent, 10; and 7 or more percent profit, 20 percent.61 By today's standards, 
the tax's progressivity was not harsh: 100 thalers profit from 10,000 yielded 
2.5 thalers to the state leaving the company with 97.5 thalers; 800 thalers net 
profit yielded 65 thalers to the state leaving 735 thalers.62 Large, prosperous 
railways thus paid taxes ranging from 63,750 thalers, as did the Berlin-Anhalt 
Railway in 1857, to 129,333 thalers, which the Cologne-Minden Railway paid 
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in 1856.63 In 1859 the Berliner Borsen-Zeitung cited 150,000 thalers as an an­
nual representative figure for large railways.64 In spite of the tax's relative 
mildness, investor's dividends for Cologne-Minden Railway common stock 
diminished by 1 percent, the Upper Silesian by 2 percent, and the Magdeburg-
Leipziger by 4.5 percent in the mid-fifties.65 Heydt admitted that skimming 
this premium off investors' returns was a "considerable burden" for profitable 
lines.66 If Rainer Fremdling's average of railroad stock dividends in the 1850s 
of 5.8 percent is correct, investors most likely agreed.67 Certainly railroad di­
rectors found the tax steep.68 By 1857, for example, the state collected a profit 
of 600,000 thalers from the Cologne-Minden and the Upper Silesian railways 
through the new tax and stock dividends. Heydt reported that this sum repre­
sented an 87.3 and 28.2 percent return, respectively, on the government's in-
vestment—a lucrative deal.69 With such prospects in mind, he reported to the 
lower house in 1855 that the more profitable lines would fall into the state's 
hands within fifteen to twenty years.70 
The tax gave new significance to the fund's assets, for it meant the creation 
of a sizable stock portfolio. Heretofore, the government only possessed stock 
from its 1842 investments, which by 1859—the year of the fund's dissolu-
tion—earned 1,452,328 thalers in dividends.71 The extra-dividends, however, 
accumulated approximately four million thalers by 1859, giving the Railway 
Fund a total of five and a half million thalers in dividend earnings for fur­
ther stock purchases.72 For railroad finance, this sum was not especially for­
midable. Yet by 1866 these earnings would have increased to fifteen million 
thalers, thus approaching the dimension Heydt desired for the fund's stock-
acquisition program. If the fund had not been dissolved in 1859, the tax would 
have achieved its purpose: private companies would have gradually financed 
their own demise.73 
The Guarantee Fund, created in 1854, is another example of Heydt's attempts 
to expand the power of the Railroad Fund. With the fund's running account 
fully committed, Heydt turned to the new possibilities created by the extra-
dividends. Using the extra-dividends of the Cologne-Minden and the Upper 
Silesian railways, Heydt created a sinking fund to enable these private rail­
ways to raise share-capital to build lines that were originally part of his re­
jected building schemes in 1852: the Oberhausen-Arnheim, the Sieg-Ruhr 
line, the Breslau-Posen-Glogau line, the Deutz-Giessen-Frankfurt a.M., and 
the Rhine bridge at Cologne.74 In addition to acting as collateral for stock 
issue, the Guarantee Fund also functioned as the subsidy fund that backed 
minimum dividend rates on the stock. 
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By agreeing to the terms of Heydt's Guarantee Fund, the Cologne-Minden 
Railway received the charters to build the bridge and three lines in the Rhine­
land and Westphalia. The company agreed to channel to the Guarantee Fund 
an annual sum of 50,000 thalers from its net profits, including a portion of 
its own stock dividends from 1854. In addition, the company contributed the 
one-time sum of 100,000 thalers, while the city of Cologne and the Rhenish 
Railway—two clear beneficiaries of the bridge—donated a combined sum of 
500,000 thalers. This money was collected in one interest-bearing account, 
a money pool that enabled the company to issue new series of stock worth 
over thirty million thalers. The government administered this account, as­
suring investors their dividends and guaranteeing the Cologne-Minden Rail­
way that the government could always raise a minimum of 300,000 thalers 
for such needs. It further promised to suspend its reinvestment of Cologne-
Minden stock and channel its dividends into building the bridge (the state 
owned one-seventh of the company's original common stock purchased in 
1842). The account, according to the contract, would last until the lines were 
constructed and the capital for the bridge was amortized. The account could 
be dismantled after five successive years of profits fully covered the annual 
interest payments.75 The same conditions were applied to the Upper Silesian 
Railway for the building of the Breslau-Posen-Glogau line, which in turn sup­
ported 12,250,000 thalers in stock issue.76 
The Guarantee Fund typified Heydt's administrative and financial talents. 
Even before the Landtag had approved the Railroad Tax, Heydt had devised a 
shrewd scheme to put those tax revenues to immediate action under his aus­
pices. Hardly a minor account, the Guarantee Fund summoned to life fifty-one 
million thalers of railroad securities over the course of the 1850s.77 
Heydt's resolve to use private companies so readily, and not to persevere 
with a state program, bespoke a change in attitude, yet his strategy with the 
assets belied the spirit of cooperation. He secured from the Cologne-Minden 
Railway, for example, the right to purchase the Oberhausen-Arnheim branch 
line at any time. In 1857-58 Heydt also sought to revise the contractual agree­
ment with the railway companies to aid state ownership. He proposed to dis­
solve the independent status of the Guarantee Fund and transfer its assets— 
mostly in the form of company stock—to the state treasury, while keeping the 
subsidy pledge intact. The "increasing demands of the general treasury" justi­
fied the move, Heydt wrote to the governor of the Rhenish province. The same 
memorandum, however, revealed that Heydt also planned to use its assets to 
acquire greater blocks of stock: "The additional purchase of Cologne-Minden 
stock for the Guarantee Fund . . . would accelerate the means of transferring 
the property of the railway over to the state."78 In addition to an increased 
stock portfolio, Heydt wrote to Bodelschwingh, the transfer would also give 
the Railroad Fund's new revenues between 550,000 and 900,000 thalers.79 
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The Upper Silesian Railway's management, which had just been replaced by 
the government in a controversial takeover in 1857, agreed to this proposal. 
As Heydt predicted, the Cologne-Minden directors rejected it.80 
The Legacy Fund (Legatenfonds) also demonstrates the lengths to which 
Heydt went to find money for the Railroad Fund's projects. Although the use 
of this fund spanned three decades, its story in connection with the Railroad 
Tax and Guarantee Fund underscores Heydt's resolve to accumulate capital 
for his railroad projects. The fund derived from the private estate of Fried­
rich Wilhelm III. In 1840, he bequeathed one million thalers on his death­
bed to a special account to finance the building of a railway from Halle to 
Cassel to the western provinces.81 Although initially hostile to railroads, the 
Hohenzoller had finally recognized the military importance of a railroad con­
necting Berlin, Halle, and the western provinces via Cassel. The hilly terrain 
around Cassel and the lack of investors prevented the construction of a di­
rect Halle-Cassel line. Consequently, in the mid-forties, the fund's executor, 
Baron von Alvensleben, in cooperation with the state ministry, had invested 
the money in two railways: 810,000 thalers in the Thuringian Railway, a line 
that approached Cassel through a circuitous southern route (Halle, Merse­
burg, Leipzig, Erfurt, Gotha); and 190,000 thalers in the Cologne-Minden-
Thuringian Railway, whose rails extended from Hamm to the eastern border of 
Westphalia in Paderborn. This last line, burdened with outstanding debts and 
not yet turning a profit, was bought by the state in 1849 and renamed the West­
phalian Railway. It immediately saddled the Railroad Fund with its losses. 
Because the terms of the Legacy Fund never explicitly stated the destina­
tion of its investment dividends from the Thuringian Railway, Heydt claimed 
them for the Railroad Fund. In 1850 the trade minister squeezed 31,310 thalers 
of back interest payments from the very reluctant, financially troubled direc­
tors of the Thuringian Railway.82 The money went directly to the Westphalian 
Railway. After 1852, the Legacy Fund's administration was transferred from 
the finance ministry to the trade ministry, thus allowing Heydt greater flexi­
bility in supervising the properties of the Railroad Fund. The dividends from 
1852 (39,200 thalers), for example, were invested in Aachen-Diisseldorfer 
bonds, a railway administered and subsidized by the state.83 By 1857, the trade 
ministry had channeled over 215,000 thalers of Legacy Fund earnings into 
stock acquisitions.84 
Several parties contested the Legacy Fund's jurisdiction and use. In De­
cember 1849 the directors of the Thuringian Railway lodged a protest with the 
Hohenzollern house —the king and his three brothers, Princes Wilhelm, Carl. 
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and Albrecht. The directors claimed that the entire fund should be invested 
in their railway. The Hohenzollern princes rejected this demand (21 January 
1850), but they complicated matters by upholding the company's ancillary 
claim that the interest from the 810,000 thalers of Thuringian stock should be 
reinvested in the railway.85 
Heydt disregarded the Hohenzollern decision and continued to use the 
interest as he saw fit. When prevailed upon to defend his recalcitrance to the 
king in March 1853, Heydt maintained that the Legacy Fund should hold to 
its "original intention" and finance the quickest route from Halle to the west­
ern provinces. For this reason, he wrote, the Railroad Fund was entitled to the 
interest from the Legacy Fund. The best route, he believed, was one north of 
Cassel that could connect with the Westphalian Railway. Such a line would 
give greater economic importance to the state railway and cancel the Thu­
ringian Railway's future claims for remuneration. Satisfied with Heydt's argu­
ments, the king issued a decree (4 April 1853) denying the company's claim 
to the interest. The railway consequently paid 40,000 thalers to the state trea­
sury, with which the Railroad Fund acquired securities.86 
Heydt's victory over the Legacy Fund's management was short-lived. 
Two years later (June 1856), the Hohenzollern princes submitted a long protest 
to King Friedrich Wilhelm IV about the use of the fund. They demanded that 
the comptroller of the Hohenzollern entailed estate (Fideikommis) manage 
the account and its income. The king asked his ministers to review the mat­
ter. Because the question was a financial and legal matter, the key opinions 
were those of Finance Minister Bodelschwingh and Justice Minister Ludwig 
Simons, and both rejected the princes' claim. Caught between his cabinet 
and his family, the king turned to the crown's lawyer, whose recommendation 
favored the princes. On 25 March 1857 the king, after a long delay, decreed 
in favor of his brothers: the interest earned from the 810,000 thalers was to 
be supervised by the family comptroller. The cabinet, not accustomed to the 
king's independence, petitioned Friedrich Wilhelm to repeal the decision two 
months later, but the king refused. On 14 July 1857, the funds were trans-
ferred.87 
Heydt, however, was not ready to acquiesce in this royal decision. After 
Prince-Regent Wilhelm assumed governing responsibilities from Friedrich 
Wilhelm in 1858, Heydt resubmitted his claim to the money. Simons backed 
the trade minister in another written opinion (Votum), but Robert von Patow, 
who had replaced Bodelshwingh as finance minister in the New Era cabi­
net, decided he had nothing against the standing agreement. The staunchest 
opposition came from Ludwig von Massow, minister of Hohenzollern house 
affairs, who told Heydt that it was futile to seek a cabinet vote. Although the 
cabinet did not deliberate on the issue, the prince-regent nonetheless agreed 
in November to review the matter. As he was one of the original parties in the 
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royal protest, Wilhelm's opinion was not surprising: he supported the stand­
ing decision. A second edict (11 November 1859) defeated Heydt's plan.88 
With characteristic tenacity, Heydt persisted. He had earmarked this 
money to help fund preliminary work on a line between Halle and Cassel via 
Nordhausen, which offered a drastic shortcut over other options. He hoped, 
furthermore, this line would be state-owned.89 In January 1860 he presented 
an obscure interpretation to the king: the royal rescript, he said, had estab­
lished the "material settlement," but it could not be considered a "final, legal 
settlement." Moreover, Heydt conferred with Patow about negotiating a cash 
settlement with the princes' comptroller. If the Hohenzollerns were set on 
controlling the interest, he wrote, they should be prepared to pay a fixed sum 
to the state treasury as a kind of tax.90 This proposal fell on deaf ears, as did 
Heydt's idea of funding a state line. The new executor of the fund, von Uhden 
(Alvensleben died in 1858), told Heydt that a state rail built with Legacy Fund 
money "could not be allowed," for Friedrich Wilhelm III had only envisioned 
a private enterprise91 
Heydt haggled with the royal house until the end of his tenure as trade 
minister (March 1862), at which time no decision had been reached. Eventu­
ally, in 1863, a private railway (Magdeburg-Leipzig) received the concession 
to build the line and, with Heydt gone, the Hohenzollern house minister sug­
gested that the finance ministry take over the administration of the stock and 
interest. Ironically, Bodelschwingh, who returned as finance minister in Sep­
tember 1862, had to refuse. The test of constitutional principle between the 
parliament and the crown over the army bill had produced a budgetless gov­
ernment, and the treasury did not have the authority to effect the transfer 
of funds92 
The dispute over the control of the Legacy Fund was not, comparatively, 
a major financial issue. Nonetheless, Heydt's struggle with the Prussian royal 
house sheds light on his determination throughout the 1850s to find capital 
wherever possible to maintain the state's role as promoter and owner of rail­
roads. Not content with the fund's limits, Heydt elasticized its legal, budget­
ary parameters through the creation of discrete accounts within the fund. The 
Railroad Tax, the Guarantee Fund, and the Legacy Fund all served the func­
tion of accelerating the fund's acquisition of private railroads. 
It was clear by 1854 that Heydt needed supplementary income to maintain 
the state's bid for leadership. By 1853, the Railroad Fund's debts exceeded the 
legal limit of its expenditure. Rather than trim back state railway construction. 
Heydt disregarded the law limiting the Railroad Fund's annual expenditure to 
The Railroad Fund, 1842-1859 • 123 
two million thalers. In the four years from 1853 through 1856, Bodelschwingh, 
in one of a series of critical memoranda, estimated that the fund's budgetary 
limit was exceeded by the cumulative sum of 1,366,000 thalers.93 This figure 
did not include other debts that Heydt should have stated in his budget. The 
952,950 thalers earned by the Lower Silesian-Mark Railway between 1853 
and 1857, for example, were never included in the formal budget, although 
they made up part of the fund.94 
Heydt further violated budgetary agreements by failing to transfer all 
profits of state-administered and state-owned railways to the general treasury. 
Although the 1849 loan allowed him to use profits (temporarily) from the 
three lines it funded (the Eastern, Westphalian, and Saarbriickener railways), 
Heydt also used profits from others. In 1856 he authorized the sale of one mil­
lion thalers of Berg-Mark Railway stock and appropriated the money for the 
fund's payment schedule in 1857. Similarly, the finance ministry challenged 
the legality of the trade ministry's use of state railroad profits to cover the addi­
tional construction costs of the Miinster-Rheine-Osnabruck line, which had 
swelled to 1,226,755 thalers.95 A 45,000 thaler discrepancy in Eastern Rail­
way profits that failed to reach the treasury also aroused the attention of the 
finance ministry.96 During the mid-1850s, Heydt's budget was easily double 
the permissible limit97 The finance ministry's concern over such sums was 
understandable: it was in dire need of budget-balancing revenues. Whereas 
the state budget ballooned over one hundred million marks between 1848 and 
1856, the tax yield rose 10.5 million thalers in the corresponding time span to 
net fifty-seven million thalers.98 Heydt, however, had his own ambitions and 
thus his own debts. 
Heydt's problem with debt perhaps explains his attempt in 1854 to stretch 
the fund's spending power with unorthodox financial maneuvers. In an at­
tempt to liquefy assets to attain the greatest amount of capital to cover bur­
geoning railroad construction costs, Heydt made inquiries in March 1854 with 
the Frankfurt bankers M. Bethmann and M. A. Rothschild and the Amster­
dam banker W. Bischoffsheim regarding a Depotgeschdft, a personally tailored 
stock-based loan. He wished to sell one of these banks two million thalers of 
railroad securities at a quote above the market price, which he would repur­
chase by the end of the year for an agreed upon premium. All three banks de­
clined the offer." The negotiations failed because Heydt wanted until the end 
of the year to repurchase the stocks (eight months), whereas these banks only 
allowed three to six months for such deposits. Heydt also wanted to discount 
the securities at a quote of 107.5, which (although under the market price) 
these bankers found too high for the sum of money in question. The other cru­
cial question for the Frankfurt bankers was the exchange rate between gulden 
and thalers; curiously, Heydt refused to cite a specific rate. 
The trade ministry's usual banks of business, the Prussian Bank and the 
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Seehandlung, were not asked, and Heydt requested from the private bank­
ers complete confidentiality. Clearly, Heydt was undertaking a risky and un­
conventional deal without the knowledge of other ministers. Bodelschwingh 
would most likely never have approved the undertaking, owing to both the 
uncertainty in financial markets caused by the Crimean War and the uncon­
ventional nature of Heydt's wheeling and dealing. 
To the finance ministry's principal accusation of exceeding the budget by 
over a million thalers, Heydt answered with silence. Previous rebukes had 
shown that Heydt was not shy in justifying his position vigorously—when de­
fensible. Most likely Heydt knew that Bodelschwingh was right, but he also 
knew that neither the lower nor the upper house had yet exerted any strict 
controls on his administration and that he had greater support in the cabinet 
than did Bodelschwingh.100 His decision to ignore the law limiting the size and 
function of the Railroad Fund for four straight years is telling of his willing­
ness to overlook any legal control impeding what he believed to be the best 
interests of the trade ministry. How serious was such an action? By the stan­
dards of his peers in the cabinet (who saw the constitution on which they took 
oaths as an elastic entity), Heydt's disregard of the law was probably not per­
ceived as criminal or worthy of dismissal. Yet deputies and liberal journalists, 
in view of wanton neglect of budgetary constraints, acquired an increasingly 
critical view. 
After 1855, the question of the Railway Fund became bound up with the 
larger issue of parliamentary control of the budget. The conflation of the two 
issues was partly by design. Bodelschwingh, frustrated with his lack of power 
to control Heydt, encouraged a more critical posture on the budget from the 
lower house. In January 1855, he engineered enough votes on the right to put 
two critical liberals on the budget committee: Robert von Patow, the former 
trade minister of 1848, and Ludwig Kiihne, the tax specialist.101 In the same 
month, Bodelschwingh also proposed to Heydt to dissolve the fund and trans­
fer its assets to the finance ministry—in vain. That the finance minister re­
sorted to parliamentary stratagems to influence cabinet policy suggests his 
relative isolation in the cabinet and inability to rouse his colleagues to act. (It 
further shows the growing role of parliament in Prussian policy making, even 
for conservative ministers such as Bodelschwingh.) He had long been con­
cerned with the trade ministry's railroad debts and its liberal spirit with divi­
dend subsidies, afinancial obligation that he believed was crushing the state.102 
The finance minister pointed up the Eastern Railway's confused budgets, late 
payments, and inefficient administration but received no support to rein in 
Heydt. Heydt did not deny that the general treasury paid the fund's overdrafts 
annually but avoided substantive debate by interpreting the finance minis-
try's memoranda as an affront to his person and authority.103 Heydt seemed to 
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brush aside Bodelschwingh's persistent criticisms easily, taking months to re­
ply, which perhaps explains why Bodelschwingh appealed to parliamentary 
factions. 
Bodelschwingh's move had its desired effect. In April 1855 the budget 
committee of the lower house presented revisions to a government bill re­
garding an additional loan to complete the Eastern Railway and construct 
the Munster-Rheine-Emshafen line. The trade ministry asked for 4,309,000 
thalers. Heydt promised the budget committee that the Railroad Fund's means 
were "fully sufficient" to meet the payments on a new loan, which, against 
the backdrop of the fund's deficits since 1853, was a bald-faced lie.104 The 
committee recommended that the sum be reduced to 3,976,000. Although a 
minor monetary reduction, the intervention itself was significant. The com­
mittee changed the route of the Miinster-Emshafen line favored by the minis­
try, shaving off a Prussian mile (7.4 km) to cut costs, and made other minor re­
visions with the Eastern Railway. It rejected Heydt's plan to amortize the debt 
at an unfixed rate, insisting instead that the loan should be repaid in 1 percent 
installments like all other railroad loans.105 It further advised that "if the gov-
ernment's proposal is accepted, then the ongoing state construction and sub­
sidization of railroads must be postponed entirely for a number of years."106 
The committee recognized that the fiscal limits of the fund were saturated and 
announced the lower house's unwillingness to approve future loans. 
This new regulatory role galled Heydt. "I mind very much," Heydt wrote 
the king two days later, "that the houses have intervened for the first time in 
questions of bookkeeping." It was indeed questionable whether the Landtag 
had the jurisdiction to concern itself with cabinet decisions, "but with a rail­
way over fifty miles long [370 km] one could hardly contest the right. Where 
that right begins and where it ends is difficult to determine."107 Unwillingly 
Heydt conceded that confusion existed between the executive and legislative 
branches regarding the control over government spending. 
In the same session of the lower house, Ludwig Kiihne, modifying his 
1853 proposal, submitted an additional motion to suspend temporarily the 
fund's stock-acquisition program (funded by the Railroad Tax) and channel 
its profits into paying this new debt.108 Kiihne, a gifted speaker who knew the 
value of wit and anecdote, offered compelling reasons to abandon the plan for 
a state monopoly of railways. Why, he asked, should the government under­
take the financially impossible task of purchasing all of Prussia's railways— 
priced at 180 million thalers—when other pressing debts were at hand and 
when private railways continued to reduce rates and expand Prussia's lines? 
To adhere reverently to the letter of the 1838 law, he argued, was foolish. 
Kiihne reminded the lower house that he had chaired the state commission in 
1838 that had written the Railroad Law. He was well aware of the law's prem­
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ises but noted that in 1838 there was only one mile of steam-driven railway on 
the European continent. Subsequent experience showed that state interven­
tion was unnecessary.109 The lower house rejected Kiihne's amendment but 
accepted the committee's proposals to alter the terms of the loan.110 
Thus, in spite of the overwhelming victory of government parties in the 
election of 1855 (which installed the so-called Landratskammer),111 liberals 
kept the budget question alive as a political issue. Since 1849, industrial and 
commercial interests had objected to the disproportionate tax burden placed 
on the Rhine and Westphalian provinces, the continued tax exemptions of the 
landed nobility in the east, and the increasing size of the budget. According to 
Patow in 1857, it was the liberals alone who consistently motioned for greater 
control of taxes and the budget.112 After 1855, however, the liberals found un­
expected support on this issue from conservatives. 
Ludwig von Gerlach, the clarion of the right, called upon the Landtag to 
unite the Prussian virtue of thrift with the constitutional regime in a force­
ful speech in the lower house on 22 February 1856.113 He introduced a new 
finance doctrine designed to curb the government's appetite for centralization 
and bureaucratization by refusing all new proposals for taxes. The move, he 
wrote to his brother Leopold, "was the only practical way to make the houses 
an instrument of the estates."114 Exercising budgetary control was one element 
in Gerlach's larger political strategy, which planned that conservatives should 
not let the constitution perish through inactivity and rejection but, rather, 
through constant use and practical application transform it into a conservative 
tool.115 Meeting with Gerlach days afterward (27 February), Bodelschwingh 
supported the new tactic. Only the king's civil cabinet or the houses, he told 
Gerlach, could begin to monitor the budget and dissolve the trade ministry.116 
By February 1856 the array of Heydt's critics and opponents had reached 
formidable proportions. They included liberals and conservatives in both 
houses of the Landtag who were concerned about the condition of the Prus­
sian budget, the financial manipulations of the minister of trade, and his con­
tinued efforts to nationalize the Prussian railway system. But they were not 
alone in their concerns. The Prussian cabinet was itself divided in its support 
of Heydt's activities; the collegial system worked poorly when confronted by 
a man of his temperament. Bodelschwingh would even have dissolved the 
ministry of trade in order to be rid of him and his schemes. But Heydt had one 
advantage; his opponents were too varied in social station, economic views, 
and political purposes to unite against him. 
Gerlach's initial tactic was to oppose the extension of a tax surcharge 
presented in the government's 1856 budget. In May 1854 the houses had ap­
proved a 25 percent surcharge on the income and meal and slaughter taxes and 
extended it to the fiscal year of 1855. In spite of Gerlach's threat, this exten­
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sion was eventually passed,117 but both the upper and lower houses warned the 
executive not to consider the surcharge again. The lower advised a thorough 
reform of state finance to streamline expenditure. The upper, more concretely, 
announced that only revenues already approved by law would be accepted in 
the next budget; all new forms of revenue would have to be approved sepa­
rately by special legislation. The resolutions of both houses pressured the 
cabinet to come to a definite settlement on finances. If the cabinet was to avoid 
a greater conflict with parliament, it had to secure state revenues already ap­
proved and, furthermore, maximize their profitability.118 
The new conservative position posed greater problems in the legislative 
session of 1856/57, for the government sought new revenues of 4,080,000 
thalers for an army reform, which proposed to extend military service from 
2.5 to 3 years. In addition, the revenues would raise the salaries of civil 
servants.119 The debate on the budget went on for months and marked the 
"highpoint and turning point of the [reactionary] era."120 The protracted de­
bate caused Ludwig Gerlach to speculate on cabinet changes and bemoan 
the "power and popularity the leftists—Auerswald, Patow, etc.—possess with 
their edifying principles of government and the chance they have to take the 
helm."121 The "edifying principles" Gerlach feared were the left's attempt to 
transform the budget debate into a constitutional reform providing for a more 
precise definition of the lower house's role in the budget. A similar campaign 
had failed by a narrow margin in 1850/51. It was the same issue that eventu­
ally turned the army reform of Wilhelm I into a constitutional crisis in 1862.122 
Both houses rejected the raise in government officials' salaries. There was 
little objection to reforming the army, but the question of who and what to 
tax was problematic. Fiercely protecting its own material interests, the upper 
house advised raising the levy that pressed against the poor the most: the salt 
tax. The second house, however, proposed using the Railroad Tax to finance 
the army reform. The latter's motion was worked out by its finance commit­
tee, a twenty-one member body controlled by liberals but chaired by Ludwig 
von Gerlach. For the liberal faction, Kiihne stated: "If the house recognizes 
the necessity of three-year service and salary raises, then I do not doubt that 
the trade minister and the government will be willing to suspend the stock ac­
quisition and apply the tax to more urgent needs."123 Clearly Kiihne strove to 
use the Railroad Tax as a bargaining chip to negotiate control over the bud­
get between the executives and the legislature. "The commission," reported a 
member who supported the government, "has declared war."124 
The plenum debate on modifying the Railroad Tax to alleviate the budget 
deficit focused on whether such a move was legal. Some argued that suspen­
sion of the stock-acquisition program would transform it into a commercial 
tax, because the revenues would flow to the state treasury like any other levy, 
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but the 1838 law forbade commercial tax on railways. Others proclaimed 
their freedom from stockholders and commercial companies and their right 
to change the tax. The debate ended in stalemate. The lower house watered 
down the amendment by introducing a new motion that proposed to suspend 
the stock-acquisition program temporarily—until finances were put in order. 
This proposition was voted down by the committee itself and also defeated 
in the plenum, 168 to 130. The upper house, however, approved the bill, 62 
to 17. The proposal's mixed support allowed the cabinet to disregard it, but 
the debate nonetheless registered changing views on the fund's status.125 Thus, 
when Bodelschwingh renewed his complaints to Heydt in April 1857, he told 
the trade minister that he should not count on next year's funds for railroads. 
The debate on taxes in the Landtag and its calls for reductions could "not en­
sure with full certainty that the fund will remain in its present form."126 
Parliamentary criticism of government spending, administrative ineffi­
ciency, and new taxes prompted Bodelschwingh in the summer of 1857 to draft 
a memorial that exhorted the king to reform state finances. Bodelschwingh's 
report, which received the influential backing of Privy Councilor Marcus 
Niebuhr, prompted the king to appoint an advisory committee to consider 
such a reform. This "State-Council Commission" was composed of eight men 
drawn from the privy council and parliament. Among them were Ludwig von 
Gerlach, the new critic of state budgets, and Ktihne, the longtime opponent 
of state railways. The king asked the council to address three specific ques­
tions with regard to the railroad industry: whether enlargement of the state's 
railroad network was politically advisable; whether Prussia's state and private 
railroads could maintain interest payments; and whether the advantages of fur­
ther railroad acquisition outweighed the burden of additional railroad bonds. 
In addition, the commission should address organizational improvements in 
the postal and mining administrations, both of which belonged to Heydt's 
sphere of administration.127 The initial report and proposed agenda placed the 
blame for the state's financial problems at Heydt's door. "When one reads Bo-
delschwingh's very interesting and thorough finance report," wrote General 
Leopold von Gerlach, close adviser to the king, "it is clear that Heydt's ac­
tions are very destructive."128 
The king's call for an advisory council produced a written protest from 
the cabinet, stating that the move undermined its authority. "Certainly it does 
not harm you," Friedrich Wilhelm replied, "when I want to listen to other 
men over an important matter." In a sharper tone the king reminded his min­
isters, "This concerns something that stands higher than the authority of the 
cabinet: my responsibility as the king of this land."129 The king's independent 
course of action underscores the historic concern for state debt that weighed 
on the Hohenzoller, the disregard for correct governmental procedure that 
The Railroad Fund, 1842-1859 • 129 
characterized his whole reign, and the degree to which the parliament and 
public discussion had influenced the court. But it further confirmed the king's 
strategy of encouraging actions that weakened the governing strength of the 
cabinet. For this reason, Bismarck noted, the king enjoyed seeing the houses 
reject the government's tax bill.130 
Before the commission convened to discuss the printed agenda, Heydt 
offered his resignation to the king on 8 September 1857.131 The creation of 
the commission and its formal agenda insulted Heydt; he believed the king 
no longer trusted him.132 Heydt probably tendered his resignation to force the 
king to choose between the commission and himself. As was so often the case 
with ministerial resignations, the king rebuffed it, telling Heydt that he had 
"indefinitely postponed" the convening of the commission. This was a politi­
cal victory for Heydt but nonetheless a qualified one. The incident revealed 
the uncertainty of the king and his advisers over Heydt's railroad policies. Be­
cause the commission was suspended, not dissolved, it could be reconvened 
at any time and thus be used as a mechanism to rein in Heydt's activities. 
While the court reassessed the desirability of state railways, the liberal 
press also questioned the putative advantages of state ownership. The growing 
burden of railways on the government budget was a frequent complaint. "The 
Prussian debt has nearly doubled since 1848," wrote one critic of the debt in 
1856, "and it is mainly because of the cost of the state railways."133 Equally 
newsworthy was the government's claim that the state could offer cheaper 
prices and freight rates than private railways. The National-Zeitung reminded 
its readers that Heydt was responsible for making the Westphalian Railway 
cost prohibitive for the working class by abolishing the fourth class.134 The 
newspaper also asked why the state raised the coal tariffs on the Upper Sile­
sian Railway and the Wilhelmsbahn after taking them over. Earlier the trade 
ministry had imposed the "one penny tariff" on private railways but now did 
not adhere to its own rule. Long editorials strove to demonstrate that, although 
Prussia's state system could offer fair rates, it could not offer better rates.135 
Practice showed that only the most efficient state railways (i.e., former pri­
vate railways such as the Upper and Lower Silesian railways) matched the 
low costs and cheap rates of private railways. But even in these cases, it was 
questionable whether state railways were cheaper or more advantageous; such 
performance was based on borrowed money, whose interest burdened the tax-
payer.136 Equally important, free-trade publicists exposed the fallacy of state 
railroad "profits." Indeed, state commissioners boasted millions of thalers in 
gross profits, but, when tallying the costs of construction, administration, and 
finance charges, they never ceased to use red ink.137 
The development of public criticism against state railway management 
grew with the bankruptcy of the Wilhelmsbahn railroad in 1857. As already 
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seen in Chapter 3, the business community blamed company directors, but the 
state railroad commission also received condemnation. The state's regulatory 
role and its overall inability to supervise the industry were severely criticized. 
Such grievances left the minister and his quest for a state monopoly open to 
further criticisms. 
Not surprisingly, the question of the Railroad Tax was once again raised in 
the Landtag in 1858. The issue of legality, which had preoccupied the houses a 
year earlier, was pushed aside to discuss the primary question of state owner­
ship of railroads. The lower house's new budget committee voted 14 to 13 to 
suspend the stock-acquisition program. The plenum voted the measure down, 
but the upper house again approved the suspension. The bill also included a 
warning to the cabinet that the upper house opposed the raising of the maxi­
mum two million thaler limit on the Railroad Fund.138 The budget committees 
of both upper and lower houses submitted stronger recommendations to the 
cabinet than they had in the previous session. Although this bill, too, was un­
successful, a sea change was evident. As one newspaper remarked in March 
1858, "We believe it is safe to say that, when similar conditions arise, that is, 
when the government demands new revenues, the result will be different." D9 
Following the two legislative sessions that debated the Railroad Fund so 
thoroughly, the cabinet met in April 1858 to review its position, and on 1 May 
summarized its deliberation to the king. The cabinet noted the waning interest 
in the state ownership of railways, though it believed the Landtag's proposal 
to suspend further state ownership was only a temporary measure until the 
financial situation improved. In recounting the Landtag's position, the cabi­
net stated that the two houses could not justify expending funds on a project 
deemed dispensable when money was lacking to settle pressing, urgent needs 
of the state. Because tariffs were low and industry and commerce prospering, 
the Landtag reasoned, there was no great need for further state ownership. 
Hence, "whether it is desirable for the state to take over all railways and, with 
it, their attending problems is still very dubious."140 The last two legislative 
sessions had questioned the logic and rationale behind state ownership. The 
conjunction of a prosperous economy with the rising popularity of laissez­
faire capitalism among Landtag members prompted the cabinet to reconsider 
its position on railroad acquisition and ownership. 
Heydt dodged this central issue and defended the acquisition program as a 
legal obligation: it must be pursued out of fairness to railways, which benefited 
from the stability provided by state stock holdings, and to the stockholder, 
who was guaranteed stocks over par. Only the directors opposed state owner­
ship, Heydt claimed, for it was in their personal interest to keep the lucrative 
business for themselves. Further, if the stock-acquisition program was sus­
pended, the Railroad Tax would act as a commercial tax, and the state would 
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be obliged to compensate all stockholders for the tax revenues. Exhibiting a 
new sensitivity to legal commitments, Heydt maintained that a commercial 
tax was unjustified, if not illegal.141 
Ministers Simons and Bodelschwingh dissented from this opinion. The 
state, they claimed, had the right to change laws, and specific passages in the 
1838 law (paragraphs 6, 39, and 49) gave the government the right to alter 
the law to suit the times. Stockholders were aware that conditions can change 
and, therefore, such narrow legal objections ought to be overruled. 
Bodelschwingh offered a fuller critique of state ownership. Competition 
kept down rates more than a state monopoly ever could. Full state owner­
ship, furthermore, would only make sense if profits exceeded the costs of 
interest and amortization payments—"how seldom is this the case." More­
over, Bodelschwingh argued, the process of acquiring railroads in this man­
ner was bad business. The state had artificially propped up stock prices since 
1842, and when it came time to acquire the remaining railways (and indem­
nify stockholders) the government would pay extremely inflated prices. It was 
also unwise for the state to be the sole owner of railways; if destroyed in war, 
they would have to be replaced entirely at state expense. Bodelschwingh also 
noted that most had neglected to factor the increased number of civil-servant 
salaries into the price that would accompany state ownership. And although 
others were sanguine about the "improved" budget of 1858, the state would 
still run a deficit of over eleven million thalers.142 
Bodelschwingh's opinion was the sole vote against sustaining the acqui­
sition program.143 Although Simons backed Bodelschwingh on the legal right 
of the state to change the law, he sided with Heydt's philosophy of a state 
monopoly. The remaining members of the cabinet believed the advantages of 
state railroads were greater. Their theses were derived from earlier statements 
and tended to stray from concrete argumentation. The military importance of 
railroads remained incontestable. Although freight rates were low, they could 
still be lower. Prussia should also not deny itself the advantage of this lucra­
tive source of income, especially when bordering states enjoyed this privilege: 
"How hopeful Prussia's future appears, if the present system is consistently 
and uninterruptedly carried out. For Prussia will end up in possession of its 
railways much earlier than its neighbors." Finally, the majority opinion noted 
that it was chimerical to accept the Landtag's suggestion for a temporary mea-
sure—such remedies always remain permanent.144 
Bodelschwingh's written opinion against the Railroad Fund was his last 
as finance minister. In October 1858 the New Era cabinet took over, and 
Robert von Patow assumed control of the finance ministry. As a former min­
ister in the liberal cabinet of 1848, an opposition leader against Manteuffel in 
the lower house, a critical voice on the budget committee in 1856/57. and a 
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confirmed free-trade advocate, Patow opposed Heydt's policy with even more 
verve than his predecessor.145 The views he shared with Rhenish liberals in 
the lower house and with Kuhne on allocating the Railroad Tax to the general 
treasury ensured private railroad interests a voice in the cabinet.146 
Heydt, undaunted by either the new appointment or the near-dissolution 
of the fund, continued to maneuver for greater spending power. Seeking im­
mediate control over the new minister, Heydt submitted to Patow a plan to ap­
propriate all railroad profits for the fund in addition to the annual two million 
thalers. Aggrandizing the fund's revenues, he claimed, was legal. His tactical 
move turned on the pivotal phrase in the 1838 law that stated the fund must 
"not be allowed to exceed" two million thalers. Whereas in the past the phrase 
had always been interpreted as the ceiling for the fund's activities, Heydt now 
proposed that the phrase referred only to the finance ministry's contribution, 
not the fund's budget. The conventional reading set a fixed, concrete limit on 
the Railway Fund; Heydt's interpretation left room for additional spending 
power. Patow's response was complete rejection. The fund's aims, he wrote 
to Heydt, no longer fitted financial conditions: "It seems to be the right time 
to dissolve the Fund . .  . the Railroad Fund is no longer reconcilable within 
the principles of an ordered budget."147 Patow rejected Heydt's claim that 
the king allowed him to manage the fund alone and announced his intention 
to wrest railroad profits from Heydt's accounts for the treasury.148 The New 
Era cabinet thus continued the struggle over the fund between the trade and 
finance ministries. The debate, however, had one marked difference: Patow, 
unlike Bodelschwingh, had more support than Heydt in the New Era cabinet. 
The continuing tendency of the government toward budget deficits mag­
nified the Landtag's scrutiny of the fund. Recognizing the houses' reluctance 
to approve new taxes and the government's need to reapportion revenues 
already approved in the annual budget, Heydt agreed to surrender the extra-
dividends of one railway—the Upper Silesian—to the general treasury in 
February 1859.149 The piecemeal reform was not enough, however. In March, 
the lower house reviewed the government's railroad budget, discussed the 
principles of state involvement in railroads, and debated the dissolution of 
the fund.150 Kiihne, Leonor Reichenheim, and Karl Milde, all liberals, led the 
attack against the government role in railroad ownership. Again Kiihne pro­
posed his amendment to disband the stock-acquisition program. The "stulti­
fying state omnipotence" with its "overweening bureaucratic influence," the 
Berliner Borsen-Zeitung reported, was the liberals' salient reason for abolish­
ing the stock-acquisition program.151 Lorenz Stein, a national economist, and 
Karl Overweg, a Westphalian protectionist with iron interests, defended the 
state, and Heydt fended off Kiihne by declaring to the house that the cabinet 
was unanimously behind its preservation.152 Indeed, commented the news­
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as long as there was no outstanding need in the budget to justify sus­
gthe fund, the cabinet had the freedom to ignore both public opinion, 
£ or a long time opposed state railways, and the houses' proposals to 
I s l  d it But when the need arose to raise money from either a tax or from 
the fund, the newspaper predicted, the fund would g o .  * 
The occasion for its dissolution arose two months later in May 1859. In 
response to the war between Austria and the coalition of France and Sardinia, 
Prussia prepared for mobilization and armed mediation. Money was needed 
and not surprisingly, the first source Finance Minister Patow turned to was 
the Railroad Tax. On 5 May 1859, Patow, with patriotic flourishes, asked the 
lower house to change the Railroad Tax of 1853, dissolve the Railroad Fund. 
and channel its revenues into paying for mobilization.154 Significantly, the bill 
was not presented as a temporary expedient but as a permanent statute. Both 
houses overwhelmingly approved the bill, which was enacted into law. 
The imperatives of foreign policy thus settled the fate of the Railroad Fund. 
The exigencies of the 1859 mobilization, however, should not deflect our at­
tention from the longer history behind the fund's dissolution and the debate 
over its utility.155 By March 1859, opposition to the fund had developed so 
strongly that, even without the Prussian mobilization, the fund would eventu­
ally have perished. The growing belief that the "natural laws" of capitalism 
were a far better regulator of prosperity than state intervention enabled both 
journalists and liberal politicians to criticize the logic of state railways. Since 
1855 the Railroad Tax and the special status of the fund had become a central 
issue for liberals in the effort of parliament to enforce parliamentary bud­
getrights. The liberal election victory of 1858 combined with the ministerial 
appointment of Patow, the laissez-faire advocate, enabled the protracted agi­
tation for private railways to attain its goal. 
Parliamentary procedure in Prussia had some worth for business inter­
ests. The attack on the proposal for a state railway monopoly by the liberal 
press and the opposition to it in both houses did eventually affect government 
policy. Parliament, press, and cabinet combined to form one integrated dis­
cussion that forced resistant ministers to acquiesce.156 
The policy reversal was an important victory for economic liberals Sav­
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of the commerce law book, the final abolition of the direction principle in 
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coal mining, and the commercial treaty with France in 1862. Such legislation 
addressed the new, growing needs of Prussia's business class and indicated 
that the Prussian establishment was undergoing change. Old and new elites 
searched for suitable terms on which to accommodate one another in the new 
society. But, as we have seen with the failed bid for a state monopoly in rail­
roads, the process of reconciling the interests of a conservative government 
and the emerging elite of commerce and industry was anything but quick and 
easy. The Railroad Fund is one indication that the balance struck between old 
and new forces in the 1860s was a series of actions constituting a political 
process with a longer history. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
T 
The Juste Milieu, 1857-1870 
The dissolution of the Railroad Fund in 1859 was not an isolated event but, rather, one element of larger policy modifications in the New Era. 
Saving Germany's largest capitalist market from state ownership augured a 
new era of free-trade legislation and economic prosperity. Other legislation 
followed that addressed the needs of Prussia's business class and indicated 
that the Prussian establishment was undergoing tangible change. Old and new 
elites searched for suitable terms to accommodate one another. The period 
1858-66 is, in fact, a critical era in the sociopolitical formation of the entre­
preneurial bourgeoisie. The business politics of large-scale industries played a 
key role in reconstituting the Prussian state, affecting both government policy 
and political liberalism. Although the decisive period of Prussian-German 
state building is often viewed as the years 1862-66—the years of the constitu­
tional conflict and Bismarck's "revolution from above"—this interpretation, 
while valid, has little explanatory value for the social group of business elites 
whose relationship to the state was affected by their economic-political ad­
vances in the years of the New Era, 1858-62. These goals, first articulated in 
the Vormdrz era and developed in the 1850s, centered on the creation of a juste 
milieu for a maturing capitalist class: a social-political atmosphere in which 
entrepreneurial elites saw their interests nurtured by the state. Entrepreneurs 
wanted not only to protect the expanding private sphere of the economy from 
government interference but also to preserve the state's traditional role in the 
economy in matters as yet beyond the reach of private capital. 
Although the new political milieu after 1858 deserves emphasis explain­
ing why the bourgeois business class came to support Prussian conservatism, 
this study avoids characterizing the New Era as a turning point or funda­
mental break in state policy. The New Era must be placed in the context of 
a complex, evolving relationship between government and business during 
the period 1830-70. This long-term, unspectacular process fits poorly with 
dramatic turning points and other narrative designs of political history. In re­
thinking the importance of the New Era, we should not place the accent on 
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the newness of the New Era reforms; indeed, many of the reforms discussed 
below were haltingly initiated before and after 1848. Nonetheless, the New Era 
is significant because it was after 1858 that businessmen felt that the reform 
path of the last two decades had widened into a central avenue of state con­
cern. The state's responsiveness in clearing obstacles to greater expansion and 
growth during the New Era brought to fruition the practical, concrete demands 
businessmen had articulated since the 1830s. There were, of course, many 
grievances still outstanding, but the incremental advances made by the busi­
ness class toward assimilation into the Prussian establishment substantially 
explain why entrepreneurial opposition ebbed in 1862-63. The juste milieu of 
the New Era illuminates one key dimension of the multifaceted explanation 
regarding the collapse of the liberal parliamentary opposition in 1863-66. 
The Depression of 1857-1859 
Relations between capitalists and the Prussian government were affected sig­
nificantly by the onset of a sharp downturn in the business cycle in 1857. For 
a brief period in the mid-1850s entrepreneurs displayed a willingness to aban­
don bureaucratic ties. The increase in businessmen's criticism of government 
actions after 1853 was approximately proportional to the health of the econ­
omy. The numerous private joint-stock and commandite banks founded in 
1853-56 provided capital-hungry entrepreneurs with a fresh source of long-
term financing free of government restrictions (see chap. 5). The door to 
entrepreneurial autonomy opened by a growing international financial net­
work was soon closed by the depression of 1857-59. These new banking 
institutions might have ensured entrepreneurial independence from state eco­
nomic policies in the next decade, but the 1857-59 depression reasserted the 
older pattern of negotiating with the state for financial and legislative aid. 
In 1856 overproduction in both agriculture and manufacturing com­
pounded by financial panic unleashed a chain of bank failures in the United 
States that spread to Europe by 1857. Prussia's and the Zollverein's newer 
industrial enterprises were not struck as hard as London's and Hamburg's 
older commercial networks (especially those in grain exports), but the impact 
of the business depression was nonetheless considerable.1 The foreign trade 
of the Zollverein declined by 300 million marks in 1857-59; wholesale prices 
and stock quotations fell drastically; and the nominal value of the national 
wealth shrank by approximately 25 percent.2 The war between Italy and 
Austria in 1859, and its ensuing diplomatic complications for all of Europe, 
prolonged the depression in commerce and production. The Prussian Bank's 
money supply in 1857-60 provides a reliable indication of the depression's 
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persistent effect on economic growth. In 1857 the money supply stood at 889 
million thalers, falling to 820 million in 1858, 815 in 1859, and hitting its low 
point of 766 in I860.3 By 1860 business optimism was evident once again, 
though raising capital for large-scale projects still remained difficult.4 In April 
1860, Rudolf Schramm could still write to F. W. Kb'nig, a technical director of 
the Rhenish Railway, "In these times I believe you [when you write] that you 
are having difficulty to cover the colossal ongoing costs of construction."5 
The onset of the first financial crisis of world capitalism enabled the Prus­
sian state to emerge once again as a necessary participant in large-scale busi­
ness. Under these circumstances Heydt reasserted state leadership in finance. 
Between November 1856 and February 1857 he lowered the discount rate 
from 7.5 to 4 percent and advanced loans to companies in need of capital. At 
the same time he banned the circulation of foreign currency in Prussia, intro­
duced stricter measures to prevent railroad companies from floating loans 
without government authorization, and forbade the inclusion of future reve­
nues in calculating assets for loan payments.6 The economic crisis allowed the 
state to wield greater control over private business. 
The 1857 economic crisis narrowed the options for large-scale capital­
ism. Money and confidence were scarce. Whereas 139 joint-stock companies 
had been formed in the Zollverein states in the years 1855-57, only 12 were 
chartered in 1857-59.7 Business failures greatly curtailed commercial under­
writing from joint-stock banks and public investment in the stock market. The 
depression prevented the joint-stock Darmstadter Bank and the commandite 
Diskonto Gesellschaft from pursuing their original aim: to supply pools of 
capital large enough to free German businessmen from restrictive government 
policies. After 1857 the new commercial banks sought safe investments, prac­
ticing conservative finance by taking refuge in state paper and loans. During 
the depression, the financiers of the new banks became part of the financial 
establishment of northern Germany known as the Prussian Consortium. 
The consortium was a group of leading Prussian financiers, many of them 
railroad directors, who sporadically aided the Prussian state in raising money 
for the 1859 mobilization and the subsequent wars of unification. Here one 
sees evidence of the sea change that had occurred since the mid-1850s. The 
joint-stock and commandite commercial banks, once considered "French" 
devices inimical to Prussian state policy, were now included among the mem­
bers of the financial establishment invited to raise capital for Prussia's bid to 
establish hegemony over northern Germany. But the consortium's early effi­
cacy in financing bonds is often exaggerated: putting together the loan for 
mobilization in 1859 was faltering and uncertain. The attempt to float a multi­
million thaler loan (which was initially set at ten but whose expansion to fifty 
million was foreseen) among selected German financiers in May 1859 did 
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not produce a spectacular subscription.8 The Frankfurt bankers, wrote Ludolf 
Camphausen, were "swamped in paper and stocks"; the Darmstadter Bank 
was "impotent and distressed to fill its own obligations"; and the Luxemburg 
Bank "also appears to have little capital at its disposal."9 In view of the loan's 
precarious reception among German banks, Otto Camphausen, president of 
the Seehandlung, wished that "we could experiment with treasury notes, 
which would be preferable in the event of peace."10 In the end, after refusals 
from London's Baring Bros., the government opted for a public subscription 
of a twenty-four million thaler loan at 5 percent, whose success surpassed the 
finance ministry's expectations.11 
In spite of the depressed stock quotes and the disappearance of invest­
ment capital, the railroad industry in general survived the crash of 1857-59 
in good condition. Railroad capitalization increased 38.7 percent, swelling 
from 273.25 million thalers in 1857 to 379 million thalers in 1860, an invest­
ment that expanded the Prussian rail network by 23.5 percent.12 Hence, while 
the depression's bear market impinged on the plans of established railways to 
complete trunk lines and delayed the undertaking of new projects, railroad 
entrepreneurs spoke more of caution than of catastrophe in the depression of 
1857-59. And, not surprisingly, railroads also used the depression to their ad­
vantage. The Rhenish, Cologne-Minden, and the Upper Silesian railways, for 
example, used the crash to postpone the construction of unprofitable lines that 
earlier state charters obliged them to build and, following the political shift 
in 1858, to extract better financial concessions from the government, such as 
the right to borrow against bonds and issue stock without the delay of formal 
state authorization.13 
But such companies as the Rhenish, Cologne-Minden, Upper Silesian, 
and Wilhelmsbahn railways remained in a difficult position. All were com­
mitted to extending their lines, plans that required millions in future stock 
issues. For railroad businessmen the most salient feature of the depression was 
probably the continued dependency on state dividend guarantees. In abso­
lute numbers, the state commitment to backing railroad issues grew by fifty 
million thalers. In 1860, 99.7 million thalers of the 286.75 million invested 
in Prussian private railways were guaranteed (34 percent); in 1863, 140.6 of 
334.25 million (42 percent); and in 1866, 154.6 of 377.75 million (35 per-
cent).14 Although the state's actual payment to investors was comparatively 
small (5,039,329 thalers),15 railroad entrepreneurs continued to use the mixed 
system's risk-free offer to investors for expansion in the 1860s, continuing a 
pattern of government-business relations established in the 1840s. 
Placing new issues on the market was perceived by financiers to be haz­
ardous. Abraham Oppenheim aptly summarized the financial market's condi­
tion in 1858: "The market still suffers from indigestion with old issues; the 
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country only has enough capital for the completion of railroads already under 
construction."16 To attract that capital (both in new issues and bonds) with­
out driving down the value of stock demanded expertise. The attempt by the 
Wilhelmsbahn to do so failed dramatically, causing scandal, bankruptcy, and 
quick government intervention in 1857. The protocols of the Rhenish Rail­
way during these years document efforts to effect a good placement, using 
to its advantage the experience of seasoned financiers, connections to bank­
ing circles, a first-rate network of domestic and international intelligence, and 
access to government officials.17 Directors also employed the services of the 
press, which could bolster confidence in railroad stocks. To fight slumping 
quotes in October 1859, A. Oppenheim instructed Gerson Bleichrbder to place 
an article in the Berliner Borsen-Zeitung. It "would simply say that, according 
to reliable reports, the directors of the Rhenish Railway do not presently con­
sider issuing a new series of common stock; and such an act would not happen 
unless they could be placed over par."18 Such tactics denoted the precarious 
state of high finance; railroads drew on all of their resources to stay afloat. An 
integral part of this resourcefulness was reaffirming ties to the Prussian state 
and its dividend guarantees, subventions, and loans. 
Business Politics in the New Era 
Although the depression reasserted state presence in large-scale capitalist 
enterprises, the political tenor of government-business relations differed sig­
nificantly from the Manteuffel-Heydt era. Had there not been a change of 
government, the effect of the depression would have exacerbated the exist­
ing problems regarding the trade ministry's intrusive and imperious behavior 
and strengthened Heydt's hand in dominating the railroad business. But the 
prince's new cabinet put government-business relations in a new key, offer­
ing a more receptive ear to business. The political shift in Prussia after 1857 
helped private enterprise. Upon assuming the governing duties from the ail­
ing King Friedrich Wilhelm IV in 1858, Prince-Regent Wilhelm dismissed the 
conservative ministers of the king's cabinet, most visibly Otto von Manteuf­
fel and Ferdinand von Westphalen, and inaugurated the so-called New Era. 
Prince Wilhelm's anti-reactionary views and his promise in 1858 to promote 
"wise legislation at home" and to support "unifying elements like the cus­
toms association" underscored his accommodating attitude toward unification 
and business needs.19 
The crown prince's phrases, which pointed to a generous state policy for 
the upper middle classes, greatly appealed to businessmen whose pragmatic, 
moderate politics largely strove for progress in alignment with the Hohen­
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zollern crown. In October 1858, Otto Camphausen, who hailed from Rhenish 
entrepreneurial wealth, wrote to his brother Ludolf in Cologne: 
On Oct. 26,1858 I attended the swearing in of the country's leader, just as 
I did on Feb. 6, 1850. In 1850, I attended as a deputy of the lower house 
and rebellious councilor third class; now I took part as a loyal councilor 
first class and even a possible ministerial candidate. This time the act had 
something uncommonly captivating. The prince spoke plainly but with a 
dignified voice and conveyed to the world the feeling that such an oath was 
truly not meaningless, that the constitution had finally attained its true con­
firmation, and that we further stand on firm ground—as if the confusions of 
1848 had never disturbed the path of legal development started in 1847.20 
These words capture well the optimism of moderate liberals for the politi­
cal era that lay ahead under the reign of Wilhelm. The prince-regent's views 
on constitutions and legislatures moved steadily to the right after 1858, but 
for the business community the juste milieu of establishing a legal economic 
framework that promoted capitalists' needs in the New Era remained through­
out the 1860s. Although little political headway in constitutional liberalism 
was achieved in the years 1858-61, the legal and economic advances for the 
monied bourgeoisie in the New Era were many. 
One immediate consequence of the New Era was a deluge of public criti­
cism against Heydt and his economic policies during the 1850s.21 In 1858 the 
Berlin Borsen-Zeitung, the major financial daily in Prussia, used the less re­
strictive censorship laws to denounce Prussian economic policy; its editorials 
urged the Prussian crown to dismiss Trade Minister August von der Heydt and 
to appoint ministers more responsive to the needs of capitalism.22 Respond­
ing to reports that the prince would ask for resignations from Manteuffel's 
ministry, the criticism against Heydt sharpened. "We must," stated the news­
paper, "unfortunately place in the foreground of our statement that the entire 
industrial and commercial estate, including those whose interests were di­
rectly served by Heydt, greet his resignation from office with genuine joy "2 3 
Without denying the expansion of the Prussian economy that occurred under 
Heydt's aegis, the newspaper questioned whether the prosperity should be as­
cribed to his influence: "We would not let the issue go unquestioned, whether 
all of this would not have developed to be larger and better without the special 
effect of Herr von der Heydt and whether his many measures had a harmful 
effect."24 
During 1858 Westphalian, Rhenish, and Silesian businessmen bombarded 
the government with letters and petitions requesting Heydt's dismissal.25 In 
the following year, H. F. L. Augustin, a director of the Berlin-Potsdam-
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Magdeburg Railway, attacked Heydt in two long essays, charging the minister 
with gross governmental misconduct.26 "In short," he concluded, "there is no 
sphere of business that he does not more or less rule and influence; he has 
the power to bless or punish any person who pursues a material interest."27 
Leonor Reichenheim, a parliamentary advocate of free trade, followed in 
1860 with a pamphlet that denounced Heydt's continued defense of the 1849 
commercial code, whose paternalistic laws restricted the free movement of 
labor (guilds) and the free association of commercial enterprises (joint-stock 
charters).28 The Chamber of Deputies joined in to criticize Heydt's protracted 
role in Manteuffel's cabinet.29 What surfaced after 1858 in the business world 
was not a defense of the trade ministry and its accomplishments but, rather, 
criticism of the heavy hand with which it regulated taxation, money supply, 
banking practices, coal mining, and the railroad industry. If the 1850s were 
an unproblematic period for capitalists, for whom Heydt acted as a govern­
mental administrator for their industrial program,30 then the enthusiasm with 
which businessmen, economic associations, and financial newspapers greeted 
the New Era is mystifying. Entrepreneurs, too, sought relief from the reaction­
ary era. 
When Heydt survived the purge of conservative ministers and remained 
as trade minister, business circles and their newspapers complained vocifer-
ously.31 Heydt never recovered a political base in the New Era, finding little 
support either in the public sphere or among his peers in business and finance. 
Upon hearing of Heydt's appointment as the leader of the short-lived cabinet 
from March to September 1862, Otto Camphausen wrote, "Our worst fears 
have been surpassed by reality—the poor, poor king."32 As cabinet chief, 
Heydt was perceived to have drifted so far to the right that such liberal gov­
ernment officials as Rudolf Delbriick, Otto Camphausen, and Friedrich Kiihl­
wetter refused to enter his cabinet.33 The minister reached the nadir of his 
political career in the election of May 1862, when his entire cabinet lost in the 
elections: "Never has a government been so thoroughly defeated."34 Even his 
hometown of Elberfeld, which had consistently put him in provincial diets 
and the chamber of deputies for over twenty years, failed to elect him.35 "Poli­
tics," Heydt wrote in 1863, "has discarded me."36 The pronouncement was 
premature. Heydt returned to parliament in 1865 and to Bismarck's cabinet as 
finance minister in 1866. But it surprised few that Heydt's small faction of arch 
conservatives in parliament was popularly dubbed the "feudal party" and that 
his return to government was principally ascribed to his demonstrated talent 
in circumventing constitutional procedures to generate revenue.37 
In spite of Heydt's survival, the business class did find relief in the New 
Era for three leading reasons. First, moderate liberals in the New Era cabi­
net ended Heydt's ministerial dominance over economic policy. He had little 
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backing from either his colleagues or the Chamber of Deputies and stayed 
in office only at the king's request. Had Heydt been an English minister, re­
marked W. O. Henderson, he would have resigned (or have been dismissed) 
much earlier.38 Finance Minister Patow, a staunch opponent of Heydt's bu­
reaucratic abuses throughout the 1850s, became the leading voice in the cabi­
net for shaping economic legislation. Patow's philosophy of curtailing statist 
intervention in the economy better reflected the wishes of the business class 
and consequently the railroad business encountered less government interfer­
ence after 1858. 
Second, the return of liberal majorities in the Chamber of Deputies after 
1858 produced a new parliamentary attitude toward government-business re­
lations. The banker David Hansemann remarked: "Three years ago no one 
would have hardly proposed me as an elector, let alone have me as a deputy."39 
After 1858 the legislature moved away from a state-controlled economy to­
ward greater liberalization in a number of key industries. As already seen, the 
demise of the Railroad Fund in 1859 marked a signal reversal in the legis-
lature's accommodation to state policy. Whereas the chamber in 1853 had 
supported Heydt's scheme for railroad nationalization, it now advocated less 
government intervention in the economy's leading sector. The dissolution of 
the Railroad Fund was the first among several key economic bills that pro­
moted the material welfare of businessmen. 
Finally, high-ranking bureaucrats of the trade and finance ministries in 
the New Era were sympathetic to the needs of large-scale business. Among 
them were Rudolf Delbriick, M. Phillipsborn, Baron von der Reck, Eduard 
Moeller, Adolf von Pommer-Esche, Friedrich Kuhlwetter, Richard Hoene, 
and Otto Camphausen. With the assistance of their staffs, they drafted the key 
legislative bills on economic policy, largely anticipating the expectations of 
the business class. These men knew and socialized with business elites and 
were not only in better touch with the practical problems of commerce and 
industry but were also ready to change how the state regulated and promoted 
the economy.40 Since the 1830s, competing interests had eroded the Prussian 
state bureaucracy's once-uniform identity, replacing it with a more multisided 
character, whose numerous factions jostled for policy-making influence.41 It 
was only during the New Era that the cohort of liberal administrators rose 
up to bureaucratic levels that allowed them to influence economic policy. As 
minister-president, Bismarck resented this power. He believed that the ma­
jority of the finance ministry's technical advisers controlled the opinions of 
their ministers (Patow and Bodelschwingh) and sided with the opposition in 
the constitutional conflict. These men, Bismarck wrote, were capable of pas­
sive resistance and saw the political struggle as a "short episode in the liberal 
development of the government's bureaucratic machinery."42 
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In the period 1858-61 economic changes, long demanded by the business 
class, became law. The coal industry, for example, attained long-sought legis­
lation in 1860 and 1861. The state had initiated the process of restructuring 
the coal industry in 1851 with pathbreaking laws that reduced its excise tax on 
mining by half (from 10 to 5 percent) and replaced its paternalistic supervision 
of mine operations—the much criticized Direktionsprinzip—with one of peri­
odic inspection.43 But Ruhr, Westphalian, and Silesian coal mine owners still 
had many complaints; laws still supported guild privileges which restricted 
the free movement of coal miners between regions and mines; and the con­
tinued bureaucratic autonomy of the state's regional regulatory offices (Ber­
gdmter) remained. Regulators' old habits of intervention and supervision did 
not entirely cease. During the New Era, business interests criticized Heydt's 
failure to adhere consistently to the laws of 1851 and, above all, his unwilling­
ness to effect further reform.44 
After 1858 the government undertook further reforms: in 1860, a law 
secured freedom of mobility for miners, thus completing the liberalization of 
the industry; in 1861, the state further reduced excise taxes and abolished the 
coal mining offices' bureaucratic independence, whose remaining jurisdic­
tion over coal operations was transferred to the general state bureaucracy.45 
Mine owners could now mine coal and ore with their own methods and at 
their own tempo, hire and fire as they saw fit (thus inaugurating a new era 
in labor relations), and better coordinate hewing and hauling with transporta­
tion and forging. Freed from state tutelage and interference, mining and iron 
firms pursued unrestrained economic growth with greater vigor and began 
to consolidate their enterprises into the large concerns that would become a 
major economic and political force in the Kaiserreich. For the Silesian and 
Westphalian railway directors involved in the coal industry, the possibilities 
of vertical integration only fully emerged after 1861. 
Another landmark of the New Era's economic settlement was the Com­
mercial Code. Begun in 1857, drafted in 1859-60, and revised throughout 
1861, the code was finally published in 1862. The new legal framework for 
arising capitalist society received much praise from the business world not 
only because it demonstrated the state's commitment to promoting economic 
growth in northern and western Germany but also because the business class 
was consulted so thoroughly in revising it. Prussia's leading business asso­
ciations and chambers of commerce assessed the bill, offering copious emen­
dations46 At its 1859 annual meeting in Trieste the Association of German 
Railroad Administrations heard and debated the recommendations of the spe­
cial commission, whose report was submitted to the German Confederation's 
diet in Frankfurt.47 In 1860, Prussia's railway administrations submitted to the 
Prussian trade ministry their own position paper which critically detailed how 
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the code's "complete lack of expertise" in railroad tariffs and finance "could 
only harm commercial traffic." The report especially emphasized the dispro­
portionate amount of authority it assigned to state railroad commissioners 
over private railroad directors.48 The Prussian government, which played the 
leading role in drafting the code, incorporated such suggestions. The railroad 
clause of the code underwent three readings before a settlement could be 
reached between the interests of state and private railways.49 
Equally significant for commercial legislation was the Franco-Prussian 
Trade Treaty, signed at the end of the New Era in March 1862, which erected a 
framework for greater commercial expansion. Although controversial among 
businessmen in heavy industries (and those from Austria and the middle Ger­
man states), the free-trade treaty connected Prussia to the leading western 
economies and reinforced Prussia's economic leadership in Germany.50 When 
Otto Michaelis, the secretary of the Chamber of Deputies' trade committee, 
sought approval from the legislature for the bill, he argued: "The treaty is a 
compromise of protectionist interests with free-trade demands; it is the first 
step to the creation of fairness. For this reason one needs to judge openly and 
freely, so that the discussion of the fatherland's welfare can cease. . .  . the 
contradictions, the interests, and the principles of the provinces have found 
their reconciliation in the position of the treaty and its tariffs."51 The bill 
passed easily in both houses. Similar treaties followed in 1865 with Belgium, 
England, and Italy. 
These laws and treaties delimited the new space that the state was staking 
out for industrial and commercial enterprise,52 but the most impressive legis­
lative signal that the state was making room for bourgeois civil society was the 
property-tax reform of 1861. This tax law became one of the essential touch­
stones of parliamentary political conflict in the New Era, and yet, although 
a well-known fact, it is not a weighted factor in the literature.53 Since the in­
corporation of the western provinces into Prussia in 1815, Rhenish and West­
phalian businessmen had complained of the unjust tax burden on the western 
provinces. French occupation had eliminated all tax exemptions in the west, 
whereas in the east there existed over one hundred varieties of land tax and 
thirty-three forms of land tax systems—most of them to ensure tax exemption 
for the nobility.54 In 1858, 41 percent of Prussian land was exempt from taxa-
tion,55 compelling the Rhineland province to pay almost eight times as much 
land tax as the province of Prussia.56 
Ending property-tax exemption (Grundsteuerfreiheit) was a reform long 
advocated by Prussian liberals. The issue resonated among Rhenish liberals 
in the 1840s, was debated in the National Assembly in 1848, and became one 
of Hansemann's proposed reforms before the Auerswald-Hansemann cabinet 
was dismissed in the fall of 1848.57 Equitable taxation of property was fur­
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ther included in the Prussian constitutions of December 1848 (article 100) and 
January 1850 (article 101), though it was never enforced.58 In January 1850 and 
in November 1852 the government drafted bills to tax landed property in the 
east, but this attempt was defeated on the lower house floor in March 1853.59 
The property tax continued to be championed by liberal and business circles 
(Vincke, Kiihne, Harkort, Camphausen, and Hansemann, as well as chambers 
of commerce) throughout the 1850s. 
For this reason, a law barring exemptions on landed property was a lead­
ing issue in Wilhelm's interviews with candidates for finance minister during 
the formation of the New Era cabinet and became a central goal of Wilhelm's 
cabinet.60 For Otto Camphausen the reform of the property tax was so impor­
tant that in November 1858 he declined the king's offer of the post of finance 
minister so that Robert von Patow could take the portfolio. Patow's status as 
a "non-Rhinelander," Camphausen explained to his brother, could better per­
suade the upper house to accept the tax reform, and he should therefore—in 
spite of other shortcomings—fill the post.61 Camphausen's belief that Patow's 
rank as noble and Gutsbesitzer was essential to passing the law was probably 
correct, for the bill's passage through the legislature was a rough one.62 The 
lower house defeated the first presentation of the bill in March 1859 because it 
contained too many loopholes for nobles; the second bill was defeated by the 
upper house in 1860 because it contained too few. In 1861, however, a coali­
tion of the crown, cabinet, and the lower house's finance commission over­
came the opposition. The strong endorsement of King Wilhelm, who coveted 
the revenue the tax would provide for his army reform, overcame the fierce 
opposition in the upper house led by Graf Arnim-Boitzenberg, who in March 
and April successfully led two rejections of the property tax bill. Even with 
the strong pressure applied by the king himself, who used his birthday greet­
ing in 1861 to remind the upper house of its duty to pass the bill, the law only 
passed by a vote of 110 to 81.63 The crown's two-pronged parliamentary pro­
gram, which exhorted the chamber to prevail over the upper house for the 
property tax while employing the latter to overcome the chamber's opposition 
to army reform, would remain only partially fulfilled. 
The law of 1861 erased exemptions from the property tax in the six east­
ern provinces and taxed property uniformly and equally throughout Prussia. 
The real-estate tax more than doubled in fifty-five counties in the east; ninety 
in the west paid less.64 One of the oldest liberal grievances had come to an end. 
The revised tax structure laid the base for a new social contract; the inviolate 
privileges of nobility, stemming ostensibly from ancient fiefs and royal pre­
rogative, were dealt a severe ideological, political, and economic blow. And 
because the finance ministry directly appraised the land and supervised the 
tax's collection, the great estate holders were prevented from watering down 
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the reform through the county and communal governments, which the Prus­
sian nobility had virtually controlled since the Reform Era. Hence the noble 
class was further brought under the jurisdiction of a centralized, bureaucratic 
modern state—another tenet of mid-century liberalism. 
The property tax reform was, of course, a questionable move for politi­
cal liberalism. Liberal factions, so focused on using the state to strip Prussian 
nobles of their birthright, failed to understand that they, by granting the state 
a new source of steady revenue, were weakening their power of the purse in 
parliament.65 By making the annual budget less critical for the administration 
of the state, they diminished their power to influence state policy after 1861.66 
Once Wilhelm had gained the property tax for his army, he began to repair 
the divisions between crown and nobility to steer a course away from the lib-
erals—a course, to be sure, more true to his nature. Because four years were 
required to reappraise all landed property, the tax could not be levied until 
1865, at which time, ironically, its revenue helped Bismarck to continue gov­
erning without parliament's approval of the state budget (the constitutional 
conflict).67 
For many businessmen and political liberals in 1861, the law demonstrated 
the state's willingness to mediate between an old established elite and a newly 
emerging one. Otto Camphausen wrote to his brother Ludolf: "We can all be 
very satisfied with one another about the results of the legislative period. The 
number of important bills passed into law is quite considerable; above all the 
property tax reform. . . . Personally both of us can be very satisfied and con­
gratulated for our hard work."68 The legislative sessions from 1859 to 1861 had 
produced undramatic but solid, concrete gains for businessmen. The property 
tax reform, the commercial code, the liberalization of the coal industry, the re­
affirmation of private enterprise in railroads—all spoke of major victories fora 
social group that saw in commerce and industry the foundation of civil society. 
Special-Interest Politics 
The Camphausens' buoyant mood is perhaps justified by an examination of 
how enmeshed business interests had become in the Prussian political net­
work. Businessmen, business associations, and lobbies successfully peddled 
their interests publicly (Landtag), semi-publicly (ministerial channels), and 
privately (personal contacts). The history of economic lobbying in Prussia 
certainly did not begin in 1858. Small associations can be traced back to the 
early nineteenth century,69 but it was the railroad associations of the 1850s 
(discussed in chap. 3) that provided other industries with a model for both 
political lobbying and industrial organization. 
Citing the success of the railroad associations in the 1850s, directors 
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joint-stock companies founded the Central Association of Rhenish-West-
phalian Joint-Stock Companies in 1858 to lobby more effectively for the modi­
fication of commercial law and for the general interests of stockholders.70 
Friedrich Hammacher, one of principal organizers of the association, subse­
quently helped to start the Coal Mining Association, whose widespread gen­
eral support, he noted, was partially attributable to the "moral force" of the 
central association.71 In December 1858 the Trade and Commercial Associa­
tion for the Rhineland and Westphalia was founded to provide a better link be­
tween businessmen and the press, government, and chambers of commerce.72 
The era of commercial and industrial interest groups had arrived. 
The principal task of the Central Association of Rhenish-Westphalian 
Joint-Stock Companies in 1858 was to protest both a 2 percent tax on the net 
profit of joint-stock companies in 1857 and the accompanying state supervi­
sion of internal business affairs that this tax demanded.73 In 1861 the Landtag 
rescinded the tax, and the association disbanded with its chief mission accom-
plished.74 The Coal Mining Association achieved similar success with efforts 
to stimulate the eastward shipment of Ruhr coal. "The agitation for the re­
duction of coal tariffs seems to have had good success," wrote Hammacher 
in 1858.75 More impressively, the association not only contributed to the pas­
sage of the coal mining laws of 1860/61, but it also attained from the state the 
provision that all future government ordinances on security and supervision 
of mines must first receive the approval of the association.76 In this instance, 
the special-interest group had become an advisory organ of the government. 
By 1861 business associations in Prussia numbered more than one hundred, 
an indicator of their success in affecting the legislative process.77 Economic 
associations became an important component of Prussian politics during the 
New Era. 
The protocols of the state cabinet during the New Era reveal that the 
criticisms and recommendations of chambers of commerce were reviewed at 
the highest level of government. Businessmen's positions on postal reform, 
the stamp tax, banking laws, and railroad freight were weighed at the highest 
level. Even the demand by business circles that a professorial chair for com­
mercial law be established at a Prussian university was given serious consider­
ation by the cabinet.78 The Berlin Trade Corporation thanked the government 
in 1859 for its "liberality" by heeding the association's advice in reforming the 
insurance industry after ignoring "so many earlier annual reports."79 When 
ascribing causes to the abolition of the Customs Union's transshipment tariffs 
in 1860, the National-Zeitung cited the participation of chambers of commerce 
in the public agitation for change as decisive.80 The chambers acted once again 
as both lobbies and advisory organs to the government, roles that Heydt had 
often denied them in the 1850s. 
In 1860 the government acquiesced in the request of chambers of com­
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merce and business associations to convene collectively (Handelstag) to dis­
cuss amendments to the Commercial Code and the Customs Union's tariff 
system. Certainly the presence of David Hansemann and Hermann Beckerath 
as presidents of the government-authorized Handelstag in 1861-62 was sig­
nificant. Both had been active critics of the government during the 1850s.81 
"It had taken battles, many battles, before the enterprise [Handelstag] came 
into being," trumpeted the National-Zeitung. "But the promising idea of a 
convention of the monarchy's entrepreneurial classes has won, and it is the 
first step toward this common enterprise, which is not merely [a recognition] 
for those directly participating but also highly advantageous for the advance­
ment of our economic conditions."82 The Prussian Handelstage of 1859 and 
1860 were followed the next year by the Deutscher Handelstag held in Heidel­
berg, a national forum for commercial and industrial interests that lent further 
strength to the growing unification movement.83 
In the 1860s chambers of commerce and other business associations exer­
cised additional influence on bills affecting the economy. When the Landtag 
deputy Heinrich Kruse, a Rhenish journalist connected with business circles, 
sought to prevent passage of a bill in 1863 that would grant the state a mo­
nopoly on telegraphic communication, he appealed to Mevissen to mobilize 
chambers against the move. "It would be of assistance, when petitions from 
chambers of commerce could be quickly assembled and presented to the presi­
dent of the lower house (within eight days) to either oppose the drafts of the 
government and the commission or, more generally, appeal/or more moderate 
legal guarantees to benefit private telegraph companies."84 This connection 
between the legislature and an extraparliamentary association of businessmen 
enabled Kruse to sink the bill. 
The legislature's responsive behavior toward specific interests suggests 
greater public access to policy making. F. Diergardt, the Rhenish entrepreneur 
who sat in the upper house, complained in 1860 that requests and petitions 
from his province kept him working "deep into the night." What troubled 
him was not his toil but the petitioners' belief "that one can execute affairs 
around here as if we were on the Rhine—that is, discuss the matter over a 
bottle of wine and settle the issue."85 Business elites possessed privileged 
contacts with both parliamentary lawmakers and government policy makers. 
Gustav Mevissen used his fellow Rhenish businessman Diergardt as his proxy 
in the legislature. During the parliamentary deliberations on the army bill in 
1860, he easily made his views known to key actors, although he was nowhere 
near Berlin. "I have done as you said," wrote Diergardt to Mevissen, "and 
gave copies of the political content of your letter to the diligent president of 
the military commission, Herr von Vincke, as well as to the president of the 
Chamber of Deputies, Herr von Simson, and discussed the same with Profes­
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sor Duncker, a member of the house."86 In matters of business, Mevissen's 
Berlin contacts also garnered important information for his railroad company 
from trade ministry officials regarding sensitive procedural matters for pro­
curing charters, loans, and company mergers.87 The presence of businessmen 
in Berlin's political circles was certainly not new, but the increased will­
ingness of politicians and government officials to respond to their concerns 
after 1858 visibly increased. Moreover, businessmen's ability to influence the 
political process through lobbies, personal contacts, and bureaucratic chan­
nels strengthened their inclination not to seek positions in the lower house. 
Wealthy businessmen sought entry to the ruling classes of the Prussian estab­
lishment but not necessarily to the political class of lawmakers. 
After 1858, the Prussian state accorded more official respect to business 
elites than before, signaling a willingness, albeit reluctant, to assimilate them 
into the establishment. In 1860 Friedrich Diergardt and Ludolf Camphausen 
were called into the upper house; Mevissen followed in 1865. Diergardt in­
terpreted the honor, which was accompanied by the entailment of his estate, 
as a "welcome sign that in Prussia closed castes no longer exist."88 By 1861, 
over 130 businessmen in the county of Dusseldorf had been given honorific 
titles (mostly Kommerzienrat) by the court.89 Although certainly ancillary to 
the priorities of business politics, the assimilation of commercial elites into 
political, bureaucratic, and court circles speaks persuasively of an embour­
geoisement of the Prussian establishment. 
Railroads and Politics 
In the New Era the railroad industry also registered positive advances for 
entrepreneurs. The Rhenish Railway, for example, experienced immediate re­
lief from the new ministries. Throughout 1858 it had sought permission to 
issue a new five million thaler bond (4.5 percent interest), but Heydt re­
peatedly denied the company's request. The directors refused to accept the 
minister's rejections, in which they recognized a "form of paternalism being 
practiced."90 Permission was finally granted, however, in December 1858—a 
month after the political shift to the New Era—without explanation for the re­
versal, suggesting that Heydt's heavy administrative hand was less tolerated in 
the new cabinet.91 In 1860 the government also permitted the Rhenish Railway 
to absorb the Cologne-Crefeld Railway. The Rhenish Railway had attempted 
to absorb the smaller company in 1855 and 1857 but was denied because of 
the restrictive demands of the state, which administered the private railway. 
In 1859, however, the government dropped the charter's more onerous obli­
gations (among them, building a branch line between Heerat and Neuss) and 
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enabled the Rhenish Railway to acquire this important line connecting the 
middle and lower Rhine commercial centers. The company advanced toward 
its long-term goal of establishing an unrivaled network on the left bank of 
the Rhine.92 
The company gained the upper hand in its affairs with the government. 
It repeatedly rebuffed the government's attempts to compel the company 
to adhere to deadlines to begin construction on two branch lines (Dtiren-
Schleiden and Herbesthal-Eupen), provoking the trade ministry's undersecre­
tary to comment, "The directors of the Rhenish Railway appear to assume it is 
merely up to them when and if the branchline between Herbesthal and Eupen 
should be built and, moreover, that it is solely their financial interest that de­
cides the matter."93 The trade ministry nonetheless cooperated with the com­
pany in its project to extend its lines to Nassau and erect a bridge in Coblenz, 
volunteering to abide by its dividend guarantee in the event of delayed con­
struction and promising to defend the company's cause in the Landtag.94 The 
ability of the Upper Silesian and Cologne-Minden railways to modify or re­
pudiate contractual promises to the state also suggested that directors and in­
vestors of joint-stock companies found themselves on better footing with the 
trade ministry.95 Overall, one sees a gradual shift back to the earlier mixed 
system, with private business reasserting its leadership but gladly accepting 
the supplemental support of the state. 
The business politics of railroad companies were further aided by the 
Prussian Landtag, which continued its trend of upholding the principle of pri­
vate enterprise. In September 1859, following the abolition of the Railroad 
Fund, the legislature comprehensively reviewed the impact of Heydt's inter­
ventionist policies for the growth of Prussia's railroad industry. It questioned 
the ratio of growth to state investment, noting that while 113 million thalers 
of state investments produced 1,946 kilometers of rail in 1844-50, 56 million 
thalers had produced merely 548 kilometers in 1850-57. More crucially it 
stated that one could consider the entrepreneurial spirit in Prussian railways to 
be "fully oppressed." In paraphrasing the debate, a Berlin daily wrote, "No­
body wishes to place money in operations whose profitability shrinks when 
it no longer rests on the natural conditions and objective development of traf­
fic but, rather, on this element of administrative regulation that one has tried 
in vain to put on a lawful basis numerous times."96 If Prussia was going to 
sustain its necessary rate of expansion, it needed to return to a more rigorous 
basis of legality. With arguments of arbitrary regulation and unhealthy inter­
vention, the legislature fiercely opposed Heydt on his newly proposed freight 
rates on state railroads and further criticized the state's unprofitable involve­
ment in the Rhein-Nahe Railway, which needed an additional unforeseen six 
million thaler bond to resume construction.97 
The Juste Milieu, 1857-1870 • 151 
In 1860 and 1862, Leonor Reichenheim introduced motions to reform the 
Railroad Law of 1838, proposing the revision of fifteen paragraphs. The re­
form took aim at the trade minister's overly large scope of power, because 
his function as impartial supervisor of the financial affairs of private railroads 
(loans, reserve funds, fixing of dividends, etc.) was incompatible with his 
other role as administrator of state rails, which competed with private rails. 
The reform also sought to limit the demands the state could enforce on rail­
roads. Using the night trains incident of the early 1850s and the more recent 
demand that the Rhenish Railway build the unprofitable Duren-Schleiden line 
as examples of excessive state inference, Reichenheim called for greater limi­
tation of state authority.98 Although the proposal initially received the support 
of all liberal factions and spurred a public debate critical of Heydt's railroad 
policies, it fell from the agenda." 
Reichenheim's oratory was not completely in vain. He sat on the com­
mittee for trade and commerce that in 1862 rejected the proposed charter for 
a state railroad between Kohlfurt and Waldenburg. The committee cited the 
state's past "unhealthy" railroad policy, especially its unfair pressures against 
private companies, as the reason for the rejection.100 A month later the same 
committee ruled in favor of petitioners who requested full access to the books 
of the Rhein-Nahe Railway, which had been a perennial loser since the state 
took over its administration in 1856. The petitioners challenged both the com­
petency of the Railroad Commission and Heydt's right to forbid any inspec­
tion of state administration.101 Heydt's autocratic tendencies during the Re­
action were no longer tolerated in the New Era. 
A parliamentary commission also reviewed the petition of a Silesian busi­
nessman who in 1862 asserted that the government had mismanaged the af­
fairs of the Upper Silesian Railway, whose profits had steadily declined since 
the government's administrative takeover in 1857, as well as those of the prov­
ince for not building a line on the right bank of the Oder River.102 The petition 
grew out of a movement of company shareholders, who had striven since 1859 
to put the company back in private administration.103 The commission upheld 
the claim, submitting a stinging indictment of governmental mismanagement. 
It charged the government with fixing artificially high freight rates, which "a 
private administration never would have permitted," and attributed the neglect 
of the province's canals and overall infrastructure to the government's interest 
in protecting the revenues of the state-owned Lower Silesian-Mark railway.104 
Although the trade ministry defended its overall record publicly, intra-
ministerial memoranda show that the ministry recognized its own shoddiness. 
For example, in 1861 Albert Maybach, a ministry official and future minister 
of railroad affairs, harshly criticized the "deficient operational competency" 
of the government officials managing the Saarbriicken and Rhein-Nahe rail­
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ways, which had cost the government millions in dividend subsidies. Portray­
ing them as inefficient, irresponsible, unqualified, dilatory, and technically 
limited, Maybach recommended transfers for all (save the chief director) and 
reorganization of the entire office.105 
By 1862 the business cycle had completely recovered from the downturn 
in 1857-59, showing signs of strength in both production and trade. Signifi­
cantly, free trade and the growth of the private railroad system prospered 
during the years of the constitutional conflict, the parliamentary struggle that 
began over a military reform bill but became a constitutional issue when Bis­
marck began to govern without a budget approved by the Chamber of Depu­
ties. Count Heinrich von Itzenplitz replaced Heydt as trade minister in Sep­
tember 1862. Unlike Heydt, the new minister had little interest in retaining 
the state railway system and supervised economic activity with a lighter hand. 
During his tenure as district governor in the coal-mining region of Arnsberg 
in the 1840s, Itzenplitz had acquainted himself with businessmen and come 
to respect their efficiency and pragmatism. With regard to business politics, 
Itzenplitz effected a seamless transition between the juste milieu of the New 
Era and the constitutional conflict. 
Businessmen were, of course, acutely aware of Bismarck's reactionary 
reputation and his hard-line defense of royal prerogative, but the key question 
for many of Prussia's capitalists was whether or not Bismarck's cabinet would 
roll back the economic policies of the New Era. When Itzenplitz reaffirmed 
Patow's noninterventionist policies, it appeared that the decade-long struggle 
to accommodate capital and political authority had borne fruit; the conser­
vative political establishment had recognized the needs of the new elites of 
commerce and industry and would not touch the reforms. It is nonetheless 
evident that alongside spheres of cooperation there remained spheres of con­
flict. Ambivalence, as we have seen, is the operative word for businessmen's 
relationship to the Prussian state from the Vormdrz period through the 1870s. 
Itzenplitz's alacrity to reduce the role of government in the economy 
eased the strained relationship between the trade ministry and railroad com­
panies that had developed under Heydt. His inclination to charter new private 
railroads and authorize the expansion of established companies prompted Bis­
marck to dub him a "signature machine."106 In his memoirs Bismarck judged 
him to be a weak leader who lacked the "necessary energy" to run a complex 
ministry. Unable to master the technical details of railroad legislation, admin­
istration, and regulation, Itzenplitz effectively surrendered ministry policy to 
such subordinates as Rudolf Delbruck,107 who favored a private railroad in­
dustry. Indeed, the governmental ministries offered fewer obstacles to build­
ing and administering lines than ever before, and parliament enthusiastically 
backed private ownership. The financial world's good will toward private rail­
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roads also increased in direct proportion to rising dividends. Public confidence 
in private enterprise grew; many new lines were proposed and constructed 
without government support.108 
In this era, private companies completed the major trunk lines and began 
the development of branch lines. The year 1862 surpassed 1857 as the most 
profitable railroad year, with increases in passenger conveyance (1.1 percent), 
freight transport (14.5 percent), gross income per mile (63,271 thalers versus 
61,839 in 1857), and ratio of profit to invested capital (7.27 percent versus 
3.76 percent in 1857).109 After 1862, stock market quotations swelled,110 draw­
ing even more investors and businessmen (many of them English)in into the 
Prussian railroad world. Private railroad companies were in their heyday. 
In piecemeal fashion, the state reduced its direct role in the railroad busi­
ness. Between 1860 and 1863 the state relinquished administrative control 
of Cologne-Crefeld, the Aachen-Dusseldorfer, and the Ruhrort-Crefeld-Kreis 
Gladbach railways, lowering the percentage of private rail under state admin­
istration from 41 percent in 1857 to 32 percent in 1866.112 The trade ministry 
continued the completion of its earlier projects but granted charters to pri­
vatefirms to build and operate lines within the state rail network in the east­
ern provinces (the Tilsit-Insterburger and the Ostpreussische Sudbahn). These 
charters announced tacitly the state's capitulation to private railroad construc­
tion. Itzenplitz's statement, "I don't care who builds the railroads—as long as 
they are built," reflected the new pragmatic attitude in the trade ministry.113 
Whereas private rail swelled from 2,960 to 4,280.7 kilometers between 1858 
and 1863, the state's portion of the industry rose modestly in the same period 
from 1,265 to 1,580.6 kilometers.114 This development, which amounted to a 
new policy, canceled Heydt's vision of a state network and promoted consoli­
dation of larger railways. 
In the years 1858-66 the rising advocacy of private capitalist enterprise 
dovetailed with the growing issue of national unification. The founding of the 
Kongress deutscher Volkswirthe in 1857 tokened a "growing awareness of eco­
nomic problems and a widespread desire among liberals to give their search 
for freedom in Germany a more practical orientation."115 Railroads were, of 
course, topics at the economic congresses. Unanimity did not exist on the 
question of how railroads could best facilitate a single German market and 
whether private ownership was the best course. Nonetheless, the principles 
of self-administration, free association, and free competition in business pre-
vailed.116 Financiers championed private railways, for they were more profit­
able than state administered lines, as did industrialists, who thought it better 
to sell their goods to many clients instead of one.117 Friedrich Hammacher ex­
pressed a commonplace sentiment in 1863, when he stated at a meeting of 
German chambers of commerce that "placing the railroads in the hands of the 
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state governments . . . means nothing other than practicing communism . .  . 
and paralyzing the railroads in the fulfillment of their industrial mission for 
the common good."118 
But the advocacy of private railroads among business circles was not 
completely uncritical. Whereas private companies had earlier charged the 
government with unfair business practice, chambers of commerce and indus­
trial businesses now criticized private railroads for exploiting their consoli­
dated networks and better organized associations to fix unfair freight rates.119 
Laissez-faire advocates further argued that Prussia's railroad system should 
be thoroughly overhauled; it was "unnatural" that railroad companies should 
enjoy monopolistic charters, dividend guarantees, sole use of rails, and other 
arbitrary practices that produced higher prices.120 In 1863 Rhenish and West­
phalian chambers of commerce and business associations protested exten­
sively against the Rhenish Railway's bid to absorb the Aachen-Diisseldorfer 
and Ruhrort-Crefeld-Kreis Gladbach railways, fearing the Rhenish Railway's 
exclusive control of the left bank of the Rhine. Itzenplitz was inclined to per­
mit the merger but yielded to regional protests.121 
In this instance, the laissez-faire principle of fair competition prevailed. 
But, although much ink was spilled in the cause of Manchester laissez-faire 
policies, the practice of businessmen showed little purist devotion to the doc­
trine. For this reason the editors of the National-Zeitung, a decidedly laissez­
faire liberal daily, criticized the lack of political independence among busi­
ness elites, who, when it suited their interests, were all too willing to work 
within bureaucratic agencies. "For every petition that demands free and inde­
pendent movement of trade and commerce, there are ten requesting support 
in one form or another; for every one that is braced with the consciousness 
of autonomy and its own power, there are ten appealing to dependency on 
the zealous, good will of the state powers."122 In this editorial the National-
Zeitung summed up the fundamental ambivalence that characterized the eco­
nomic and political stance of the Prussian business class in the 1860s. On the 
one hand, this increasingly self-confident interest group supported the lib­
eral economic agenda of laissez-faire, which called for ever more freedom 
from state direction of economic life. On the other hand, it could not bring 
itself to abandon fully, perhaps prematurely, the benefits and privileges that 
stemmed from the state's long-established role as the promoter and director of 
economic growth. There were benefits in both directions, and Prussian busi­
nessmen wanted to have it both ways—both the new and the old, the way of 
the future and the way of the past. 
Itzenplitz's policy of relaxing regulation did create room for abuse, illegal 
profit, and schemes for stock market killings. The most prominent exploiter 
of the trade ministry's leniency in these years was the "railroad king" Be­
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thel Henry Strousberg, who amassed millions through his "general contract" 
procedure in the 1860s. His shady business operations, mistreatment of stock­
holders, and many contacts in the Prussian government occasioned a scathing 
Reichstag speech by Eduard Lasker, which led to a public scandal and brought 
about Itzenplitz's resignation in 1873.123 
Businessmen and Constitutional Politics 
The dovetailing of the business cycle's upswing in 1862 with the mounting 
conflict between parliament and crown posed a potential dilemma for the rail­
road industry: would the Landtag use its right as cosignatory for all railway-
building charters as a political weapon in its confrontation with the crown? 
Dividend subsidies to railroad investors were part of the budget, so railroad 
finance could be employed to obstruct government policy. In the early phase 
of the conflict, however, the chamber budget committee avoided bringing 
such areas offinance into the debate about a 25 percent increase in taxation to 
cover the planned expansion in the army. Bills on state aid for railways pitted 
liberal principle against local self-interest and would serve Bismarck's aim 
of dividing the opposition.124 Hence most spheres of railroad policy were left 
alone, which enabled railroad companies to receive twenty-four major char­
ters involving trunk and branch lines in this period.125 In the years 1863-66, 
the government distributed 4,885,662 thalers in subsidies to railroad compa-
nies.126 Some charters came with immediate subventions from the budgetless 
government: in June 1863 the Landtag approved a 200,000 thaler subvention 
for Berg-Mark Railway's branch line between Rittershausen and Lennep.127 
In December 1864 the chamber did modify the language of a Rhenish Rail­
way charter to emphasize more fully the chamber's power of coauthorization 
(which the cabinet accepted) but did not challenge the 4 percent dividend 
guarantee that accompanied it.128 Up until 1865 the Landtag's liberal factions 
avoided linking business politics directly with parliamentary politics. And 
railroad directors clearly had not objected to receiving charters and moneys 
for their companies from a budgetless government in conflict with parliament 
over the power of the purse. 
In mid-1865, however, the Landtag's liberal majority did turn to its bud­
getary power and elements of railroad finance to press the government for 
concessions. The time for a shift in tactics, wrote Ludolf Camphausen in June 
1865, appeared propitious: "By the end [of the legislative session] the relation­
ship has changed. In five months the government has had no foreign-political 
success; it has made no forward movement, even regressed, and the govern­
ment must build internal strength through approbative declarations from the 
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lowly regarded deputies, who refuse to do so. The deputies have used this pre­
dicament to gleefully reject railroad projects."129 The factions that made up 
the liberal opposition to Bismarck's government, however, were initially di­
vided on how to use railroads as a political weapon. In March 1865, when a 
railroad bill was put before the chamber, the commission reviewing it (headed 
by Otto Michaelis) recommended postponing the vote until the budget had 
been legally established. The recommendation was voted down 178 to 108, 
with members of the Progressive Party defecting. Instead, the chamber passed 
the alternative motion that the government should sell its railroad stock, which 
had accumulated in the years of the Railroad Fund, to cover the costs of pro­
posed construction.130 By rejecting the loan, the chamber retained its stance 
of principled opposition yet did not undercut the future prosperity of the rail­
road market. With this maneuver house members upheld constitutional right 
without injuring economic self-interest. 
In 1865 the Landtag rejected the government's bid to tax foreign railroad 
companies using Prussian rails.131 It further blocked the government's attempt 
to sell its Westphalian line to the Berg-Mark Railway in 1865 for fourteen mil­
lion thalers. But the chamber had been unable to prevent an earlier deal closed 
between the railroad and the government. In 1863-64, when the government 
surrendered administrative control of the Aachen-Diisseldorfer and Ruhrort-
Crefeld-Kries Gladbacher railways to the Berg-Mark Railway (another pri­
vate railway administered by the state), it exercised its option to purchase all 
privately held shares in the two railways. The Berg-Mark Railway bought the 
options in May 1864 but paid the actual sum (1,247,000 thalers with common 
stock) much later, in January 1866.132 
The chamber was also unsuccessful in thwarting the government's sale 
of its options on shares of the Cologne-Minden Railway in August 1865. By 
selling its stake in the company, the government stood to gain nearly thirty 
million thalers with which to finance a possible war against Austria.133 This 
incident, in conjunction with the Berg-Mark deal, caused considerable debate 
in the chamber's liberal factions, raising the question of what thefinance and 
trade ministries would do with the vast portfolio of railroad stock acquired 
over twenty-five years.134 
The initiative for the transaction came not from the government but from 
the railroad company. In December 1862 Gerson Bleichroder, the railway's 
financial agent in Berlin, prepared a deal that proposed a purchase price often 
million thalers for the government's options on the Cologne-Minden Railway. 
Bleichroder noted to Bismarck that "the leading idea of the enclosed proposal 
is to serve the fatherland," but the trade ministry believed that his patriotic 
efforts undercut the worth of the government's share in the railroad by nearly 
ten million thalers.135 The deal was refused. 
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The matter remained dormant until negotiations were once again resumed 
in thefirst half of 1865. Dagobert Oppenheim, a director of the railway, nego­
tiated for the company and packaged a larger deal in May. The new deal 
offered a ten million thaler indemnity for the surrender of the government 
options amassed under the Railroad Fund; the government's release from re­
taining company stock acquired under the Guarantee Fund of 1854, whose 
liquidation value was reckoned between seven and ten million thalers; and 
the conversion of the government's remaining financial commitments into 
common stock, which the state was entitled to sell.136 The company directors 
boldly planned a split in the common stock to create the necessary paper for 
the transaction. The deal enabled the government, if it exercised all elements 
of the plan, to realize the sum of 28,828,500 thalers.137 Three weeks later, 
Oppenheim sewed on coattails, requesting a number of charters for branch 
lines that would guarantee the company's dominance in Westphalia's emerg­
ing coal and iron industrial complex.138 
The government contested only the company's ten million thaler amor­
tization offer for its options, claiming the figure was much too low. Officials 
in the finance ministry fixed the sum at 14,903,632 thalers, but the govern­
ment settled on a compromise of 13 million, which the company accepted.139 
On 18 July 1865, the two parties signed a provisional contract, whose final 
form was notarized on 10 August. The agreement became binding upon the 
approval of the company shareholders (28 August) and the crown (13 Septem-
ber).140 On three occasions in 1865 officials in the finance ministry demon­
strated the illegality of signing a deal that involved equities of the Guarantee 
Fund without the legislature's approval, but these legal considerations were 
overlooked.141 
The deal benefited both parties. For the government, the immediate re­
ceipt of millions was the driving logic of the deal: the trade minister know­
ingly accepted a low price in order to obtain the funds for mobilization in the 
event of war with Austria.142 The company paid 3 million in hard currency 
in October and another 2.7 million in January 1866.143 Without these cash in­
fusions Bismarck could not have pulled the trigger in 1866. In addition to 
Cologne-Minden's partial cash payment of 5.7 million thalers, the liquidation 
of other railroad stock in 1866 contributed to the war chest. The sale of Berg-
Mark (1 million), Upper-Silesian (500,000), and Cologne-Minden stock (2.2 
million) in 1866 helped cover the costs of the Austro-Prussian War.144 
For the Cologne-Minden railway, the purchase was nothing less than sal­
vation, for the acquisition of the options nullified the government's right to 
buy out the railroad. According to the contract of the 1842 Railroad Fund, 
to which the Cologne-Minden was bound, the government retained the right 
to purchase the company after thirty years; the Guarantee Fund of 1854 also 
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stipulated state ownership of certain lines after fifteen years. Facing immi­
nent absorption into the state rail system in the 1870s, the private company 
negotiated with the government on several occasions after 1858 to abrogate 
the state's claim to ownership and did not hesitate to exploit the government's 
need for money after 1862.145 Although doubling the common stock produced 
consternation among shareholders (for fear of value loss), the directors argued 
at the extraordinary stockholder's meeting convened to vote on this change 
that dividends after the split would fall from 15 to 9 percent, a drop that repre­
sented gain for the 1:2 conversion.146 The shareholders approved. 
The willingness of railroad directors to conduct million-thaler trans­
actions with the government had a direct bearing on the ongoing constitu­
tional crisis, since it suggested the readiness of business interests to allow the 
government to continue operating illegally (by acquiring funds through extra-
parliamentary means) as long as such tactics served the economic interests of 
private business. For Heinrich von Wittgenstein, the president of the Cologne-
Minden Railway, as well as the company's directors, the release from eventual 
state ownership appeared more important than constitutional principles.147 
The incident is important because it typifies the behavior of Prussia's 
industrial, financial, and commercial elites. In 1864, following the Prussian-
Austrian victory over Denmark, Adolf Hansemann, G. Bleichroder, G. Mevis­
sen, Alexis Meyer, and a long list of notables (headed by Heydt) initiated 
proceedings with the Prussian government to organize a joint-stock company 
to build a Baltic-North Sea canal, an enterprise promising great profit.148 In 
the same year Alfred Krupp offered the Prussian government a long-term 
credit for armament deliveries amounting to two million thalers.149 In Au­
gust 1865, following the Cologne-Minden sale, the directors of the Rhenish 
Railway entered into negotiation with the government to purchase the state-
owned Luxemburger Railway; they further offered to buy the state-owned 
Saarbriickener Railway in 1866.150 In 1863 and in 1866, Colognefinanciers ap­
proached the government with the offer to convert state coal mines into joint-
stock companies.151 It is clear that the business politics of entrepreneurs did 
not play a supporting role for the parliamentary opposition. Their eagerness to 
buy the state's capital assets, receive government subventions, and cooperate 
with the government in matters of pragmatic business to pursue consolidation 
and expansion strongly suggests that the politics of business were more para­
mount than questions of constitutionalism. 
It would certainly be wrong to exclude all entrepreneurs from the politi­
cal struggle in the years 1862-66—a clean, conscious break is not there. 
Businessmen, according to E. N. Anderson, served widely on election com­
mittees and "devoted many hours of service to secure the election of liberals 
from their districts."152 Of the 448 electors chosen in Cologne in the 1861 
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November election, 181 (40 percent) were businessmen, which rose to 222 in 
1862.153 Hartmut Kaelble's study of Berlin Wahlmdnner in 1862 shows that 89 
percent of businessmen voted for the Progressive Party.154 Of the 231 names 
that accompanied the printed election program of the Berlin chapter of the 
Constitutional Party (old liberals) in November 1861 —backed prominently by 
David Hansemann—41 identified themselves as businessmen.155 And, to be 
sure, some businessmen directly engaged in political activity: Friedrich Ham­
macher, Hans Viktor von Unruh, and Hermann Beckerath were prominent in 
the Progressive Party's right-wing faction in the struggle against Bismarck. 
Most financial and business elites, however, were even more moderate in their 
views and leaned toward the old liberals, whose political outlook demanded 
that the constitution and the interests of the Handelsstand be recognized but 
rejected a direct confrontation with the crown. 
The rift between moderates and the left-wing Progressives was evident 
by 1860. The old-liberal stance of loyal opposition had little in common 
with the principled constitutionalism and confrontational style of such emerg­
ing popular leaders as Benedikt Waldeck and Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch. 
In 1860 Hermann Beckerath publicly criticized Waldeck as a "political nul­
lity," whose name was "connected with revolution, blood, and civil war" and 
who was one lawyer among too many jurists in parliament. Similarly, Graf 
Schwerin, a New Era minister, declared to his constituency in 1860 that he 
would resign as chamber deputy if Schulze-Delitzsch were elected in the same 
district, announcing his incompatibility with Schulze-Delitzsch's democratic 
views.156 The central difference between old liberals and Progressives was 
the former's willingness to accommodate liberal reforms within the royalist-
bureaucratic traditions of the Prussian state. Ludolf Camphausen, writing in 
1859, succinctly captured the ambivalent posture of the old liberals, whose 
deference toward state power precluded genuine parliamentary governance: 
"In domestic affairs much has happened and we are entitled to expect more, if 
the deputies succeed in convincing the prince that they are very good, right-
minded, and also rather obedient but nonetheless people whose will, even to 
the crown, has meaning."157 Old liberals such as Camphausen sought greater 
political recognition and social esteem for the bourgeoisie but ultimately be­
lieved that constitutional development should only be aligned with monarchi­
cal prerogative and state interest. Such a view precluded a decisive break with 
Prussia's brand of mixed-powers government, for it was unwilling to advo­
cate either popular sovereignty or firm, parliamentary procedures that would 
enable the legislature to check arbitrary actions of the executive.158 
Regardless of political stripe, few businessmen stood as Landtag candi­
dates during the New Era, and even fewer lent their economic clout to the lib­
eral cause after 1862.159 Liberal newspapers lamented the lack of experienced 
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businessmen in the Landtag: "Although the people vote in its interest... and 
although the class division in the electoral system apportions the great powers 
of trade and industry a privileged influence, it is nonetheless evident that 
few representatives of these elites have entered the lower house."160 Indeed, 
D. Hansemann declined the nomination to stand as a candidate in Berlin, but 
he urged Mevissen (in vain) to do so, noting that "it would be very unjust, if 
Cologne did not send a businessman or industrialist to the Landtag."161 Fried­
rich Diergardt also disapproved of the "passive behavior" of "independent 
industrialists" who chose to use the new business associations rather than 
bring their expertise to the Landtag.162 
During the constitutional crisis, the elites of the business class further re­
frained from active engagement in oppositional politics. When reporting to 
his brother about a political gathering of Cologne's liberals and democrats in 
October 1862, Ludolf Camphausen noted that the "estate of wealthy business­
men was completely missing," adding that their absence "is attributed pri­
marily to indifference; that they also show a new direction is clear in itself."163 
The accuracy of Camphausen's remark is borne out by businessmen's subse­
quent public displays of solidarity with the government, such as the Rhenish 
Railway's lavish banquet in November 1862 to celebrate the laying of the 
cornerstone of its Coblenz bridge. Attended by the queen and high-ranking 
government officials along with the company's principal investors and the re-
gion's economic notables, the banquet's convivial atmosphere was in sharp 
contrast to the open break between the chamber and crown that began in Sep-
tember.164 Mevissen's banquet peroration, "Such jointly created enterprises of 
peace form the tight knit that inextricably ties together nation and monarchy," 
was not just harmless, ceremonial phrasemaking; it also signaled support for 
the crown.165 In 1865, the company's political stance was explicitly articulated 
when a director issued an advisory that admonished company workers not 
to vote for Progressive Party candidates "like Classen-Kappelman and Horst, 
who stand in constant opposition to the government."166 
The swan song of elite businessmen's political engagement during the 
constitutional conflict was the petition of 6 January 1863 and its accompany­
ing meeting, which was held in a Cologne hotel and hosted by Joseph Burgers, 
Heinrich Claessen, and Dagobert Oppenheim.167 Drafted by Hermann Beck­
erath and signed by one hundred Rhenish and Westphalian notables, who re­
portedly represented over 300 hundred million thalers in capital assets,168 the 
petition was strategically submitted to the king on the eve of the new legisla­
tive session to "warn, remind, and maintain [to the king] that an understand­
ing with the present chamber is possible."169 Its text viewed the government's 
course as illegal: "The basis of a constitutional monarchy is the law, and 
when the state government does not operate its finances on the basis of a con­
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stitutionally confirmed budget, the law is broken." The petition underscored 
the people's loyalty to the crown, their recognition of the king's power, and 
the monarch's "wise views" on reforming the army. Although conciliatory in 
tone, the petition concluded by requesting that the crown consider the "re­
duction in service time that is generally desired" and the implementation of 
army reforms within the limitations set by Prussia's "economic conditions and 
financial capacity."170 It thus asked the crown to abide by the present norm of 
a two-year service period and relinquish its demand of enforcing the legally 
permissible three-year service period, which would require higher taxation 
and larger appropriations. 
The exhortation to the king to seek a compromise with the parliament 
evoked the voice of muted, moderate opposition. It pointed up the ambiva­
lence of industrial wealth in Prussia, which saw no reason to jeopardize the 
prosperous reign of Wilhelm, yet yearned for the court and state to recog­
nize the supremacy of law. Typical for the business class, the petition stressed 
the financial burdens of three-year service rather than the political objec­
tion of left-wing Progressives regarding the ramifications of extended military 
service for a liberal civil society. Although Beckerath, Diergardt, and Abra­
ham and Dagobert Oppenheim signed the petition, doubts about the wisdom 
of public agitation arose. Camphausen, for example, declined the invitation 
to sign the petition and refused to attend the conference.171 Diergardt wor­
ried about the petition's reception in court circles and conferred with Mevis­
sen and Heydt about placing a "correct commentary" on the petition in the 
Spener'sche Zeitung to redress any misperceptions about the intentions of the 
Handelsstand.172 Mevissen, too, criticized the spirit of the petition, which im­
plicitly supported the parliamentary opposition. At the meeting he recognized 
that Bismarck's ministry had broken constitutional law, but he argued that the 
parliament's obstructions were also unlawful, being "injurious to the welfare 
of the state."173 This argument, which posited that political opposition under­
mining material prosperity was unjustifiable, was not solely Mevissen's. The 
annual reports of chambers of commerce in 1862-66 echoed the belief that 
the economic well-being of Prussia overrode political doctrine.174 
At the height of the political crisis in July 1863, with the new press re­
strictions in effect and the breach between Bismarck and the chamber ever 
wider, Cologne's liberals and democrats feted Rhenish deputies in public dem­
onstrations of "passive resistance" that included a banquet, a Rhine cruise, 
and entertainment criticized as "saturnalia of the German bourgeoisie."175 Yet 
"none" of the city's business notables "was to be seen, which very much as­
tonished the visiting guests."176 In September of the same year F. Diergardt ac­
knowledged the de facto dissolution of the old-liberal faction, to which many 
businessmen belonged. "There is no longer an organized old-liberal party. Of 
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communal action and personal sacrifice there is not a word. This is unfortu­
nate but not to be changed."177 
The low profile of the business class in the legislature affected the terms 
of debate during the constitutional conflict, which for businessmen became 
overly theoretical and impractical, remote from reality. Friedrich Hammacher, 
who joined the Progressives in 1863, lamented this development. In 1865 he 
wrote, "I won't complain any more that a large part of the country's business­
men remain apathetic and have abandoned the [political] terrain to doctrinaire 
democracy."178 Hermann von Beckerath, who attempted reconciliations with 
the crown in 1862 and 1863, retired from the party in 1863, frustrated with the 
party's course of action. Heinrich von Sybel, the historian who represented 
the commercial center of Crefeld, also remarked that "most of the Progres­
sive Party's activity is averse to practicality and reality."179 
The rapprochement between Otto von Bismarck and Hans Viktor von 
Unruh in 1865 also revealed one businessman's search for a way out of the 
fruitless stalemate. Although Unruh was a founding member of the Progres­
sive Party, his experience as a railroad entrepreneur (Magdeburg-Leipzig 
Railway) embodied the practical, nationalist sentiments of many businessmen 
who had prospered during the economic boom of the 1850s but still criticized 
Prussia's excessive bureaucratic supervision. In 1865 Unruh tried to persuade 
Bismarck that he, with greater restraint, could have received budgetary ap­
proval from the Chamber and that liberals were prepared to work with his 
government.180 A year later, Unruh led the moderate faction of the Progres­
sives to form the National Liberal Party and to work with Bismarck by con­
solidating the economic foundations of the Reich. The old-liberal party, which 
atrophied in 1862-66 because of its hesitancy to abandon its position of loyal 
opposition, saw many of its precepts about law, commerce, and civil society 
resurface in the program of the National Liberals. 
Salus publica suprema lex was the motto Mevissen quoted in July 1866 to 
frame his written arguments for ending the constitutional conflict, repairing 
the division between crown and legislature, and building the North German 
Confederation into a vital political and economic entity.181 Mevissen's political 
credo, that the public welfare is the supreme law, can be seen as a palimpsest 
that reveals deeper traces of political ambivalence and economic opportun­
ism. Progressives unconnected with commerce and industry were quick to 
infer baser motives. As a chamber deputy in 1866, Rudolf Gneist inveighed 
against the forces of materialism that had ostensibly divided the opposition. 
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"We know that acquisition rules the world," he stated, and " t h a t . .  . a sepa­
rate governing system has arisen, which on ethically foul-smelling ground 
has shrewdly combined all the factors to control people through the salability, 
characterlessness, and the shortsightedness of interests."182 In 1866 Hermann 
Baumgarten sarcastically posed the question: "How could these millionaires 
inconvenience themselves with the predicaments of a nation that did not 
want to advance loans, approve lucrative charters, and generally live in dis­
advantageous conditions?"183 The bitter anger of Gneist and Baumgarten was 
grounded in their belief that the business class had been lured away from 
the liberal parliamentary opposition by the commercial policies of the Prus­
sian state during the constitutional conflict, which split the forces of Prussian 
Burgertum and allowed conservatives to divide and conquer. Many historians 
have since adopted this position. 
Yet it would be wrong to assign the conflict ministry's economic and 
foreign policies in 1862-66 as primary factors for the economic-political be­
havior of the business class during the years of German unification. Although 
1866 is the decisive year of political conversion of the liberal opposition, it 
is apparent that Mevissen, Hansemann, Camphausen, Bleichroder, and others 
of the business class worked with the budgetless government throughout the 
conflict years. The support the business class lent to Bismarck after 1866 is 
partially explained by the military victories in 1864 and 1866, but Bismarck's 
dramatic steps in foreign policy do not explain the prevalent disposition of 
businessmen to work with the government before 1864. 
Before the parliamentary contest of 1862-66, the Prussian government of 
the New Era demonstrated its flexibility in bending to the needs of industrial 
capitalism. For businessmen the economic reforms of the New Era largely 
obviated the need to remake the Prussian state, thus partially decoupling bour­
geois capitalism from political liberalism. In the New Era we see how mod­
erate liberalism's emphasis on economic and juridical reforms in civil society 
became more estranged from the political-constitutional vision of liberalism. 
Although the sociopolitical formation of the business class is a fluid process 
stretching back to the eighteenth century, the New Era was a moment in this 
development at which political affinities between capitalists and liberals were 
not strengthened but weakened. The conflict and cooperation of the 1850s left 
a decidedly mixed legacy, but, significantly, a juste milieu emerged for com­
mercial and industrial capitalism during the New Era. Its economic settle­
ments reconfigured the terms of dialogue, reconfirming the belief of the busi­
ness class that the Prussian state and crown, while primarily the instrument of 
agrarian interests in the east, was nevertheless capable of acting as an honest 
broker in balancing the needs of the new and old elites. Before the constitu­
tional conflict and Bismarck's "revolution from above," the New Era govern­
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ment had demonstrated to the emerging elite of industry and commerce that 
the Prussian state still remained flexible in bending to the needs of industrial 
capitalism. The crucial transition of the monied bourgeoisie from old liberals 
to National Liberals occurred less with the military victories of 1864-66 than 
with economic reforms of 1858-62. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusion 
In 1864 Otto Michaelis, an editor of the National-Zeitung, labeled the Prus­sian state a "lazy serf" of railroad entrepreneurs.1 Michaelis, to be sure, 
knew hyperbole when he wrote it: between 1848 and 1864 the business class 
never wielded political dominance over the state. As a political economist, 
however, he sought to point up the favorable conditions for building railroads 
in Prussia: a government that had shelved plans for railway nationalization; a 
trade minister who since 1862 had practiced laissez-faire policies; and a state 
that used the ample share-capital of the railroad industry to promote Berlin as 
Germany's leading financial center. The mixed system had successfully nur­
tured the railroad industry; its further development and greater profits were 
now left to businessmen. 
Historians have focused on this kind of success to reduce the story of 
business-government relations to the convenient formula of an alliance, which 
neatly explains the mid-century amalgam of finance capitalism, laissez-faire, 
and authoritarian government. The evidence adduced in this study, however, 
suggests that the idea of an alliance serves more as an assumption to fit larger 
interpretations of German history than as a description of actual relationships 
in the political economy of mid-century Prussia. 
The idea of an alliance rests on the premise of revolution from above, 
an overarching view of German history that emphasizes the ability of Prus­
sian conservative elites to introduce just enough reform to stave off revolution 
from below. The importance of the revolution from above in early modern 
and modern German history is undeniable; it remains the most secure con­
ceptual handrail to guide students through German history. And yet this in­
terpretation only half explains the formative era of German industrialization. 
Certainly the Prussian state's constitution by decree in 1848 was a revolu­
tion from above. It sapped bourgeois revolutionary vigor and refashioned the 
principle of a mixed-powers government toward conservative ends. But this 
does not explain how the preindustrial Prussian state harnessed the accelerat­
ing force of the new capitalist economy, a central element of its Staatsraison. 
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It does not provide a sufficient explanation of how the bourgeois class that led 
the industrial revolution established its relationship with the Prussian govern­
ment after 1848. 
The problem is not the term "alliance" but what is meant by it. The as­
sumption that businessmen capitulated to the wishes of conservative elites 
and swapped political docility for economic concessions distorts both the ac­
tions and the sociopolitical outlook of this social group. This oversimplified 
interpretation fails to convey the complex process by which commercial and 
industrial elites joined forces with the Prussian establishment. More accu­
rately, the amalgamation of new and old elites in postrevolutionary Prussia 
constituted an unresolved settlement, a process of accommodation in which 
opposing interests produced compromises for both sides. To render accurately 
the political resettlement after 1848, we must recognize entrepreneurial elites 
as agents of their own interests. Proponents of the structural continuity thesis 
must modify their conception of the social forces that produced modern Ger-
many's economic foundations. 
Conflicts arose between railroad entrepreneurs and government officials. 
This was hardly surprising. Eager to promote private enterprise and greater 
financial independence in the 1850s, businessmen were bound to oppose the 
policies of a state apparatus accustomed to directing the economy for its own 
purposes. Businessmen registered their resistance to government policy early 
on, with their refusal to run night trains. The standoff from 1849 to 1853 be­
tween Heydt, who made no secret of wanting to own and administrate all 
railways in Prussia, and numerous railroad companies characterized the de­
fensive posture of railroad directors toward the trade ministry for the rest of 
the decade. The litigation over night trains rendered a serviceable image for 
government-business relations in the 1850s: businessmen opposed to govern­
ment actions using the state to seek a just, legal settlement. 
The strained relations with government are further confirmed by the sup­
pressed royal decree of 1856. Government officials perceived the creation of 
commandite and joint-stock banks as a powerful instrument of a monied bour­
geoisie, whose financial clout posed a threat to the political and economic 
status of the Prussian establishment. The suppressed decree of 1856 marks two 
important features: the antagonism of the Prussian cabinet toward the busi­
ness class in the mid-1850s, and the decline of the power of the state to direct 
and control the economy. The episode revealed that, when prevented from 
making money, Prussian businessmen did not abide by government wishes. 
And by undermining and circumventing state policy, Prussian businessmen 
set their own terms. 
The behavior of railroad entrepreneurs in this period reveals a business 
class capable of both opposition and cooperation with the Prussian state. 
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When government interests coincided with theirs, businessmen worked with 
the state. They welcomed state backing in 1842, state intervention during 
railroad bankruptcies in 1848, and state construction when private investors 
showed no interest in building the Eastern Railway. This pattern continued 
through the 1850s. The Rhenish and Cologne-Minden railways, for example, 
shrewdly negotiated state subsidies and long-term loans to build the Cologne-
Deutz bridge, completed in 1858. Prussian businessmen expected and received 
state support. They tapped state resources when they could and exploited the 
state's long history of funding private projects of public interest. 
Yet entrepreneurs equally demonstrated defiance when material interests 
were at stake. Although dependent on the trade ministry for loans, charters, 
and authorizations for stock issue, dividend rates, and timetables, railroad di­
rectors refused to comply with orders deemed unfair or injurious to business. 
In addition to opposing night trains and banking policy, railroad businessmen 
also protested the terms of the 1853 Railroad Tax, the publication of monthly 
profits, the state order to build a second reserve fund, the government's re­
fusal to charter new railway companies, and the discharging of employees in­
volved with the Revolution of 1848. Directors incurred thousands of thalers in 
fines while challenging the encroachments of government. The protocols of 
the Rhenish Railway (one of the few company papers extant) reveal a decade-
long adversarial relationship with the trade ministry. The interests and aims of 
government officials and railroad entrepreneurs were usually in conflict, not 
in concert. 
It is hardly accurate, then, to speak of a symbiotic alliance, when elites 
of business and finance were compelled throughout the 1850s to fend off an 
acquisitive government interested in absorbing the most profitable financial 
sector in Germany. Heydt not only supervised with a heavy hand but also 
took over financially strapped companies against their will. (Having taken 
over seven railway companies within seven years—amounting to tens of mil­
lions of thalers of lost share-capital—Heydt might well deserve the epithet of 
thefirst "corporate raider.") That the business class was able to ward off total 
state absorption speaks of its political ability to use bureaucratic channels, the 
new parliament, and the press to defend its turf. 
At issue in the struggle between state and private ownership was the 
need of the business class to develop means to press its claims. Individu­
ally each company defended itself through bureaucratic channels, chambers 
of commerce, and courts of law. On a corporate level, the creation of five 
railroad Verbdnde in the 1850s protected private railroads against state domi­
nance; Heydt's hostility toward these associations confirmed their purpose. 
And on the parliamentary level, various factions—among them free traders— 
challenged Heydt's use of public funds for state railroad construction. The in­
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creasingly vigilant position among liberal deputies (such railroad investors as 
Robert von Patow, Karl Milde, Friedrich Harkort, and Ludwig Kiihne) trans­
formed the issue of the Railroad Fund into a battle of principle over the legis-
lature's budgetary powers. Heydt's illegal bookkeeping and his penchant for 
constructing state railways on borrowed money exacerbated his relationship 
with the legislature, which passed the cabinet's bill to dissolve the Railroad 
Fund. The Chamber of Deputies and House of Lords secured the profits of 
Prussia's leading sector for private enterprise. 
In short, the continued existence of Prussia's private railroad industry was 
not a concession. The economic-political activity of the business class was not 
passive or a retreat from politics. Rather, the various dialogues and protracted 
exchanges that defended and secured private railroad ownership unfolded 
as a struggle. Railroad entrepreneurs exerted pressure on the government to 
win particular business-related gains and scored important successes. They 
showed no hesitation in articulating their material interests, a form of politics 
that should not be dismissed as secondary to parliamentary activity. Estab­
lishing the right to make money is a political process. As Thomas Nipperdey 
noted: "Economic interests, economic growth, and economic crises became 
rudimentary political-social facts. The politics of the economy became a cen­
tral part of politics."2 Entrepreneurial assertiveness contributed to Prussia's 
new economic policies in the 1860s, a political shift that had far-reaching con­
sequences for both domestic and foreign politics. The National Liberal party, 
for example, derives its political origins as much from the modus operandi of 
the business class in the 1850s as from military victory in 1866. 
The assimilation of the entrepreneurial elite should thus be seen as a dual 
process of two mutually reinforcing factors: a forceful business class that ap­
plied pressure on the state to abandon its tradition of paternalism; and the 
subsequent government response, which reformulated economic policy and 
gradually retreated from the marketplace over the course of the 1850s. To 
understand this process, both elements need to be weighted equally. Respond­
ing to business interests, the Prussian state acquiesced in key economic ques­
tions. It reformulated its economic policy to give the business class greater 
space to pursue private enterprise. And the business class, by achieving dis­
crete economic reforms through protest, negotiation, and compromise, ulti­
mately lent support to the Prussian state, enabling it to survive in the era of 
industrial capitalism. 
The eventual nationalization of Prussian railroads in 1878/79 merits at­
tention, especially in regard to how it affects this study's argument on 
government-business relations. By 1865 private railways dominated the Prus­
sian network; their 3,672.75 kilometers outweighed the 1,701.95 kilometers 
of railway owned and operated by the state.3 After the reorganization of Ger­
Conclusion • 169 
many in 1866, the balance tipped once more in favor of the state, for the Prus­
sian state absorbed the Hessian and Hanoverian state railways. This addition 
of approximately 1,200 kilometers to the state-owned network gave Bismarck 
the impetus to propose the nationalization of all railways in 1866-67. 
Examining railroad companies in the years 1866-78 reaffirms the asser­
tiveness of business elites in shaping the railroad industry to their needs and 
not necessarily to those of the state(s). The railroad industry rebuffed plans 
for nationalization as long as railways wished to remain private, that is, as 
long as they persisted as a lucrative sector for capital investment. With the 
help of particularist interests of southern states, profitable private railroads 
were able to fend off the growing cries for state ownership and a simpler tar­
iff system in 1866-67.4 An Imperial Railway Office was established in 1873 to 
streamline the tariff system for private railways but remained ineffective be­
cause of what Bismarck called "the railway powers," finance capitalists who 
refused to accept the interventionist presumptions of a new imperial agency 
demanding lower and simpler freight rates.5 In 1876 Bismarck sought again to 
nationalize the empire's railways and was defeated on two counts: first, by the 
middle German states and private railroad interests; and second, by his own 
ministers Otto Camphausen and Heinrich von Aachenbach, who in the space 
of two years could not agree on a smaller bill that would focus exclusively on 
Prussia. He accused them of passive resistance to his policies because of their 
close connection to entrepreneurial circles, which was largely true.6 
Bismarck and Albert Maybach, the chief of the newly created ministry of 
railroad affairs, did however succeed in nationalizing railroads with a law in 
December 1879. Nationalization was part of the broad-scale tax reform that 
"refounded the Reich" in 1878/79, jettisoning free trade to revive the inter­
ventionist state. Tariff protectionism and a nationalized rail system promoted 
the interests of both heavy industry and agriculture and appeared to blud­
geon railway capitalism—financiers and capitalists were apparently denied 
the right to profit from administrating railways and trading their shares on 
the bourse. But, although other commercial circles did complain vociferously 
about the sweeping changes of 1878/79, the view from the railroad industry 
suggests that the law was mostly welcomed. Hans Viktor von Unruh and Ruhr 
industrialists opposed the plan, but most railroad entrepreneurs saw it as a fair 
settlement. Since 1873 railroad stocks had experienced a downward trend, and 
the late 1870s were particularly hard.7 Whereas the average interest rate on 
German railroad stock stood at 7.3 percent in 1871, it slid to 4.7 in 1874 and 
4.4 in 1879. Such returns were not much better than state paper.8 Railroads 
yielded to other economic sectors as stock market leaders (electrical engi­
neering, chemicals, and machine building), compelling railroad directors to 
accept generous state compensation for shares that might never rise to previ­
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ous levels.9 Thus, unlike earlier attempts in the 1850s and 1860s, a consensus 
for state ownership existed—most railroads surrendered willingly, seeing it 
as an opportune time to bail out. Making the best of a persistent commercial 
slump (and disappointing freight volume), railroad capitalists also benefitted 
from the swing to state interventionism.10 Hence the railroad industry, as a sec­
tor involved in shipping and international commerce, does not conform neatly 
to the interpretation that Bismarck, by splitting commercial and heavy indus­
trial interests, could ally iron with rye. The railroad industry was brought into 
the purview of the interventionist state with the blessings of the major private 
lines. In this respect, we do not see a great "second founding" in government-
business affairs but, rather, a longer continuity of business sectors using the 
state for their needs. The eventual nationalization of railways was as much a 
triumph for smart capital as it was for state power. 
Overall, then, the revolution-from-above model to explain the politi­
cal economy of the first industrial revolution clearly has grave limitations. 
Through the window of the railroad industry, one can mark the growing con­
nections between the state and the business world and the latter's ability to 
influence policy. Businessmen penetrated ministerial policy-making before 
1848, contested state economic policy in the 1850-58 period, and successfully 
agitated for favorable economic and legal settlements after 1858. Business 
elites never abandoned their privileged status of direct access to ministries 
(manifesting the impact of the bureaucratic state on business political culture) 
yet also used the growing public sphere of the press, lobbies, parliament, and 
chambers of commerce to press for their needs. After 1858 the government 
responded to the agitation of railroad companies, lobbies, stock market inves­
tors, and the press for business reforms with key economic legislation. The 
willingness of the trade ministry to prepare bills that pleased the business 
world marks the many ties, formal and informal, between the bourgeois busi­
nessmen and the Prussian state. In fact, business politics after 1840 confounds 
German historians' general dichotomy of state vs. society and the more spe­
cific binary paradigm of bureaucratic-noble state vs. bourgeois civil society. 
The embourgeoisment of the Prussian establishment is pervasive in sectors 
pertaining to political economy. In sum, characterizing the state's ability to 
control the political and economic dimensions of industrialization as a "revo­
lution from above" is empirically inaccurate and conceptually skewed. More 
satisfactory is viewing postrevolutionary state building as a mutual accom­
modation of capital and political authority: an evolving settlement negotiated 
to the full satisfaction of no one party. 
In viewing the economic-political goals of railroad entrepreneurs during 
period 1830-70, we see significant limitations. Businessmen's chief concerns 
were attaining particular, business-related needs; even economic principles 
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were dispensable. They ostensibly defended the inviolate rights of free trade, 
the joint-stock principle, the right to association, and the superiority of pri­
vate over state enterprises. But the driving element behind these principles 
was the practical necessity of making money. When their material interests so 
dictated, businessmen abandoned such time-honored doctrines as free trade 
and private railways, as they did in 1878/79. The abandonment of economic 
liberalism in 1878/79 was consistent, however, with the political tactics of the 
business class since 1830, regularly vacillating between state intervention and 
free trade as an expedient to profit. 
The sole principle consistently upheld by businessmen throughout this era 
was perhaps the belief in law, especially as it affected property relations. Be­
fore 1848 the antipathy for arbitrary government among liberal businessmen 
fueled their espousal for a state ruled by constitutional law (Rechtsstaat). But 
their proposals for a constitutional settlement (before and after 1848) revealed 
what kind of lawful state they envisioned. It was not such inalienable rights 
as liberty or universal suffrage (which most businessmen firmly rejected) that 
made the business class press for a constitution. Rather, they sought laws that 
distributed taxes equitably, secured property rights, and promoted commer­
cial progress. Rhenish burghers, as we have already seen, devised the three 
class system of voting in 1845, an electoral procedure that underscored the 
primacy of wealth and property over equality. The economic brokering that 
reached new heights in the Reichstag in the 1880s and 1890s was not a "devia­
tion" from German parliamentary tradition. On the contrary, it was the logical 
outcome of Rhenish-Prussian political practices articulated since French rule 
on the Rhine.11 
Because the business class never challenged the political rule of Prussia's 
conservative elite, it receives poor marks from historians, who assume mod­
ern capitalists should prefer democracy to authoritarian forms of government. 
This assumption, while perhaps noble, is not historically grounded. Although 
the entrepreneurial class was the engine of a new economic order, it is anach­
ronistic to assume that industrial capitalists were irremediably estranged from 
the aristocracy and state apparatus of the old political order. We should place 
the actions and attitudes of businessmen within the context of early industrial­
ization, a time when businessmen tried to accommodate new economic forces 
to old social structures. Prussia's entrepreneurial elite, too, was acculturated 
in the estate mentality of status and occupation. As men of property and intel­
lect, the Handelsstand aspired to rise above local government and strove to 
integrate into the ruling elite, not to supplant it. Most important, between 
1830 and 1870 the Prussian business class never intended to raze the state, but 
rather to modify it to better serve the interests of commerce and industry. 
This accommodating, reformist attitude of the business class derives 
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partly from its relations to the state in the late eighteenth and early nine­
teenth centuries. Prussia's bureaucratic machinery preceded the emergence 
of an entrepreneurial class, which partially owed its early successes between 
1770 and 1820 to government reforms. Businessmen first practiced capitalism 
under state paternalism and benefitted from loans, subsidies, customs unions, 
and market-oriented law. In spite of manifest disadvantages, businessmen rec­
ognized Prussia's economic achievements and consequently admonished the 
monarchy after 1830 to reform politically or be overthrown. In the pre-March 
era (1830-48) they advocated modifying bureaucratic absolutism with consti­
tutional checks, a political system that would reform but not undo the army, 
aristocracy, or even the bureaucracy. Before 1848 businessmen commonly dis­
paraged the Prussian government for its arbitrary actions, unwarranted pater­
nalism, and its slow execution of policy. Nonetheless the business class en­
visioned political and economic reform within the structure of the Prussian 
state, which it largely perceived as a guarantor of commercial prosperity. It is 
not surprising—nor a bourgeois "surrender" —that in 1848 such businessmen 
as Camphausen, Hansemann, and Heydt accepted ministerial positions and 
worked with the king and his bureaucracy to arbitrate between new and old. 
Radical democratic upheaval was never an element in their political outlook. 
In the 1850s the business class continued on a similar course. It pursued 
specific material gains and, in so doing, sought to reform state economic 
policy. (That many idealist participants in the 1848 revolutions subsequently 
converted to the Realpolitik of the 1850s should not prevent us from recog­
nizing the political continuity of the business class.) After 1849 businessmen 
worked with the government but criticized it, too, much as they had be­
fore 1848. The lesson of the 1850s, however, was perhaps more significant. 
Through both conflict and cooperation the business class tested the capacity 
of the Prussian state to bend to the needs of modern capitalism. With banks, 
railroads, and coal mines, the Prussian state relented to protests and reformu­
lated its economic policy to accommodate the demands of its business class. 
Sometimes voluntarily (as with coal mines), sometimes grudgingly (as with 
commandite banks and railroads), the state relinquished certain controls over 
the economy, acceding greater autonomy to private enterprise. In a slow and 
unspectacular way the dialogue that the business class had developed with the 
Prussian state since the 1830s produced profitable results by the late 1850s. 
It is striking that Prussia's business class remained content to negotiate 
with the state for particular gains; wealthy capitalists sought neither direct 
political power nor resolutely pursued constitutional issues. The trade minis-
ter's unchecked authority, for example, was commonly criticized by business 
circles. But railroad businessmen readily accepted Heydt's dictatorial powers 
when it meant the swift execution of favorable decisions (a dividend guaran­
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tee, a charter, credit). For short-term gains businessmen tolerated ministerial 
authority whose potential for abuse they knew first hand. Direct negotia­
tion with ministries also undermined the power of parliament. Ministers like 
Heydt often presented retroactively the financial transactions between railroad 
companies and the government to the parliament, making the chamber's task 
of enforcing its budgetary powers more difficult. In brief, businessmen alter­
nated between direct negotiation with the bureaucracy and indirect arbitration 
through the parliament, press, and courts to attain their desired settlement. 
This blend of strategies reveals a greater interest in expediency than in adher­
ence to legal spheres of political rule and administration. The fluid, ill-defined 
spheres of power in the business world of mid-century Prussia suggest much 
about the commitment of business elites to constitutions and their ambivalent 
attitude toward the state. 
Business cycles played an important role in the dialogue between busi­
nessmen and state officials. It would be an exaggeration to link directly the be­
havior of businessmen to cycles of economic growth, but a rough correlation 
is present. The constitutional movement of 1830-47, and its accompanying 
criticism of state paternalism, occurred during an overall period of economic 
expansion. The decline in production between 1846 and 1849 and the threat 
to property in 1848 encouraged greater reliance on both state credit and state 
authority. 
Similarly, the boom cycle of 1850/51-57 produced a critical, indepen­
dent spirit among business elites. The willingness of railroad entrepreneurs 
to undermine state banking policy and to contest numerous ministerial re­
scripts spoke of assertive opposition. But the depression of 1857-59 returned 
government-business relations to their old course. The first financial crisis 
in world capitalism reasserted the business class's reliance on the state, for 
it narrowed the options for large-scale capitalism. With money and confi­
dence scarce, railroad entrepreneurs looked to the state for regulatory laws 
(increased money supply, suspension of usury ordinances), direct assistance 
(loans, dividend guarantees), and safe investment (state paper, loans to gov­
ernment). With promotional commercial banking made riskier after 1857, 
Germany's new investment banks turned to state loans as a cautious but profit­
able undertaking. Once reviled as "agents of the French" by the government 
in 1853-56, such railroad financiers as Gustav Mevissen, Abraham Oppen­
heim, and David Hansemann became the chief figures of the Prussian Consor­
tium, the collection of bankers that intermittently financed war loans during 
the era of unification, 1859-71. 
In retrospect the contingency of the 1857 crisis and the accompany­
ing shift in government-business relations was a critical juncture in German 
history. It decisively influenced relations between high finance and politi­
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cal power. By reestablishing the Prussian state as an economic necessity, it 
shaped the contours upon which the economic foundation of the future Ger­
man empire was laid. How this change exactly affected the business class 
during the Prussian constitutional conflict of 1862-66, which occurred dur­
ing a pronounced upward swing in economic growth, is difficult to measure. 
It is, however, hard to dispute the overall effect of the long business cycle of 
1850/51-1873, which benefited both the business class and the Junker land­
holding class (whose grain sales rose on the free market). That the economic 
interests of these two classes coincided with each other during a crucial 
period of state building—especially during the constitutional crisis—remains 
an essential structural peculiarity of modern German history. We could speak, 
then, of a conjunctural Sonderweg, but only in qualified terms.12 To refer to 
business cycles without reference to the larger context of Prussian political 
culture would be a facile, unconvincing approach to the problem. 
The effect of the 1857 crisis was consolidated, furthermore, by the 
political-economic gains of businessmen in the New Era. Their interests were 
weighed by both the cabinet, which researched and initiated important eco­
nomic reforms, and the legislature, which cooperated with ministers and 
passed their bills. Between 1859 and 1862 strong signals of a juste milieu be­
tween old and new elites appeared. In 1859, at the tail end of the depression, 
the government plan to buy out all railways was abandoned. In 1861, the Land-
tag passed a property tax for the landed estates in the eastern provinces, and 
the government lifted in the same year the final restrictions of the direction 
principle in coal mining. In 1862 Prussia signed a free trade treaty with France 
and completed the Commercial Code (begun in 1857), which earned the ap­
plause of businessmen. 
These changes suggested the willingness of the Prussian establishment to 
compromise on long-standing grievances (like the disproportionate tax bur­
den borne by the western provinces) and grant legal and practical reforms that 
allowed businessmen to expand their markets and industrial base. These gains 
showed the ability of Prussia's New Era cabinet and legislature to arbitrate be­
tween business and landed classes, state and private interests. Similarly, such 
incidents as the suppressed decree of 1856 showed the relative worth of the 
constitution as a check to royal arbitrary actions. 
The developments from 1858 to 1862 supported the contemporary popu­
lar belief that material progress would inevitably bring political advances. 
The appointment of Heinrich von Itzenplitz as trade minister in 1862 capped 
a series of events that seemed to anchor bourgeois interests in the center of 
Prussian politics. By the time the constitutional conflict began to escalate to 
crisis proportions in 1862, business elites had seen that pressure on the gov­
ernment brought results—a favorable economic policy. Business elites had 
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learned over the course of the 1850s that industrial capitalism could flourish 
within the constraints of the Prussian conservative state. 
The case-by-case process through which business and government elites 
established terms to accommodate capital and conservative political authority 
played, then, an indisputably important role in the consolidation of Prussian 
state power after 1848, and it became an essential precondition to unification. 
If historians are to understand the structural continuities in German history, 
we must begin to recognize the role played by businessmen in establishing the 
conditions for that continuity in the postrevolutionary state building period. 
Placing the political aims and actions of Prussian entrepreneurs in proper 
context in the period 1830-70 supplements our explanation of how industrial 
capitalism and authoritarian government uneasily accommodated one another 
in mid-century Germany. 
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Note on Archives and Translation 
The research for this study was undertaken between 1988 and 1993, years which wit­
nessed not only the unification of West and East Germany but also the relocation and 
renaming of state archives. In 1993 the lion's share of the Prussian state archive was 
moved from the East German archive, Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Dienstelle Merseburg, 
to its site before the Second World War, the Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Dahlem-Berlin. 
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the Staatsarchiv Potsdam, located in the orangerie at Sanssouci, reverted to its old 
name, the Brandenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv. In the above abbreviations I note all 
current and earlier names of archives. I have, however, decided to continue to cite 
those repositories used in the former Deutsches Zentralarchiv at Merseburg as a sepa­
rate section of Berlin's Geheimes Staatsarchiv: GStA Merseburg. This usage enables 
the reader to discern with greater accuracy where the information was found. More­
over, at my last visit to the Geheimes Staatsarchiv in Berlin (July 1996), I found that 
the Merseburg repositories are still stored separately from the Berlin repositories and, 
more importantly, the archive still uses the old classification system. And because it is 
unlikely that the system will change, the interested reader should still be able to find 
individual documents with the citations used in the notes. 
I have translated the offices of Regierungsprdsident as district governor and Ober­
prdsident as provincial governor. I have mostly used the awkward term deputy prefect 
for Landrat, although the German term is used too. The bicameral legislature of Prus­
sia is referred to as a parliament; the Haus der Abgeordneten is designated the lower 
house or chamber and the Herrenhaus, the upper house or chamber. The elected rep­
resentatives are called deputies. 
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Chapter Six 
1. Ministers Heydt and Patow to prince-regent, 23 Dec. 1860, GStA Merseburg, 
Rep. 2.2.1., nr. 29519, pp. 205-6; VBMHGA 1864-66, pp. 42-43. Historians have sub­
sequently assigned causal significance to Prussia's role in railroad construction in the 
rapid industrialization of Germany after the 1840s. The literature on the role of the 
state in the first industrial revolution is large, but for direct references to Prussia's state 
railroads see Alexander Bergengriin, Staatsminister Freiherr von der Heydt (Leipzig, 
1908), chap. 7; Henderson, Industrial Revolution, chaps. 8 and 9; Knut Borchardt, 
Wachstum, Krisen, Handlungspielrdume der Wirtschaftspolitik (Gottingen, 1982), p. 26; 
Wolfram Fischer, "Verhaltnis von Staat," pp. 60 ff. More recently, Rainer Fremdling 
has refuted the thesis that the state was instrumental for the development of early 
railways (and industrialization): Eisenbahnen. Many of Fremdling's quantitative find­
ings are supported by the archival sources on the Railroad Fund. The Eastern Railway 
notwithstanding, almost every state railroad project was started or could have been 
started by private interests. By 1849, when the Prussian state began its state programs, 
the railroad industry had long been established (twenty-six railroad companies existed 
in Prussia), thus weakening the assertion that state building was the motor of rail­
road development (Borchardt, Fischer, Henderson). Fremdling's hypothesis that rail­
road construction would have proceeded at a similar rate without state involvement 
has sound counterfactual qualities. See also Wehler, Gesellschaftsgeschichte, 2:621-
22, who writes, "The profitability of rail construction showed itself to be so high that 
state help, argued hypothetically, would presumably 'not have been at all necessary.'" 
Alfred D. Chandler deemed state involvement to be so minimal that it did not merit 
mention in his discussion of German railroads: Scale and Scope, pp. 411-19. These 
judgments support the accuracy of Werner Sombart's much earlier statement, in 1903, 
that railroads "were a work of capitalism. . . . The states were visibly reserved." 
Sombart, Deutsche Volkwirtschaft im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert (Berlin, 1903), p. 281. 
Nonetheless, it seems unhistorical to underestimate the importance of state involve­
ment in the 1840s and in the boom of the 1850s. It is, to my mind, equally unhistorical 
to underestimate the attitude of business circles that sought supplemental aid from 
the state. It is a weakness of economic history not to factor in the cultural mentality 
of German businessmen, who assumed that the state should aid large-scale business 
enterprise. 
2. Pflanze, Bismarck, 1:109. The Stein-Hardenberg reforms opened up space 
for greater economic activity, but this does not discount the fact that other politi­
cal reforms, constrained by the conservative restoration after 1820, fell far short of 
their goals. See Koselleck, Zwischen Reform und Revolution, 2d ed. (Stuttgart, 1975\ 
chap. 3. 
3. Although welcoming the state's enthusiasm for the new capitalistic economy. 
Prussian businessmen nonetheless grew restless under the lingering state paternalism 
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and did not hesitate to criticize it. See Richard Tilly, Financial Institutions, chaps. 4 
and 5; and Radtke, Seehandlung, chaps. 2 and 3. 
4. See chap. 3 for parliamentary citations; see also NZ 3:357,14 Oct. 1849, for 
noting the houses' enthusiasm for state ownership. 
5. See the editorial that quotes the Ostsee-Zeitung at length in NZ 3:400 (8 Nov. 
1849). 
6. NZ 3:404 (10 Nov. 1849) quoting the 8 Nov. 1849 editorial of the Kolnische-
Zeitung. 
7. See L. M. Niebuhr's "Denkschrift betr. Contrahirung einer grossen Anleihe: 
Fundirung einer grossen Anleihe durch die bisherigen Eisenbahn-Fonds," 26 Nov. 
1852, GStA Merseburg, Rep. 92, Nachlass v.d. Heydt, nr. 8, pp. 35-43, esp. pp. 38-40. 
8. NZ 4:75 (15 Feb. 1850). 
9. NZ 4:99 (1 Mar. 1850); see also 3:95 (27 Feb. 1850) for a general criticism 
of the rising state debt that reached 156,019,872 thalers in 1850; for a cursory over­
view of the German understanding of public finance from 1800 to 1870, see Klein, 
Geschichte der qffentlichen Finanzen, pp. 125-34. 
10. VZ criticized dividend subsidies for the Aachen-Du sseldorfer Railway, claim­
ing it was unfair for the stockholders of other railroads in the Rhineland. Nr. 274 
(23 Nov. 1849), nr. 276 (25 Nov. 1849), nr. 285 (6 Dec. 1849), and nr. 291 (13 Dec. 
1849). 
11. For criticism of the dividend guarantees and the adverse effect they had on 
the Rhenish Railway, see the VZ, 8 and 13 Jan. 1850; see also the stenographic report 
of the 116th Session of the upper house, reprinted in VZ, 13 Feb. 1850. 
12. Heydt to king, 7 July 1852, GStA Merseburg, Rep. 93E, nr. 146, p. 9; 
VBMHGA 1855-57, p. 35. In total, the Fund contributed thirteen million thalers to the 
construction of these lines. 
13. The evidence of this proposed loan to fund state construction would amend 
the view of W. O. Henderson, who maintained that Heydt dropped any ambition for 
rapid state ownership after 1849. See Industrial Revolution, p. 172. 
14. Memorandum of Heydt to Bodelschwingh, 16 June 1852, GStA Merseburg, 
Rep. 77, tit. 258, nr. 1, vol. 3, pp. 148-49. The Fund's running account accrued as fol­
lows: 
1843 500,000 1848 1,342,000 
1844 528,000 1849 1,663,900 
1845 629,000 1850 1,481,000 
1846 1,021,000 1851 1,471,000 
1847 1,205,200 1852 1,513,000 
Heydt calculated from this pattern that the Fund's account would rise 100,000 for the 
next three years. In 1857 the account reached the legal limit of two million thalers. 
VBMHGA 1855-57, p. 46. 
15. VBMHGA 1849-51, p. 22. 
16. Bodelschwingh to Heydt, 28 Sept. 1852, GStA Merseburg, Rep. 77. tit. 258, 
nr. 1, vol. 3, p. 162. The price tags on these projects were Sieg-Ruhr, 8,750,000; 
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Rheine-Osnabriick, 1,500,000; Munster-Rheine, 1,500,000; Saarbriicken-Trier-Lux-
emburg, 6,000,000; Cologne Rhine bridge, 1,400,000; Breslau-Posen, 7,000,000; 
Bromberg-Thorne, 1,700,000. This came to 27,850,000 thalers. 
17. Memorandum of Heydt to Bodelschwingh, 16 June 1852, GStA Merseburg, 
Rep. 77, tit. 258, nr. 1, vol. 3, p. 150. 
18. Memorandum of Heydt to Bodelschwingh, 16 Mar. 1852, GStA Merseburg, 
Rep. 77, tit. 258, nr. 1, vol. 3, pp. 150-51. Heydt often used the lame condition of pri­
vate investment in combination with foreign competition to drum up support. His tac­
tic of sketching a Prussia economically devastated if bypassed in international trade 
was especially effective in winning the support of the king. For this reason the king 
backed Heydt's proposal to build the Saarbrucken-Trier-Luxembourg line. This fear of 
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